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INTRODUCTION 
[U]nder our system of criminal justice even a thief is entitled to com-
plain that he has been unconstitutionally convicted and imprisoned as 
a burglar. 1 
[I]nformal . . . practices have been used to induce conviction by "con-
sent" in a significant number of cases in which the protections of the 
formal system would have precluded condemnation.2 
The critical questions, which have not yet been honestly faced by [ei-
ther the accusatorial or the inquisitorial] systems, are how cases that 
will receive less than the full process should be chosen, and what com-
bination of adversarial procedures and judicial initiative should consti-
tute that summary process.3 
Although our criminal justice system has many inquisitorial4 fea-
tures, it remains in theory an accusatorial process5 because of its con-
stitutional commitment to protect fundamental values, such as the 
presumption of innocence, proof beyond a reasonable doubt, lay ad-
judication, and the privilege against self-incrimination. These prin-
ciples, which I shall refer to as our system's "legal guilt"6 
I. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 323-24 (1979). 
2. Finkelstein, A Statistical Analysis of Guilty Plea Practices in the Federal Courts, 89 
HARV. L. REV. 293, 311 (1975). 
3. Goldstein & Marcus, The Myth of Judicial Supervision in Three Inquisitorial Systems: 
France, Italy and Germany, 87 YALE L.J. 240, 283 (1977). 
4. Inquisitorial systems view the criminal process as an official inquiry where state officials 
take primary responsibility for determining whether the defendant has committed a crime. 
[T]he dominant mode is state control of the case, usually through the judiciary, rather 
than party control. The judge, whether as investigating magistrate or at trial, regards 
himself as more than an umpire. He is expected to take the initiative in amassing evi-
dence and in assuring that the merits of guilt and penalty are correctly assessed. 
Goldstein, Reflections on Two Models: Inquisitorial Themes in American Criminal Procedure, 
26 STAN. L. REV. 1009, 1019 (1974). To ensure that the inquiry advances both substantive and 
procedural state policies, state officials direct the official investigation, determine the appropri-
ate charges, and conduct the course of a nonadversarial trial that offers a public recapitulation 
of the official investigation. All relevant sources of information may be used, including non-
coercive questioning of the accused during either the investigatory or trial stages. 
5. Our accusatorial system structures criminal proceedings not as an official inquiry but as 
a dispute between two parties, the state and the accused. However, accusatorial procedure 
encompasses not only an adversarial trial procedure but other fundamental norms taken from 
constitutional law that regulate the balance of advantage between the state and the accused 
throughout the criminal process. Thus, accusatorial norms like the privilege against self-in-
crimination reflect the system's requirement that the state bear the burden of developing evi-
dence of guilt through its independent efforts. The presumption of innocence lies "at the heart 
of an accusatorial system" because it requires the accuser to present compelling proof of the 
accused's guilt to an independent adjudicator. "Until certain procedures and proofs are satis-
fied, the accused is to be treated by the legal system as !fhe is innocent and need lend no aid to 
those who would convict him." Goldstein, supra note 4, at 1017 (emphasis in original). The 
parties control the course of both the investigation and trial. Unlike its inquisitorial counter-
part, the court plays a fairly passive role at the trial as an umpire who ensures that the parties 
abide by the technical evidentiary rules that are necessary to regulate an adversarial proceed-
ing before a lay adjudicator. 
6. See H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 166-67 (1968). Professor 
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requirements, are designed in part to ensure that the state will only 
apply its most coercive and stigmatizing sanction to those defendants 
who have in all probability committed a substantive offense, the fac-
tually guilty.7 However, most of these legal guilt requirements are 
equally concerned with the investigatory and adjudicatory processes 
by which these reliable final judgments are reached. Indeed, our sys-
tem's legal guilt requirements are most distinctive for their attempt 
to maintain a fair accusatorial process before conviction (a fair bal-
ance of advantage between the state and the accused) by safeguard-
ing the individual's rights during the investigatory process and by 
requiring a reliable and independent adjudication of guilt before ap-
plication of the criminal sanction. For example, the Supreme Court 
has repeatedly found coercive state interrogation practices to violate 
the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination (or the right to 
due process8) in cases where the resulting confession was trustwor-
thy.9 In explaining those decisions, the Court has emphasized that 
the privilege fosters "a fair state-individual balance"10 before convic-
tion by requiring the government to honor its accusatorial burden of 
Packer used the term legal guilt to refer to those procedural requirements which have nothing 
"to do with the factual question of whether the person did or did not engage in the conduct 
that is charged as the offense against him" which Packer defined as factual guilt. Id. at 166. 
I believe that Packer's distinction between factual and legal guilt is a useful analytical 
device but I define the terms quite differently. I equate factual guilt with the substantive crimi-
nal law's definition of criminal conduct. Therefore, an affirmative defense which justifies or 
excuses the defendant's conduct negates his factual guilt. I use the term "legal guilt require-
ments" to encompass all those procedural requirements that the state must satisfy in an accusa-
torial system of justice before it can apply the criminal sanction. While many of these legal 
guilt requirements have nothing to do with the question of factual guilt (e.g., venue, statute of 
limitations, double jeopardy), others, such as the trial's formal proof requirements, dictate the 
procedural norms by which factual guilt is reliably adjudicated. The term "legal guilt" refers 
to the final outcome of that procedural process. While I believe that the substantive-procedu-
ral distinction between factual and legal guilt is useful in distinguishing different screening 
standards, the reader should remember that factual guilt is an artificial construct that cannot 
be empirically verified. The question of whether the accused violated the substantive criminal 
law cannot ultimately be separated from the procedural mechanism used to adjudicate it. See 
text at notes 64-84 i,!fra. 
7. For example, the trial's proof-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt requirement protects the fac-
tually innocent by requiring that the state provide compelling proof of factual guilt to an 
independent adjudicator. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970). 
8. See Lisenba v. California, 314 U,S. 219, 236-37 (1941) ("The aim of the requirement of 
due process is not to exclude presumptively false evidence, but to prevent fundamental unfair-
ness in the use of evidence, whether true or false. Such unfairness exists when a coerced con-
fession is used as a means of obtaining a verdict of guilt."). See also Rogers v. Richmond, 365 
U.S. 534, 543-44 (1961). 
9. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 464 n.33 (1966): 
The decisions of this Court have guaranteed the same procedural protection for the de-
fendant whether his confession was used in a federal or state court. It is now axiomatic 
that the defendant's constitutional rights have been violated if his conviction is based, in 
whole or in part, on an involuntary confession, regardless of its truth or falsity. 
IO. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966). The Court emphasized that the privi-
lege against self-incrimination is "the essential mainstay of our adversary system," 384 U.S. at 
February 1980) Reforming the Federal Grand Jury 467 
developing reliable evidence of the defendant's guilt through its in-
dependent efforts. 
While the accusatorial values protected by the system's legal guilt 
460, because it vindicates essential accusatorial norms that apply directly to the investigatory 
process. 
Some co=entators have criticized Miranda's broad view of the interests protected by the 
fifth amendment privilege. See Grano, Voluntariness, Free Mil and the La.w of Co,ifessions, 65 
VA. L. RE.v. 859, 926-37 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Voluntariness]. Professor Grano argues 
that the Court's suggestion that the privilege against self-incrimination protects accusatorial 
norms like "a fair state-individual balance" is "neither valid nor helpful to analysis" of the 
investigatory stage, which Grano characterizes as essentially inquisitorial in function. ''To 
posit a system that is completely accusatorial is to beg the question and to do so inaccurately'' 
because "we have in fact a mixed system of criminal justice - one primarily accusatorial, 
especially at the judicial stages, but also partly inquisitorial." Id. at 934. For example, police 
interrogation is essentially inquisitorial because "police, with society's approval, seek to obtain 
the truth from a suspect, who, if guilty, has nothing to gain and much to lose from giving the 
police what they wanL" Id. at 913. To perform this inquisitorial function, "police interroga-
tion cannot assume the attributes of the adversary trial and still be police interrogation." Id. 
Grano argues that judicial approval of police interrogation and other inquisitorial aspects of 
the investigatory process (e.g., the grand jury) demonstrates that the government need not 
shoulder the entire load of proving guilt because these inquisitorial bodies permit the govern-
ment to use the accused as a source of evidence. 
Grano's perception of police interrogation and the rest of the investigatory stage as essen-
tially inquisitorial leads him to conclude that the fifth amendment privilege merely protects the 
accused's right not to be compelled to answer police questions. Id. at 937. Instead of giving 
the accused a right to remain silent that would force the state to honor its accusatorial burden 
of developing its own evidence of guilt, the privilege simply protects the accused "from undue 
impairment of mental freedom in his decision to answer questions put to him." Id. at 936. 
The most obvious objection to Grano's mixed model of our criminal justice system is that it 
really posits two different models _working at cross-purposes with each other. Indeed, Professor 
Grano concedes that his description of our criminal justice system "may seem schizophrenic in 
its rigid insistence on accusatorial protections during the judicial process and its complacent 
tolerance of inquisitorial procedures, which frequently assure conviction, before the judicial 
process begins." Grano, Rhode Island v. Innis: A Need lo Reconsider the Constitutional Prem-
ises Underlying the La.w of Co,ifessions, 17 AM. CRIM. L. RE.v. I, 27 (1979). Grano insists, 
however, that this dichotomy "is a product not of [systemic] schizophrenia but of historical 
compromise," id., between the competing tensions of inquisitorial and adversarial models. 
Since police interrogation is essentially inquisitorial, its legitimacy cannot be evaluated by 
adversarial standards that would preclude police from performing this valuable function. 
Therefore, Grano concludes no purpose is served by describing our system as "adversarial" or 
"accusatorial" because to "start with such an assertion is to conclude in advance that police 
interrogation, at least as we have known it, should not exisL" Voluntariness, supra, at 913. 
I believe that the dichotomy Grano posits between norms applicable to the investigatory 
and adjudicatory stages of our criminal process stems not from "historical compromise" but 
from Grano's mistaken use of the terms "accusatorial" and "adversarial" interchangeably in 
his analysis. As I have pointed out, accusatorial criminal procedure encompasses not only 
adversarial trial procedure but other fundamental values that regulate the balance of advan-
tage between the state and the accused throughout the criminal process. See note 5 supra. 
One may concede Grano's point that it is inappropriate to apply adversarial procedures to 
police practices without accepting his conclusion that accusatorial norms do not apply to the 
investigatory process. Indeed, the Supreme Court's observation that the privilege helps main-
tain a fair state-individual balance before conviction is an example of an accusatorial norm 
that places some limit on the police's inquisitorial powers by requiring law enforcement offi-
cials to develop independent evidence against the accused. The fact that the government need 
not shoulder the entire load does not negate its accusatorial obligation to carry most of iL If 
one views the privilege as protecting accusatorial norms directly applicable to the investigatory 
process, Grano's dichotomy of a two-stage criminal process working at cross-purposes disap-
pears. 
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requirements are designed to prevent conviction without adjudica-
tion and to safeguard individual rights throughout the accusatory 
process, our criminal justice system relies primarily on the trial as 
the appropriate occasion to vindicate these principles. 11 The trial 
gives them concrete substance because its stringent formal proof re-
quirements force the state to develop its own evidence and then con-
vince an independent lay adjudicator of the accused's guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Our system's heavy reliance on the trial to vindi-
cate accusatorial values may have made sense in an earlier day when 
trials were fairly simple affairs and most defendants had their day in 
court. But the modern adversarial jury trial is far too expensive, 
complex, and time-consuming to be used as the system's routine 
method for dispute resolution. Since our present system "can off er a 
trial to all only if few accept the offer,"12 it places considerable pres-
sure on criminal defendants to convict themselves by pleading guilty 
in return for some expected concession from the state.13 Conse-
quently, most criminal defendants never reach trial because the sys-
tem convinces them to forgo its protections. 14 
It is this Article's thesis that the substitution of plea-bargaining 
for the criminal trial as our primary method for determining legal 
guilt requires a fundamental reassessment of our pretrial screening 
processes. In a system where the prosecutor's decision to file charges 
11. The trial lends "concrete substance" to the accused's presumption of innocence and 
privilege against self-incrimination by forcing the state to shoulder the burden of proving the 
defendant's factual guilt through its independent efforts. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 
362-63 (1970). The trial's proof-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard symbolizes the signifi-
cance that our society attaches to the criminal sanction and thus to liberty itself by impressing 
upon the fact-finder the "necessity of reaching a subjective state of certitude" of the guilt of the 
accused. 397 U.S. at 372. The trial's adversarial procedures promote a more reliable determi-
nation of factual guilt than that by the police and the prosecutor because they give defendants 
an opportunity to confront their accusers, expose flaws in the prosecution's case, and raise 
defenses that might negate their guilt. The trial also protects the accusatorial principle that the 
disposition of society's most serious sanction should not be left exclusively in the hands of 
professionals by offering the community an opportunity to participate in its adjudication. See 
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 154-56 (1968). Finally, the trial guarantees that criminal 
sanctions will only be applied after the state has shown a neutral judicial official before or 
during trial that it has respected the defendant's rights in securing its evidence, making its 
charges, and proving its case. See H. PACKER, supra note 6, at 166-69. 
12. L. WEINREB, DENIAL OF JUSTICE: CRIMINAL PROCESS IN THE UNITED STATES 82 
(1977). Commentators have cited such factors as the expansion of the substantive criminal 
law, increased crime rates, the professionalization of the police, prosecution, and defense func-
tions and the growing complexity of adversarial trial procedures, to explain why the modern 
American jury trial cannot be used as the routine procedural mechanism for adjudicating guilt. 
See, e.g., Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U. Cm. L. REV, 3, 20-21 (1978). 
13. See Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, 79 COLUM, L. REV. 1, 42 (1979), 
14. During fiscal year 1976, 51,612 criminal defendants passed through federal district 
courts. Of the 40,112 convicted and sentenced, 34,041, or 85%, had entered a plea of guilty or 
nolo contendere. U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, SoURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 551 
(1977). 
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is µsually followed by a negotiated guilty plea, we can no longer 
pretend that the pretrial process does not adjudicate the defendant's 
guilt. Accordingly, this Article argues that it no longer makes sense 
to rely primarily on the trial to safeguard essential accusatorial prin-
ciples when pretrial screening devices like the preliminary hearing 
and the grand jury perform the only independent adjudication of the 
defendant's guilt before conviction in most cases. 
Plea-bargaining's transformation of the pretrial process into our 
major adjudicatory mechanism raises three critical questions for 
criminal justice reform efforts: 
(1) Should the preliminary determination of guilt during the pretrial 
process provide some protection of the accusatorial values that the trial 
was designed to vindicate? 
(2) If so, does our present pretrial process adequately protect those 
principles? 
(3) If not, how can those accusatorial principles be safeguarded dur-
ing the pretrial process without unduly burdening an already over-
taxed criminal system? 
This Article assumes that our Constitution has answered the first 
question affirmatively.15 Since our system's legal guilt requirements 
protect not only the reliability of the final outcome but also the fair-
ness of the process which determines that outcome, we cannot simply 
equate the doctrine of legal guilt with the procedural protections re-
quired at trial. Thus, the fact that the defendant waives some of 
these legal guilt requirements by pleading guilty does not alter the 
state's obligation to provide a fair accusatorial process before convic-
tion. The government's accusatorial burden to develop evidence in-
dependently, our system's commitment to apply the criminal 
sanction only after making a compelling showing of a defendant's 
factual guilt, the principle of independent fact-finding, our prefer-
ence for lay participation in adjudicating guilt - all attempt to es-
tablish a fair accusatorial process that reliably adjudicates 
defendants' factual guilt while safeguarding their individual rights. 
While these dual objectives can be completely vindicated only at 
15. Some of these legal guilt requirements apply directly to the investigatory process. See 
notes 5 & IO supra. The defendant's waiver of those requirements by pleading guilty does not 
affect the state's constitutional obligation to comply with them before conviction. Waiver 
merely affects the defendant's ability to raise their violation to undo a conviction. 
Many prosecutors seem to believe that the defendant's guilty plea waives the state's obliga-
tion to satisfy legal guilt requirements. To them, the doctrine of legal guilt applies only to 
defendants who elect to contest their culpability in an adversarial forum. See note 213 iefra 
and accompanying text. But see Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62-63 n.2 (1975) (per 
curiam), where the Supreme Coun emphasized that not all legal guilt requirements, such as 
the double jeopardy clause, are necessarily waived by a guilty plea. 
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trial, they merit significant protection 16 in any summary process that 
provides an altemative17 model of resolving criminal disputes. 
What follows begins to ~swer the last two questions. Section I 
evaluates our present pretrial screening process.18 First, it identifies 
several screening standards presently used in the pretrial process to 
evaluate factual guilt (probable cause)19 and legal guilt (directed ver-
dict20 and likelihood of conviction at trial21). It then examines 
whether the formal stages of pretrial review (initial appearance, pre-
liminary hearing; and grand jury) screen out cases where there is 
substantial doubt concerning a defendant's factual guilt or where the 
government's evidence will probably not satisfy the trial's formal 
proof requirements. Using the federal pretrial process as its model, 
this Section demonstrates that both Congress and the courts have 
assumed that the trial will ensure reliable prosecutorial screening of 
legal guilt and provide the appropriate forum for its adjudication.22 
Acting on that assumption, both institutions have limited the formal 
pretrial inquiry to whether the government's evidence presents a fac-
tual basis (probable cause) for believing that the defendant commit-
ted the crime. As a result, the prosecutor is the primary pretrial 
official responsible for screening out cases where the system's legal 
guilt requirements would preclude conviction at trial. 
16. For example, judicial review procedures at the plea hearing are designed to protect 
some of these accusatorial principles. Judicial inquiry into the factual basis for the plea pro-
tects the factually innocent defendant by insuring that an independent fact-finder will examine 
the evidence before accepting the plea. See text at notes 272-86 infra. The constitutional re-
quirement that the plea be voluntary protects a fair state-individual balance by invalidating 
guilty pleas produced by state coercion. See text at notes 250-56 infra. Section III suggests, 
however, that those judicial safeguards insufficiently protect these accusatorial principles. See 
text at notes 298-307 infra. 
17. Our system's legal guilt requirements reflect its co=itment to limit the state's ability 
to convict in order to protect individual rights. Accordingly, they undermine the view that the 
sole objective of accusatorial criminal procedure is to detect the truth (ie., factual guilt). 
Viewed from this perspective, plea-bargaining represents a su=ary process for resolving dis-
putes whose legitimacy depends in part on the plea's reflection of the trial's probable outcome. 
See generally Uviller, Pleading Guilty: A Critique of Four Models, LAW & CoNTEMP, PROD., 
Winter 1977, at 102, 118-26. See also North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970) (holding 
that a court has the discretion to accept a guilty plea from a defendant who refuses to admit 
culpability as long as the state's evidence demonstrates that a conviction at trial is likely). 
A!fard is discussed in text at notes 287-97 infra. 
18. Most co=entators agree that the primary function of the pretrial process is to screen 
out cases that should not go to trial. See Graham & Letwin, The Preliminary Hearing in Los 
Angeles: Some Field Findings and Legal-Policy Observations (pt. 1), 18 UCLA L. REV. 635, 
639-40 (1971). 
19. See text at notes 72-76 infra. 
20. See text at notes 79-80 infra. 
21. See text at notes 81-83 infra. 
22. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 344-45 (1974); Costello v. United States, 
350 U.S. 359 (1956). 
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Section Il therefore examines whether the possibility of facing 
the system's legal guilt requirements at trial guarantees reliable 
prosecutorial screening of legal guilt before trial. There is reason to 
be skeptical. Several circumstances, including the seriousness of the 
crime,23 the reputation of the accused,24 and the possibility of con-
viction through plea-bargaining,25 may lead the prosecutor to indict 
a defendant when the government's proof of legal guilt is marginal 
at best.26 Since the pretrial process does not require the government 
to present compelling evidence of factual guilt to an independent 
fact-fi.nder27 or demonstrate that its evidence could satisfy the trial's 
formal proof requirements, prosecutors can and sometimes do get 
indictments despite insufficient evidence to support a conviction at 
the time of indictment.28 
Section Ill continues the examination of the pretrial system by 
exploring the balance of advantage between the state and the ac-
cused during plea-bargaining. It evaluates whether the parties nego-
tiate on an equal footing and whether their bargains approximate the 
trial's probable outcome.29 This Section rejects the Supreme Court's 
assumption that the participation of competent defense counsel will 
ensure that the defendant has intelligently decided to plead guilty30 
by demonstrating how several institutional factors impair defense 
counsel's ability to prepare a defense or to accurately gauge the 
strength of the government's case.31 Nor does judicial review of the 
23. See, e.g., Kaplan, The Prosecutorial .Discretion -A Comment, 60 Nw. U. L. REV. 174,' 
181-83 (1965). 
24. Id. 
25. See text at notes 210-17 i,yra. See also Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bar-
gaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REv. 50 (1968). 
26. See H. MILLER, W. McDONALD & J. CRAMER, PLEA-BARGAINING IN THE UNITED 
STATES 97-114 (1978) [hereinafter cited as L.E.A.A. STUDY]. 
27. See text at notes 170-77 i,yra. 
28. See note 469 i,yra. 
29. See note 17 supra. While neither the prosecutor, defense counsel, nor the court can 
predict the likely outcome at trial with scientific precision, the state should not be permitted to 
convict a defendant through plea-bargaining where its independent evidence of factual guilt is 
so weak that the defendant would have won a directed judgment of acquittal at trial. See note 
71 i,yra. To permit such a result would dilute the defendant's privilege against self-incrimina-
tion and the state's concomitant obligation to prove guilt through its independent elforts. The 
state could indict an individual without making any reliable showing that its evidence would 
warrant a conviction at trial and then pressure the defendant to plead guilty in return for some 
expected sentencing concession from the state. 
Conversely, those observers who believe that the criminal process's sole objective is to dis-
cern the truth (factual guilt) would not require the bargain to approximate the trial's probable 
outcome because "all matters alfecting the persuasiveness of the prosecution case [would] be 
irrelevant," Uviller, supra note 17, at 114, as long as the defendant's admission of culpability 
reliably demonstrates factual guill 
30. See text at notes 228-29 i,yra. 
31. See text at notes 227-49 i,yra. 
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case at the plea hearing provide adequate safeguards. Under the 
Supreme Court's present standards, judicial inquiry into the 
voluntariness, intelligence, and factual basis32 of the plea cannot en-
sure that guilty pleas will be accepted only when the system's legal 
guilt requirements could probably be satisfied at trial.33 Thus, Sec-
tion III concludes that the pretrial process seriously dilutes our sys-
tem's capacity to protect accusatorial values by confining most legal 
guilt requirements to a stage of the process that few defendants 
reach. Instead of a presumption of innocence, the pretrial process 
operates on a presumption of guilt.34 Instead of providing a neutral 
forum to adjudicate a defendant's guilt reliably, the pretrial process 
relies on the ex parte determination of factual guilt made by the po-
lice and the prosecutor. Lay participation in the adjudication of 
guilt is limited to a grand jury that is dominated by the prosecutor.35 
While the state is supposed to develop its case against the accused 
independently, the prosecutor need only make a minimal showing of 
probable cause before using the state's panoply of permissible pres-
sures to induce the defendant to admit guilt "voluntarily"36 and 
plead guilty. 
One's prescription for reform depends upon one's diagnosis of 
the disease. Some observers37 suggest that plea-bargaining is the 
problem and therefore recommend its .abolition. Others conclude 
that the adversarial trial itself is the problem and accordingly urge 
adoption of the best features of inquisitorial systems.38 Section IV 
briefly examines and rejects these proposals. Returning to an adver-
sarial trial system, which has not been used to adjudicate guilt for 
most cases in this century,39 would cost far more than we can afford. 
32. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure I 1, which governs the acceptance of pleas, reads 
in part: "(f) Determining accuracy of plea. Notwithstanding the acceptance of a plea of guilty, 
the court should not enter a judgment upon such plea without making such inquiry as shall 
satisfy it that there is a factual basis for the plea." FED. R. CRIM. P. I I(f). 
33. See L.E.A.A. STUDY, supra note 26, at 280-83; W. RHODES, PLEA-BARGAINING: WHO 
GAINS? WHO LosES? 47 (Pub. No. 14, Promis Research Project, Washington D.C., Inst. for 
Law & Soc. Research) (1978) [hereinafter cited as PROMIS STUDY]; Finkelstein, supra note 2, at 
310-11. 
34. See H. PACKER, supra note 6, at 160. 
35. See text at notes 170-77 i'!fra. 
36. Indeed, our system's informal methods for determining guilt closely resemble Herbert 
Packer's "Crime Control" model of the criminal process. See H. PACKER, supra note 6, at 158-
63. 
37. See note 309 i'!fra. 
38. See note 310 i'!fra. See, e.g., L. WEINREB, supra note 12; Langbein & Weinreb, Conti-
nental Criminal Procedure: "Myth" and Reality, 87 YALE L.J. 1549 (1978). 
39. See Alschuler, supra note 13, at 5. 
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The debate over the adequacy of inquisitorial safeguards40 and the 
severe institutional remodeling required by such proposals suggest 
the need for more "intermediate prescriptive steps"41 that use our 
present institutional framework to effect change. 
Accordingly, Section IV proposes that the pretrial process be 
used to provide greater protection of the accusatorial values embod-
ied in our legal guilt requirements. The pretrial process must be re-
formed to ensure that 
(1) the government shoulders its accusatorial burden of developing 
independent evidence of a defendant's factual guilt before it encour-
ages the defendant to plead; 
(2) a neutral adjudicator evaluates the government's evidence 
before or soon after formal accusation to determine whether that evi-
dence can satisfy the trial's formal proof requirements; 
(3) where possible, the community is given an opportunity to par-
ticipate in that preliminary adjudication of legal guilt, so that the dis-
position of society's most serious sanction is not left exclusively in the 
hands of professionals; 
(4) the defense attorney has sufficient access to the prosecution's 
case to make an informed prediction about the likely outcome at trial 
before advising the client to plead. 
At the state level, a reformed preliminary hearing seems most 
likely to meet those goals. Because it is an adversary proceeding, the 
defendant has an opportunity to rebut the prosecution's case by 
cross-examination or by presenting a defense. By applying the rules 
of evidence and requiring the prosecutor to present a prima facie 
case of legal guilt (measured by a modified directed-verdict stan-
dard),42 such a proceeding would prevent conviction without adjudi-
cation while safeguarding individual rights. 
However, the preliminary hearing cannot be an effective vehicle 
for federal reform. Unlike most states,43 the federal system only 
conducts preliminary examinations in approximately twenty percent 
40. See notes 335-37 infra and accompanying text. 
41. See Morris, Book Review, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1367, 1370 (1978). 
42. See note 342 infra. 
43. After the Supreme Court ruled in Hurtado v. California, llO U.S. 516 (1884), that 
indictment by a grand jury is not mandated by the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment, many states abolished their mandatory indictment requirements and permitted prosecu-
tors to initiate prosecution either by indictment or by filing an information. See Federal Grand 
Jury: Hearings on H.J. Res. 46, H.R. 1277 and Related Bills Before the Subcomm. on Immigra-
tion, Citizenship, and International Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 716-17, 716 n.3 (1976) [hereinafter cited as 1976 Hearings]. In those jurisdictions, most 
prosecutions commence by information. See Y. KAMISAR, w. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, MODERN 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 868 (4th ed. 1974). Most information jurisdictions require a prelimi-
nary hearing, however. Id. at 977. In some jurisdictions, the accused has a right to indictment 
by grand jury for serious crimes, see 1976 Hearings, supra, at 717 n.4, and a few states require 
grand jury indictments for capital offenses. See id. at 717 n.9. 
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of all prosecutions.44 Thus, mandating preliminary hearings for all 
federal prosecutions would generate significant pretrial delay and re-
quire up to five times the resources presently committed to such 
hearings. Moreover, mandatory preliminary hearings would dupli-
cate the grand jury's screening function since the fifth amendment 
requires most federal prosecutions to proceed by indictment. 45 
Admittedly, a constitutional amendment abolishing the accusa-
tory function of the federal grand jury would remedy the problem of 
duplicated screening. Some observers would apparently welcome 
that development.46 While the grand jury was enshrined in our Con-
stitution because of its reputed ability to protect the innocent from 
unfounded prosecution,47 few scholars or practitioners take its 
screening function seriously today.48 Most argue that an inexperi-
enced and untrained body of citizens cannot possibly screen out un-
warranted prosecutions in an ex parte proceeding where they hear 
only the government's side of the case and depend on the prosecutor 
for all legal advice and direction. 
Section V takes issue with that explanation of the grand jury's 
defects. It argues that the grand jury's present tendency to rubber-
stamp the prosecutor's decisions stems far more from the limited role 
the Supreme Court has assigned to it49 and the type of evidence it 
receives50 than from any institutional incapacity. By refusing to pre-
scribe the kind or amount of evidence that the prosecutor should 
present to the grand jury, the Supreme Court in Costello v. United 
States51 impaired the grand jury's ability to screen factual guilt and 
precluded it from determining whether the government's evidence, if 
44. See note 370 infra. 
45. "No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless 
on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury •.•. " U.S. CONST. amend. V. FED. R. 
CRIM. P. 7(a) invokes the indictment requirement for any offense punishable by imprisonment 
for a term exceeding one year. 
46. See Campbell, Eliminate the Grand Jury, 64 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 174 (1973). 
However, even some of the grand jury's critics have expressed reluctance about altering the 
Bill of Rights for fear that once the process is started and legitimized, other guarantees of 
individual liberties may be jeopardized. See, e.g., Morris, Book Review, 87 YALE L.J. 680, 682 
(1978). At the very least, those who favor a constitutional amendment abolishing or revising 
the fifth amendment's indictment requirement should demonstrate that the grand jury is not 
capable of performing a valuable accusatorial function. See, e.g., M. FRANKEL & G. 
NAFTALIS, THE GRAND JURY 118-19 (1977). Section V argues that the abolitionists have not 
met that burden. 
41. See Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 390 (1962). 
48. See, e.g., Antell, The Modem Grand Jury, Benighted Supergovemment, 51 A.B.A.J. 153 
(1965); Morris, supra note 46, at 683. 
49. See text at notes 176-77 infra. 
50. See text at notes 393-505 infra. 
51. 350 U.S. 359 (1956). 
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uncontradicted, would warrant a conviction at trial.52 I therefore 
suggest a series of federal reforms that check the prosecutor's charg-
ing discretion and strengthen the grand jury's ability to make a pre-
liminary ex parte adjudication of factual guilt. Congress should 
repudiate Costello by requiring the prosecutor to present the in-
dicting53 grand jury with a prima facie case of legal guilt. Further-
more, to ensure that the prosecutor has presented the grand jury with 
sufficient legally admissible evidence to warrant a conviction, the 
trial court should have the authority to dismiss any indictment where 
the indicting grand jury's transcript54 reveals that the prosecutor has 
not met that burden. Finally, I propose specific reforms in the use of 
hearsay testimony, 55 illegally seized evidence, 56 and exculpatory evi-
dence57 that would enable the grand jury to adjudicate factual guilt 
reliably and independently without transforming its ex parte inquiry 
into a prolonged adversarial proceeding. Although these reforms 
will lengthen the grand jury's review of the prosecution's case and 
impose a burden on courts reviewing the grand jury's transcript,58 
they should prove to be far less expensive and time-consuming than 
those proposals mandating adversarial preliminary hearings for all 
federal prosecutions.59 While any extension of our system's legal 
guilt requirements to the pretrial process will incur costs, the reforms 
52. To demonstrate this point, Section V examines how some courts have attempted to 
improve the quality of grand jury screening by more actively reviewing the prosecutor's con-
duct before the grand jury. Those courts have found prosecutorial misconduct justifying dis-
missal of the indictment when the prosecutor's presentation of evidence precluded the grand 
jury from screening effectively. However, the prosecutorial misconduct doctrine does not cure 
all of the accusatory grand jury's present ills because Costello prohibits the federal courts from 
imposing an affirmative obligation on the prosecutor to present the grand jury with a prima 
facie case of legal guilt At best, the prosecutorial misconduct doctrine remedies the worst 
excesses generated by Costello without acknowledging that Costello is the source of the prob-
lem. 
53. One of the major objections to reforms that would enhance the grand jury's accusatory 
function is that such reforms would impair the grand jury's inquisitorial function of investigat-
ing criminal activity. Accordingly, Section V proposes that Congress enact a statute that 
would preclude the same grand jury from performing both functions. This proposal would 
permit an investigatory grand jury "to pursue its investigation . . . unimpeded by the eviden-
tiary and procedural restrictions applicable to a criminal trial" United States v. Calandra, 414 
U.S. 338,349 (1974). Barring the same grand jury from performing the inconsistent functions 
of investigator and impartial fact-finder should also enhance the accusatory grand jury's ca-
pacity to perform an independent screening function. See text at notes 553-57 iefra. 
54. Section V also proposes that the defendant receive a transcript of all recorded proceed-
ings of the indicting grand jury subject to any reasonable conditions or limitations that the 
court may impose to prevent possible abuses. See text at notes 563-80 infra. 
55. See text at notes 523-29 iefra. 
56. See text at notes 530-34 iefra. 
57. See text at notes 536-52 infra. 
58. See text at notes 582-84 infra. 
59. See text at notes 367-75 iefra. 
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suggested in Section V can vindicate essential accusatorial principles 
at a price our system can bear. 
I. PRETRIAL SCREENING 
While the pretrial process serves multiple purposes - providing 
opportunities for discovery,60 preserving witnesses' testimony,61 and 
protecting defendants' constitutional rights62 - most commentators 
agree that its primary function is to screen out cases that should not 
go to trial. 63 After identifying several screening standards that could 
perform this function, this Section examines the actual application of 
these standards at the formal stages of pretrial review in the federal 
system. 
A. Standards for Screening 
To examine federal pretrial review, I shall distinguish between 
those screening standards that evaluate factual guilt and those that 
evaluate legal guilt. Factual guilt refers to the substantive criminal 
law's definition of criminal conduct. A factually guilty accused is 
one who voluntarily commits the proscribed act or omission with the 
requisite intent under circumstances that neither excuse nor justify 
that conduct. To determine whether the accused is factually guilty, 
the criminal process must provide a procedural mechanism (theoreti-
cally the trial) that will reliably adjudicate the factual and normative 
questions64 raised by the substantive criminal law's definition of 
60. See United States v. King, 482 F.2d 768, 775 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Coleman v. Burnett, 477 
F.2d 1187, I 199-200 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Note, The Function of the Preliminary Hearing in Federal 
Pretrial Procedure, 83 YALE L.J. 771, 772 n.5 (1974). For a discussion of how the preliminary 
hearing permits discovery in California, see Graham & Letwin, The Preliminary Hearing in Los 
Angeles: Some Field Findings and Legal-Policy Observations (pt. 2), 18 UCLA L. REV. 916, 
916-31 (1971). 
61. See, e.g., California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 165 (1970); FED. R. Ev10. 804(b)(I); Gra-
ham & Letwin, supra note 60, at 925; Note, supra note 60, at 784 n.63. 
62. An arraignment or a preliminary hearing that provides a fair and reliable determina-
tion of probable cause assures the legality of a defendant's custody under the fourth amend-
ment, thereby affording pretrial protection of some legal guilt requirements. Gerstein v. Pugh, 
420 U.S. 103, 123-25 (1975). Indictment by a grand jury also satisfies the fourth amendment. 
See 420 U.S. at 117 n.19. But see Thompson, The Fourth Amendment Function of the Grand 
Jury, 37 OHIO ST. L.J. 727, 743-74 (1976), which argues that the grand jury's dependence on 
the prosecutor precludes it from making a sufficiently neutral and detached judgment to satisfy 
the fourth amendment. 
63. See note 18 supra. 
64. Most affirmative defenses require the adjudicator to make normative judgments about 
the defendant's culpability. For example, a self-defense claim asks the fact-finder to determine 
whether a reasonable person would have acted like the defendant under similar circumstances. 
See W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, CRIMINAL LAW 393-94 (1972). Criminal responsibility doctrines 
implictly require the fact-finder to judge whether it is fair to hold a mentally disabled defend-
ant accountable for his actions. See generally Arenella, Book Review, 80 CoLUM. L. REV. 420 
(1980). 
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criminal conduct. Legal guilt refers to the final outcome65 of that 
procedural process. However, the reliable adjudication of a defen-
dant's factual guilt is not the only objective of an accusatorial pro-
cess. Concern over the gravity of the criminal sanction, respect for 
individual rights, and the felt need for community participation in 
guilt adjudication have all fostered legal guilt requirements that limit 
the state's ability to detect and convict the factually guilty. For ex-
ample, the state might have reliable evidence of a defendant's factual 
guilt that it cannot use at trial because of the rules of evidence66 or 
because police violated the defendant's constitutional rights when 
seizing the evidence.67 Even if the state has some legally admissible 
evidence, it may not have enough to avoid a directed acquittal at 
trial. Or the government might have enough legally admissible evi-
dence to reach the jury but not enough to convince it of the defen-· 
dant's factual guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Finally, the jury 
may temper the literal requirements of the substantive criminal law 
with community notions of justice by acquitting a defendant despite 
compelling proof of factual guilt.68 In all of those examples, our 
criminal justice system has deliberately69 created a discrep·ancy be-
tween perceived70 factual and legal guilt to promote policies other 
than conviction of the factually guilty. Thus, our system should ,not 
tolerate the conviction of a defendant who is either factually or le-
gally innocent.71 
65. While the defendant is not legally guilty until guilt has been adjudicated at trial or 
negotiated by counsel, the accusatorial values underlying the concept (which I refer to as legal 
guilt requirements) concern the process of reaching that outcome as well as the ultimate result. 
Thus, commentators who equate legal guilt with the trial's actual or predicted outcome de-
value the concept by ignoring how many of its requirements embody accusatorial principles 
that insure a fair state-individual balance before conviction. See, e.g., Church, In .Defense of 
Bargain Justice, 13 LAW & SocY. R.Ev. 509, 515-16 (1979). 
66. For example, prosecutors sometimes use lie-detectors to evaluate factual guilt. See 
Kaplan, supra note 23, at 178. But such tests are usually not admissible at trial. See, e.g., 
United States v. Cardarella, 570 F.2d 264 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 997 (1978); United 
States v. Flores, 540 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Tremont, 351 F.2d 144 (6th Cir. 
1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 944 (1966); Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
But see United States v. Ridling, 350 F. Supp. 90 (E.D. Mich. 1972). 
61. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
68. See generally H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966). 
69. Unintentional "discrepancies may also arise from human error. A factually innocent 
defendant may be found legally guilty at trial. Indeed, some commentators and practitioners 
have claimed that plea-bargaining provides a more reliable determination of factual guilt than 
trial. See L.E.A.A. STUDY, supra note 26, at 96-97. 
70. As noted earlier, factual guilt is an artificial concept that cannot be empirically verified. 
Ultimately, the question of whether the accused is factually guilty cannot be separated from 
the procedural mechanism used to adjudicate it. See note 6 supra. 
71. I use the term "legal innocence" to refer to those cases where conviction at trial would 
be impossible because the government lacks sufficient legally admissible evidence to reach the 
jury. If the state, through pl~a-bargaining, is permitted to secure the conviction of a defendant 
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1. Screening Factual Guilt 
While the pretrial process is not designed to adjudicate a defen-
dant's factual guilt conclusively, it does attempt to protect the factu-
ally innocent by weeding out those cases where the government's 
evidence does not provide adequate reason to believe that the ac-
cused committed the crime. The primary pretrial screening stan-
dard72 for factual guilt used at the formal stages of pretrial review is 
the probable cause requirement. While disagreement arises over the 
proper evidentiary standard to measure probable cause to indict, 73 
the standard for probable cause at the initial appearance and prelim-
inary hearing comes from the fourth amendment's definition of 
probable cause to arrest. The fact-finder must determine whether 
the government's evidence would warrant a person of reasonable 
caution to believe that the accused committed the crime.74 The 
probable-cause-to-arrest standard screens only75 factual guilt be-
cause it can be satisfied by evidence that is inadmissible at trial (such 
who could not possibly be convicted at trial, our system's accusatorial requirement that the 
state independently develop compelling evidence of factual guilt would lose most of its force. 
See note 29 supra. Nor can we simply assume that the defendant would have no incentive to 
bargain in such cases. First, several factors influencing a defendant's decision to plead (e.g., 
pretrial custody, very attractive bargains) have little to do with the strength of the prosecutor's 
case. More importantly, defense counsel may not have access to sufficient information to as-
sess the government's case, especially when the prosecutor exaggerates its strength or engages 
in bluffing tactics. See text at notes 217-18 iefra. Many prosecutors see no ethical problem in 
such practices even when they result in the conviction of a defendant who could not possibly 
have been convicted at trial. See PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE LAWYER 62 (1976). 
See also note 218 iefra. 
Some commentators have devalued the concept of legal innocence by suggesting that it 
refers merely to a prediction of the trial's probable result. See Church, supra note 65, at 516 
("Legal innocence is merely an attorney's prediction prior to trial"). Since those predictions 
cannot be made with scientific precision, these commentators suggest no unfairness results 
when a legally.innocent defendant pleads guilty as long as the defendant was represented by 
competent counsel because legal innocence is not empirically verifiable. The assumption un-
derlying that argument is that no incentive to bargain would exist if "defendants did not face a 
very real chance of conviction at trial." Id. Many prosecutors rely on this argument to justify 
the use of plea-bargaining to secure the conviction of a defendant who probably would have 
been acquitted at trial See L.E.A.A. STUDY, supra note 26, at 109. My difficulty with the 
argument is that it fails to distingujsh between different categories of weak cases. Legal inno-
cence becomes a matter of prediction only when the state has sufficient evidence to warrant a 
conviction. 
72. Some pretrial screener should also determine whether the conduct charged, if proved, 
would constitute a violation of the penal statute noted in the complaint. Graham and Letwin 
label this the "demurrer" screening function. Graham & Letwin, supra note 18, at 663. 
13. See notes 107-13 iefra and accompanying text for a discussion of the various standards 
used by courts.in their charging instructions to the grand jury. 
74. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949). 
75. As Professors Graham and Letwin have observed, some of these screening judgments 
overlap and some are applied at the same pretrial stage. Graham & Letwin, supra note 18, at 
622. For example, I have identified the probable cause requirement as a factual guilt screening 
standard because it considers evidence that cannot be used to prove legal guilt at trial. How-
ever, judicial review of the probable cause basis for the arrest also protects the defendant's 
fourth amendment rights. Consequently, the probable cause requirement could be character-
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as hearsay) or that does not prove the defendant's guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt.76 Moreover, the probable-cause-to-arrest stan-
dard is a weak screen for factual guilt because it focuses on whether 
the defendant committed the proscribed act. Thus, probable cause 
may exist despite factual innocence if the defendant lacked the req-
uisite criminal intent or acted under circumstances that justified or 
excused the conduct. 
2. Screening Legal Guilt 
Since the primary function of the pretrial process is to screen out 
cases that should not go to trial, it would make little sense for pre-
trial screeners to look exclusively to the defendant's factual guilt 
without asking whether the government could satisfy our system's 
legal guilt requirements.77 On the other hand, evaluating the legal 
ized as a legal guilt requirement that insures that the state is respecting the individual's consti-
tutional rights before trial. See note 89 i'!fra. 
76. There is a large difference between the two things to be proved [probable cause and 
legal guilt], as well as between the tribunals which determine them, and therefore a like 
difference in the quanta and modes of proof required to establish them. 
. . . Guilt in a criminal case must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt and by [le-
gally admissible) evidence .... 
In dealing with probable cause, however, as the very name implies, we deal with 
probabilities . . . . 
"The substance of all the definitions" of probable cause "is a reasonable ground for 
belief of guilt" . . . • And this "means less than evidence which would justify condemna-
tion" or conviction. . . . 
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 173-75 (1949) (citations omitted). 
77. Normative considerations would seem to dictate the same conclusion. If one views the 
presumption of innocence as a directive to treat the accused as innocent until legal guilt is 
adjudicated at trial, the government should not be able to impose the serious economic, moral, 
and physical sanctions triggered by indictment without making some preliminary showing that 
legal guilt will probably be established. See H. PACKER, supra note 6, at 167. q. McGinnis v. 
Royster, 410 U.S. 263,273 (1973) ("it would hardly be appropriate for the State to undertake 
in the pretrial detention period programs to rehabilitate a man still clothed with a presumption 
of innocence"); Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. I, 4 (1951) ("Uuless the right to bail before trial is 
preserved, the presumption of innocence, secured only after centuries of struggle, would lose 
its meaning"). But if. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 533 (1979) (majority of Court concluded 
that the presumption of innocence "has no application to a determination of the rights of a 
pretrial detainee during confinement before his trial has even begun"). 
Wo!jish's limited view that the presumption of innocence applies only to the trial appears 
to assume that the system's legal guilt requirements refer only to the procedural protections 
afforded to defendants who elect to contest their culpability at trial. Thus, Wolfish could be 
used to defend the fairness of a pretrial screening process that examined only factual guilt. 
Society's interest in protecting itself from the accused would take precedence at this stage over 
the safeguards provided by the legal guilt doctrine. This view of pretrial screening would 
permit the government to use the indictment's sanctions as a pressure tactic against the ac-
cused. Before trial, the government could use the leverage it gained from the indictment to 
convince the accused to cooperate with the government's search for legally admissible evi-
dence against that defendant or others. If legally innocent, the defendant can insist on a trial. 
If the defendant resists these pressures to plead or tum state's evidence, the prosecutor would 
still have time after indictment to develop sufficient evidence of legal guilt to secure the in-
dictee's conviction. 
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sufficiency of the government's proof before indictment poses some 
ticklish problems. First, such an evaluation must come late in the 
pretrial process to give the government time to develop its case. Sec-
ond, any preindictment evaluation of legal sufficiency will be com-
plicated by the uncertain admissibility of some of the government's 
evidence, an uncertainty that will be resolved only after indict-
ment. 78 Finally, any review of legal sufficiency must be performed 
expeditiously to prevent undue pretrial delay. 
Despite these difficulties, one can suggest at least two standards 
for evaluating legal guilt that the pretrial process could apply before 
issuing an indictment. First, the pretrial process could eliminate 
cases with inadequate admissible evidence to support a conviction at 
trial:79 a directed-verdict standard. Establishing a basis for believ-
ing in the defendant's factual guilt does not tell us whether the gov-
ernment has sufficient legally admissible evidence to warrant 
conviction. A directed-verdict screen makes the latter, more strin-
gent judgment. To ensure that the evaluation considers only admis-
sible evidence, a pretrial screener performing this function should 
generally apply the rules of evidence applicable at trial. 80 
Second, the pretrial process could predict the jury's reaction to 
the government's case: a probability-of-conviction standard. As all 
prosecutors know, juries sometimes acquit defendants despite suffi-
cient proof to warrant conviction. Trial juries may acquit because 
the government's evidence does not dispel their reasonable doubts 
about the defendant's factual guilt.81 Moreover, nonevidentiary fac-
tors may lead juries to acquit or reduce the defendant's criminal lia-
bility. A jury may temper the law with community notions of justice: 
it may refuse to convict when it sympathizes with the defendant, 
when the victim was also at fault, or when the defendant violated an 
unpopular law.82 A jury might also reduce the defendant's criminal 
liability by returning a guilty verdict for a less serious offense when it 
believes that the penalty for the more serious offense is too harsh for 
this particular defendant. 83 The pretrial process should consider 
those possibilities to predict intelligently the likelihood of conviction. 
Having identified several distinct screening standards84 that can be 
78. For example, the admissibility of evidence seized by the government during its investi-
gation will be determined at a post-indictment suppression hearing. See FED. R. CRIM, P. 41. 
79. See Graham & Letwin, supra note 18, at 692. 
80. Note, supra note 60, at 779-80. 
81. See Kaplan, supra note 23, at 183-84. 
82. See generally H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 68. 
83. See generally id. 
84. By no means is this an exhaustive list of pretrial screening judgments. For example, 
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used to screen factual and legal guilt, the next Subsection examines 
how the present pretrial process performs its screening function. 
B. Steps in Pretrial Review 
1. Initial Appearance Before a Federal Magistrate 
After arrest, the defendant must be taken to the nearest available 
federal magistrate "without unnecessary delay"85 so that judicial su-
pervision of the prosecution may begin. Although judicial screening 
may begin even earlier when law enforcement officials apply for ar-
rest warrants under rule 4, 86 only a small minority of federal prose-
cutions involve arrests on warrants. At the initial appearance, the 
magistrate must determine that the complaint prepared by the prose-
cutor or the arresting officer complies "with the requirement of Rule 
4(a) with respect to the showing of probable cause."87 
The magistrate's ex parte finding of probable cause is the first 
judicial screening of a defendant's factual guilt.88 It also satisfies the 
fourth amendment's requirement that there be a prompt judicial de-
termination of the probable cause basis for detention before the state 
restrains an arrestee's liberty for any extended time.89 Since this ex 
parte hearing assesses the validity of a defendant's custody pending 
further action by the grand jury, the magistrate does not determine 
the prosecutor and arguably the grand jury may refuse to prosecute despite compelling evi-
dence of factual and legal guilt because the particular case is not sufficiently important to merit 
the allocation of scarce criminal justice resources. See notes 184-90 i'!fra and accompanying 
text. Graham and Letwin have identified the following different screening judgments: the 
summary judgment function; the demurrer function; the litigant control function; the abuse-of-
process control function; the predictive function; the directed-verdict function; the allocation 
of resources function; the limitation of jurisdiction function; the sentencing function; and the 
community judgment function. Graham & Letwin, supra note 18, at 662-67. 
85. FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(a) provides: 
An officer making an arrest under a warrant issued upon a complaint or any person 
making an arrest without a warrant shall take the arrested person without unnecessary 
delay before the nearest available federal magistrate or, in the event that a federal magis-
trate is not reasonably available, before a state or local judicial officer authorized by 18 
U.S.C. § 3041. If a person arrested without a warrant is brought before a magistrate, a 
complaint shall be filed forthwith which shall comply with the requirements of Rule 4(a) 
with respect to the showing of probable cause. When a person, arrested with or without a 
warrant or given a summons, appears initially before the magistrate, the magistrate shall 
proceed in accordance with the applicable subdivisions of this rule. 
86. FED. R. CRIM. P. (4)a provides in part: 
If it appears from the complaint, or from an affidavit or affidavits filed with the com-
plaint, that there is probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed and that 
the defendant has committed it, a warrant for-the arrest of the defendant shall issue to any 
officer authorized by law to execute it. 
87. FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(a). 
88. See text at notes 72-76 supra. The magistrate also performs the demurrer screening 
function by determining whether the alleged conduct, if proved, would violate the penal stat-
ute noted in the complaint. See note 72 supra. 
89. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114, 124-25 (1975). 
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whether the government's evidence would support a conviction.90 
Instead, the magistrate applies the same probable cause standard 
that is required for an arrest warrant. 
Few prosecutions are screened out of the process at the initial 
appearance because the magistrate's ex parte review of the complaint 
is often pro forma at best. The reluctance of magistrates to screen 
out cases at this preliminary stage is understandable. They know 
that an Assistant United States Attorney has already reviewed the 
probable cause basis for the arrest,91 and any doubts concerning its 
propriety can be aired at the preliminary examination, where the de-
fendant is represented by counsel and has more time to prepare the 
challenge. Moreover, the primary purpose of the initial appearance 
is not to eliminate weak cases but to minimize police interrogation of 
uncounseled defendants by requiring that they be brought promptly 
before a magistrate.92 At this initial appearance, the magistrate in-
forms a defendant of the criminal complaints involved, the right 
against self-incrimination, the right to counsel (appointed if neces-
sary), the right to a preliminary hearing, and the general circum-
stances under which a defendant may secure pretrial release.93 After 
establishing the conditions for a defendant's pretrial release (if any), 
the magistrate sets a date for the defendant's preliminary examina-
tion. 
2. Preliminary Examination 
Like the initial appearance that precedes it, the preliminary hear-
ing's primary function is to test the legality of a defendant's custody. 
Notwithstanding the views of many commentators,94 who would 
prefer that federal preliminary examinations screen legal guilt by a 
90. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 4 provides that the "finding of probable cause 
may be based upon hearsay evidence in whole or in part." FED. R. CRIM. P. 4(b). 
91. See notes 180-83 i'!fra and accompanying text. • 
92. See Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449,454 (1957); McNabb v. United States, 318 
U.S. 332, 443-44 (1943). 
93. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 5 provides in part: 
Offenses not Triable by the United States Magistrate. If the charge against the defendant 
is not triable by the United States magistrate, the defendant shall not be called upon to 
plead. The magistrate shall inform the defendant of the complaint against him and of any 
affidavit filed therewith, of his right to retain counsel, of his right to request the assign-
ment of counsel if he is unable to obtain counsel, and of the general circumstances under 
which he may secure pretrial release. He shall inform the defendant that he is not re-
quired to make a statement and that any statement made by him may be used against 
him. The magistrate shall also inform the defendant of his right to a preliminary exami-
nation. He shall allow the defendant reasonable time and opportunity to consult counsel 
and shall admit the defendant to bail as provided by statute or in these rules. 
FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(c). 
94. See, eg., MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE§ 330.1(1) (1975), which 
defines the purpose of the preliminary hearing as being "to determine whether there is suffi-
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probability-of-conviction standard,95 Congress designed the prelimi-
nary hearing's timing and evidentiary requirements to assure com-
pliance with the fourth amendment. To prevent investigative 
arrests,96 the hearing must be held shortly after the defendant's ar-
rest. Because the hearing determines only whether a probable cause 
basis for the defendant's arrest presently exists, the magistrate may 
consider any evidence, regardless of its admissibility at trial,97 that 
establishes a reliable factual basis for believing that the defendant 
committed the crime. Given the preliminary nature of that determi-
nation, the type of evidence introduced at the hearing, and the possi-
bility that the government may bolster its case after further 
investigation, a magistrate will rarely dismiss a charge on the ground 
that the prosecution's evidence would not support a conviction at 
trial.98 
While the preliminary hearing performs the same screening func-
tion as the initial appearance, it is not a superfluous step. First, it 
performs valuable collateral functions, permitting the defendant to 
discover99 the prosecution's case, preserving the testimony of wit-
cient evidence to proceed to trial"; Graham & Letwin, supra note 18, at 639-40; Note, supra 
note 60, at 779. 
95. See notes 60-63 supra and accompanying text. 
96. One of the most important purposes is to provide protection against arrests for 
investigation. It is not only a determination of probable cause but a determination of 
probable cause shortly after the arrest which is significant. The requirement that the de-
fendant be brought before the Commissioner without unnecessary delay and the right of 
the defendant to have a ~earing to determine whether there is probable cause combine to 
discourage law enforcement officers from arresting on suspicion and then investigating the 
case at their leisure to determine whether there is probable cause. The elimination of the 
Commissioner's hearing is an open invitation to arrests for investigation. If a subsequent 
investigation develops no probable cause, or establishes the defendant's innocence, the 
grand jury can be requested to return an ignoramus. During the interval, the defendant 
will have been deprived of his liberty in violation of the Constitution, but will be without 
redress. The present hearing provision is one of the best devices which we have found to 
implement the Fourth Amendment's requirement of arrest on probable cause. A motion 
to suppress at a later time provides protection only if real evidence or a statement has 
been obtained from the defendant. It provides no protection for either the innocent de-
fendant or the guilty defendant who remained silent and from whom no evidence was 
seized. · 
8 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE~ 5.1.02[2], at 5.1-6 n.1 (2d ed. 1976) (quoting Hearings Before 
the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary on 
the United States Commissioner System, Part 3, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 266, 270 (1966) (statement 
of Professor A. Kenneth Pye)). See generally Note, supra note 60, at 775-79. 
97. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 5.1 provides in part: 
(a) Probable Cause Finding .... The finding of probable cause may be based upon 
hearsay evidence in whole or in part. . . • Objections to evidence on the ground that it 
was acquired by unlawful means are not properly made at the preliminary examination. 
FED. R. CRIM. P. 5.l(a). 
98. Thus, the magistrate who disbelieves the government's witnesses or thinks the defend-
ant's defense will prevail at trial is not empowered to dismiss charges. See, e.g., Note, supra 
note 60, at 779 n.33. 
99. See note 60 supra. 
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nesses who may not be available later, 100 and offering an opportunity 
to initiate plea negotiations. Second, the hearing's adversarial proce-
dures promote a more reliable determination of probable cause than 
the speedy ex parte review at the initial appearance. 101 Finally, 
events following the defendant's arrest and initial appearance might 
undermine the government's justification for detaining the defend-
ant. For all those reasons, a magistrate is apt to apply the probable-
cause-to-arrest standard more stringently at the preliminary exami-
nation than at the initial appearance. 102 
Although the preµminary hearing is not a superfluous screen, it is 
a rare one. Since the preliminary hearing assesses only the validity 
of a defendant's custody pending action by the grand jury, its pur-
pose is vitiated by the grand jury's indictment, which itself estab-
lishes probable cause to hold the defendant for trial. 103 Thus, the 
prosecutor usually bypasses the preliminary hearing by obtaining an 
indictment against the defendant before the scheduled date of the 
hearing. 104 
3. Screening by the Federal Grand Jury 
The prosecutor's power to bypass the preliminary hearing in-
creases the importance of the grand jury's screening function. Ex-
cept for the prosecutor, the grand jury is the only significant sieve 
through which most federal prosecutions must pass after the defen-
dant's initial appearance. Moreover, given the high ratio of guilty 
pleas to trials, the grand jury is usually the only stage in the federal 
criminal process where the community helps to determine whether to 
impose criminal sanctions. Because of the grand jury's importance 
and the considerable confusion that has permeated discussions of its 
accusatory function, this Subsection presents a detailed analysis of 
its screening functions. 
Judicial references to the grand jury as both a "sword" and a 
"shield"105 reflect its somewhat contradictory investigatory and ac-
100. See note 61 supra. 
101. q. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 121-22 (1975). Although the Court concluded that 
adversarial procedures are not constitutionally required to make a reliable probable-cause-to• 
arrest determination, it conceded that adversarial procedures might "enhance the reliability of 
probable cause determinations in some cases." 420 U.S. at 122. 
102. Dismissals remain a rarity, however, because the government usually has enough 
evidence of defendant's factual guilt to satisfy the probable cause standard. 
103. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 117 n.19 (1975). 
104. See note 370 infra. 
105. See, e.g., United States v. Fein, 504 F.2d 1170, 1179 (2d Cir. 1974) ("We have no 
reason to become enmeshed in the long-continuing debate ... as to whether the grand jury 
constitutes a sword or a shield."); United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 186 n.l (5th Cir.) (Wis-
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cusatory functions in our federal criminal justice system. As investi-
gator, the grand jury uses subpoena, immunity, and contempt 
powers to detect criminal activity and identify its perpetrators.106 As 
accuser, the grand jury is supposed to check the prosecutor by elimi-
nating charges where the evidence does not establish probable cause 
for believing in the defendant's guilt. Whether the grand jury 
screens factual or legal guilt depends upon the type of probable 
cause standard it applies and what evidence it considers. 
a. Judicial instructions. Judicial instructions to grand juries107 
exhibit considerable disagreement over the proper evidentiary stan-
dard for measuring probable cause to indict. Some courts limit the 
grand jury to screening factual guilt by equating probable cause to 
indict with probable cause to arrest: 
Your prime function is to decide whether or not sufficient evidence 
has been produced to indicate that a federal crime probably has been 
committed by the person accused. If the evidence produced does not 
meet the standard necessary for an indictment, because you cannot 
conclude that a crime probably has been committed by the accused, 
you should have no hesitancy in refusing to vote for an indictment. 
You're not a Trial Jury, however. That is, it is not your responsibil-
ity to determine the innocence or guilt of an accused defendant, but 
solely to determine whether or not sufficient evidence has been pro-
duced to indicate that a federal crime probably has been committed by 
the person accused. ios 
The Department of Justice shares this limited view of the proba-
dom, J., concurring specially) (quoting ABA FEDERAL GRAND JURY HANDBOOK 8 (1959)) 
("The grand jury is both a sword and a shield of justice - a sword because it is the terror of 
criminals, a shield because it is the protection of the innocent against unjust prosecution."), 
cert. denied, 381 U.S. 935 (1965). See generally Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra 
note 43, at 893-955. 
I 06. It is a grand inquest, a body with powers of investigation and inquisition, the scope 
of whose inquiries is not to be limited narrowly by questions of propriety or forecasts of 
the probable result of the investigation, or by doubts whether any particular individual 
will be found properly subject to an accusation of crime. As has been said before, the 
identity of the offender, and the precise nature of the offense, if there be one, normally are 
developed at the conclusion of the grand jury's labors, not at the beginning. 
Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 282 (1919). See also Schwimmer v. United States, 232 
F.2d 855, 862-63 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 833 (1956). 
I 07. Before receiving the judge's charging instructions, federal grand jurors may be given a 
copy of the Federal Grand Jury Handbook. Unfortunately, the handbook never defines what 
type of evidence grand juries may consider or what specific evidentiary standard grand jurors 
should use in evaluating the government's evidence. Instead, the pamphlet exhorts grand ju-
rors to protect "the innocent against unjust prosecution" and not to "find indictments not 
warranted by the evidence." A.B.A. FEDERAL GRAND JURY HANDBOOK 8 (1959) (reproduced 
in 1976 Hearings, supra note 43, at 277-97). In fact, the only specific guideline articulated is an 
admonition that grand jurors should not let their personal judgment that a particular law is 
"unduly harsh" influence their judgment in carrying out their duty to enforce the law as it 
exists. Id. at 12. But see United States v. Asdrubal-Herrera, 470 F. Supp. 939 (N.D. Ill. 1979). 
108. Grand Jury Reform: Hearings on H.R 94 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, C,'li-
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hie-cause-to-indict standard. In its instruction prohibiting prosecu-
tion without "probable cause to believe that a person has committed 
a federal offense,"109 the department explains that probable cause is 
the same standard for an arrest warrant, "for a magistrate's decision 
to hold a defendant to answer in the district court, . . . and for in-
dictment by a grand jury."110 
On the other hand, some judges have suggested in their charging 
instructions that the grand jurors should not return an indictment 
unless the government's evidence would lead them to convict the ac-
cused at trial. As one federal judge explained it, "Before returning 
an indictment, the grand jury should be satisfied from the evidence 
which is submitted to it that a conviction would be warranted if the 
evidence were presented to a trial jury where there was no evidence 
to rebut it." 111 That type of instruction asks the grand jury to predict 
the likelihood of a defendant's conviction. Such prediction requires 
the grand jury to evaluate the quality of the government's evidence, 
such as the credibility of its witnesses: 
One of the most important functions you are to perform is to judge the 
credibility of the various witnesses who may appear before you. You 
and you alone are the judges of the credibility of those witnesses, that 
is, the believability of their statements to you. In reaching your conclu-
zenship, and International Law of House Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 
111 (1977) (Exhibit to A32) [hereinafter cited as 1977 Hearings, pt. 1 or pt. 2). 
However, the grand jury's review of factual guilt should be somewhat more structured than 
that of the magistrate's evaluation of probable cause to arrest. While the magistrate seeks a 
reasonable factual basis for believing that the defendant committed the crime, the grand jury 
must consider the crime's material elements. See Gaither v. United States, 413 F.2d 1061 
(D.C. Cir. 1969), where the D.C. Circuit dismissed an indictment because the grand jury did 
not have the actual terms of the indictment before it when it considered the government's 
evidence. After listening to an arresting officer testify about the theft Gaither had allegedly 
committed, the grand jurors voted to "present" him for grand larceny and recorded their deci-
sion on a printed form. The United States Attorney's office then drafted an indictment for 
grand larceny and submitted it to the grand jury's foreman, who signed it. None of the other 
grand jurors saw or voted their approval of this indictment. 413 F.2d at 1065. In rejecting the 
government's contention that the foreman's signature constituted sufficient proof that the in-
dictment reflected the grand jurors' intent, Judge Wright emphasized that the grand jury was 
designed to do more than simply approve the prosecutor's recommendation. "The content of 
the charge, as well as the decision to charge at all, is entirely up to the grand jury- subject to 
its popular veto, as it were." 413 F.2d at 1066. 
Judge Wright concluded that "Rule 6 requires the grand jury as a body to pass on the 
actual terms of an indictment," because "[w]ithout an indictment before them, the jurors might 
not have focused upon each particular element and determined which particular facts should 
be included in the ultimate accusation." 413 F.2d at 1071. 
109. U.S. .Department of Justice Materials Relating to Prosecutorial .Discretion, 24 CRIM, L, 
REP. (BNA) 3001, 3002 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Justice .Department Standards], The com-
ment to this provision certifies that this probable cause determination is a "minimal require-
ment." Id. at 3002. The prosecutor may still decide not to prosecute. 
110. Id. at 3002. 
111. United States v. O'Shea, 447 F. Supp. 330,331 (S.D. Fla. 1978), qffd. per curiam, 588 
F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1979). 
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sions as to the credibility of any witnesses you: may consider . . the 
demeanor of the witness, the witness' manner of testifying, the reasona-
bleness or probability of the witness' story as it is related to you, 
whether a witness has been corroborated by other witnesses, evidence 
or circumstances in the case. 112 
While the probability-of-conviction standard of probable cause 
clearly suggests a more rigorous evidentiary barrier to indictment 
than the probable-cause-to-arrest standard, most judicial instruc-
tions using the former legal guilt standard fail to explain how the 
grand jury should measure convictability.113 Even if this defect were 
remedied, the grand jury could not evaluate the legal sufficiency of 
the government's proof or assess the likelihood of conviction unless 
it considered evidence that the government could use at trial. 114 In-
deed, the presentation of some types of hearsay testimony could also 
prevent the grand jury from making a reliable assessment of a de-
fendant's factual guilt. m Therefore, the next Subsection examines 
the quality of the evidence presented to the grand jury. 
b. Judicial supervision of evidence presented to the grand jury. 
Most federal courts have consistently declined to review the eviden-
tiary basis of a grand jury's indictment. Their reluctance to do so 
stems in large part from the Supreme Court's refusal to dismiss an 
indictment based exclusively on hearsay testimony in Costello v. 
United States. 116 To understand the importance of Costello, one 
must place it in historical context. 
(1) Costello's antecedents. Before Costello, some precedent sug-
gested that the rules of trial evidence applied to the grand jury. No 
112. United States v. Gallo, 394 F. Supp. 310,314 (D. Conn. 1975) (quoting routine federal 
grand jury instructions for the United States Distri.ct Court for the District of Connecticut). 
113. For example, a judge, who defined p~obable cause to indict as sufficient evidence to 
convince a trial jury to convict, dismissed an ~dictment because his review of the grand jury 
transcript indicated that the prosecutor had not presented "prima facie evidence of probable 
cause." United States v. O'Shea, 447 F. Supp. 330, 331 (S.D. Fla. 1978), ajfd. per curiam, 588 
F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1979). Yet the judge-insisted that he was not dismissing the indictment 
"because of the quality of the evidence." 447 F. Supp. at 332. Dismissal was required because 
the indictment was not supported "by any evidence, competent or otherwise, to establish a 
prima facie case." 447 F. Supp. at 332 (emphasis added) . 
. 114. See United States v. Estepa, 471 F.2d 1132 (2d Cir. 1972). 
115. Admittedly, the rules of evidence applicable at trial are "generally not applied in ex 
parte proceedings . • . 'mainly because the system of Evidence rules was devised for the spe-
cial control of trials by jury.'" Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 174 n.12 (1949) (quot-
ing 1 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 19 (3d ed. 1940)). But hearsay testimony is also excluded 
because it is often less reliable than first-hand accounts of factual events. C. McCORMICK, 
LAW OF EVIDENCE§ 244, at 580 (1954). See United States V. Arcuri, 282 F. Supp. 347, 349 
(E.D.N.Y.), ajfd., 403 F.2d 691 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 913 (1969). 
116. 350 U.S. 359 (1956). 
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less of a jurist than Justice Nelson had stated, "evidence before a 
grand jury must be competent legal evidence, such as is legitimate 
and proper before a petit jury."117 Moreover, there was a significant 
trend in nineteenth-century state courts to 'Judicialize" 118 grand jury 
proceedings when it became apparent that the indictment itself im-
posed serious sanctions against the individual. 
However, an examination of the federal case law before Costello 
reveals a decided reluctance to dismiss indictments as long as some 
competent evidence was presented to the grand jury.I 19 Even if con-
vinced that the grand jury had considered incompetent evidence, 
most trial courts would presume that there was enough admissible 
evidence to support the indictment, and all courts refused to weigh 
the sufficiency of that evidence. 120 The denial of a motion to quash 
an indictment based on incompetent evidence was within the discre-
tion of the trial court and not appealable before trial. 121 
The Supreme Court's only significant comment on this subject 
before Costello was consistent with this trend. Writing for a unani-
mous Court in Holt v. United States, 122 Justice Holmes vigorously 
rejected the petitioner's argument that his indictment should have 
been quashed because the grand jury had considered reliable but 
117. United States v. Reed, 27 F. Cas. 727, 735 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1852) (No. 16,134). 
118. Beginning with a hearing restricted to the prosecution's case alone, with a firm ban 
on calling the defendant or his witnesses, most states soon authorized the grand jury to 
hear them if it chose. A considerable number enacted statutes providing that the grand 
jury was to hear only "legal evidence," or that it "ought" to indict only on the basis of 
such evidence. And those requirements were frequently enforced through the granting of 
motions to quash indictments based on no evidence at all, or no evidence as to an element 
of the crime, or "utterly insufficient" evidence. 
Goldstein, '17re State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE 
L.J. 1149, 1170 (1960). 
119. See Note, Quashing Federal Indictments Returned upon Incompetent Evidence, 62 
HARV. L. REV. 111, 113 (1948). 
120. See id. at 113. For example, in United States v. Reed, 27 F. Cas. 727 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 
1852) (No. 16,134), Justice Nelson rejected a defense counsel's challenge to an indictment 
based on the counsel's affidavit that no competent evidence was presented to the grand jury on 
a material element of the crime. 27 F. Cas. at 735. While Justice Nelson conceded that the 
rules of evidence appli~d to the grand jury, 27 F. Cas. at 735, 738, he argued that judicial 
review of the evidence would interfere with grand jury secrecy. 27 F. Cas. at 738. Moreover, if 
courts permitted challenges based merely on a defense counsel's assertion that no competent 
evidence was presented to the grand jury, they would be faced with reviewing the evidentiary 
basis of every indictment. 27 F. Cas. at 738. Decisions like Reed made it quite difficult for 
counsel to raise such challenges since they had no direct access to what transpired before the 
grand jury. This difficulty did not trouble Justice Nelson because he trusted that the grand 
jury would function properly without judicial interference. 27 F. Cas. at 738. 
121. See, e.g., Nanfito v. United States, 20 F.2d 376, 378 (8th Cir. 1927) (citing Durland v. 
United States, 161 U.S. 306 (1896)); United States v. Rosenburgh, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 580 (1868); 
Lewis v. United States, 295 F. 441 (1st Cir. 1924)). 
122. 218 U.S. 245 (1910). 
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inadmissible testimony.123 The opinion did not address the question 
of whether an indictment should be quashed when it rested exclu-
sively on incompetent evidence. 124 
The first case to face that question directly was Na,!fito v. United 
States. 125 The Eighth Circuit explained that the grand jury's screen-
ing function required it to consider competent evidence: 
It has become accepted as a general rule that investigations before the 
grand jury should be made in accordance with the well-established 
rules of evidence . . . and ample justification exists for such a rule, in 
order that the time of the trial courts may not be consumed in dispos-
ing of matters incapable of proof by competent evidence; and further 
that persons may not be indicted upon mere suspicion.126 
Therefore, the court concluded that the trial judge should have per-
mitted the defendants to show that the indictment rested exclusively 
on incompetent evidence.127 Moreover, in reaffirming N a,!fito a year 
later, 128 the Eighth Circuit came close to imposing a directed-verdict 
standard, concluding that an indictment should be quashed "where a 
grand jury returns an indictment without any evidence whatever 
before it of a separate, distinct, and essential element of the of-
fense."129 With the exception of those Eighth Circuit cases, however, 
federal courts rarely analyzed the grand jury's screening function or 
how the rules of evidence would frustrate or promote it. Instead, 
most federal courts refused to examine the evidentiary basis for the 
grand jury's action because they feared that their inquiry would in-
terfere with the grand jury's independence, violate grand jury se-
crecy, and create intolerable administrative burdens for the courts. 
(2) Costello and its progeny. Costello 130 presented the Supreme 
Court with an opportunity to clarify the juridical confusion over 
123. 218 U.S. at 247-48. 
124. The validity of an indictment based solely on incompetent evidence was not squarely 
before the Court since only part of the evidence considered by the grand jury in Holt had been 
incompetent. See 218 U.S. at 248. 
125. 20 F.2d 376 (8th Cir. 1927). The Na,yito court held specifically that the wife of a 
coconspirator was incompetent to testify before a grand jury that subsequently indicted her 
husband. 20 F.2d at 378. The husband's guilty plea could not retroactively make the wife's 
testimony competent, and, thus, the trial court should have allowed the defendants to make a 
showing in support of their motion to quash the indictment. 20 F.2d at 378. 
126. 20 F.2d at 378 (citations omitted). 
127. 20 F.2d at 378. 
128. Brady v. United States, 24 F.2d 405 (8th Cir. 1928). The specific problem in Brady 
was not that the evidence presented to the grand jury was incompetent but that there was no 
evidence of the defendants' use of the United States mail, which was a critical element of the 
offenses charged. 24 F.2d at 408. 
129. 24 F.2d at 408. 
130. Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956). 
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what types of evidence an indicting grand jury should consider be-
cause it raised the questions that Holt left unresolved. After hearing 
the testimony of three federal agents, a federal grand jury indicted 
Frank Costello for willfully attempting to evade federal income 
taxes. 131 The agents' testimony was technically hearsay because they 
had no first-hand knowledge of the transactions upon which they 
based their net worth computations.132 However, their testimony 
was admitted into evidence at Costello's trial after the government 
had laid a proper foundation for it by calling 144 witnesses who tes-
tified about the transactions involved and authenticated the docu-
ments relied upon by the three agents.133 
Costello filed a pretrial motion to dismiss the indictment sup-
ported by an affidavit alleging his belief that the grand jury had 
heard only incompetent evidence before it returned the indict-
ment.134 At the close of the government's case, Costello renewed his 
motion to dismiss the indictment after cross-examination of the gov-
ernment's trial witnesses established that the grand jury had heard 
only the agents' hearsay testimony. The court denied that motion 
and Costello was convicted.13s 
The Second Circuit could have resolved Costello's appeal 136 on 
the narrow ground that the grand jury may rely exclusively on net 
worth hearsay testimony because such testimony does permit the 
grand jury to screen both factual and legal guilt: the agents' testi-
mony had clear probative value and became competent evidence at 
trial once the government laid the proper foundation for its admis-
sion. Little would· be accomplished by requiring the government to 
repeat the entire trial before the grand jury by calling 144 witnesses 
to lay that foundation. Deciding the case in that manner would have 
illustrated how unthinking application of all trial rules of evidence to 
the grand jury would create a prolonged mini-trial without materi-
ally enhancing the grand jury's capacity to screen either factual or 
legal guilt. 
However, Judge Hand was not inclined to rest the circuit court's 
decision on such narrow grounds. His critical discussion of the 
Eighth Circuit's definition of incompetent evidence in Na'!fito re-
flected his view that the grand jury's sole function was to screen fac-
131. 350 U.S. at 360-61. 
132. 350 U.S. at 361. 
133. 350 U.S. at 360. 
134. 350 U.S. at 360. 
135. 350 U.S. at 361. 
136. United States v. Costello, 221 F.2d 668, 670 (2d Cir. 1955), q/fd., 350 U.S. 359 (1956). 
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tual guilt. 137 He emphasized that hearsay information is often quite 
reliable· and that the primary reason for its exclusion, the inability to 
cross-examine the declarant, does not apply to ex parte proceedings 
like a grand jury.138 He concluded that the courts should not inquire 
into the evidentiary basis of the grand jury's action unless "it ap-
peared that no evidence had been offered that rationally established 
the facts." 139 In that case, "the indictment ought to be quashed; be-
cause then the grand jury would have in substance abdicated."140 
Although Judge Frank concurred in the court's judgment, he ex-
pressed "serious misgivings about concurring in a conclusion that a 
grand jury may indict solely on the basis of evidence that would not 
support a verdict after trial." 141 One might infer from that comment 
that Judge Frank wanted the grand jury to screen legal as well as 
factual guilt, at least to some extent. Nevertheless, out of "esteem for 
Judge Hand's wisdom," Judge Frank reluctantly concurred. 142 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether "a de-
fendant [may] be required to stand trial and a conviction be sus-
tained where only hearsay evidence was presented to the grand jury 
which indicted him." 143 Costello argued that such an indictment vi-
olated the fifth amendment provision that "[n]o person shall be held 
to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a 
presentment or indictment of the grand jury .... " 144 In the alter-
native, he asked the Court to exercise its supervisory power over the 
federal courts by issuing a rule invalidating all such indictments. 145 
A unanimous Court affirmed Costello's conviction. 146 
137. If"incompetent" is to cover all evidence, however rationally persuasive it may be, 
that would be excluded at a trial[,] with great deference we cannot agree. Legal rules 
presuppose that the occasions to which they apply, shall be decided under the ordinary 
postulates of reasoning; and the exclusory rules are an exception, for they apply to evi-
dence that is relevant rationally, but that courts will not accept, not because it does not 
prove the issue, but it is thought unjust to the opposite party to use it against him, or 
because it is within some privilege to suppress the truth. 
221 F.2d at 677. 
138. 221 F.2d at 677-78. 
139. 221 F.2d at 677. 
140. 221 F.2d at 677. 
141. 221 F.2d at 679 {Frank, J., concurring). 
142. 221 F.2d at 680 {Frank, J., concurring). 
143 .. 350 U.S. at 359 (quoting 350 U.S. at 819, the grant of the writ of certiorari). 
144. 350 U.S. at 361. 
145. See 350 U.S. at 361. In McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340-41 (1943), the 
Court held that it would exercise its supervisory power to exclude a confession when federal 
officers had failed to comply with a statutory requirement that defendants be brought 
promptly before a magistrate after their arrest. 
146. Justices Clark and Harlan did not participate. Justice Burton concurred with the 
Court's decision. 350 U.S. at 364. 
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Writing for the Court, Justice Black offered three justifications 
for refusing to prescribe the kind of evidence upon which a grand 
jury could act. First, since the American grand jury was patterned 
after its English progenitor, Black argued that it should have the 
same powers and duties as the English grand jury.147 He noted that 
the English grand jury's freedom "from control by the Crown or the 
judges" was strengthened by its power to act "on such information as 
they deemed satisfactory," secure in the knowledge that their work 
would not be "hampered by rigid procedural or evidential rules." 148 
Justice Black's conclusion that the grand jurors' work would be ham-
pered by technical rules designed to ensure the fair determination of 
legal guilt in an adversary proceeding reflected his belief that the 
grand jury's sole function was to screen factual guilt. If the grand 
jury was to screen legal guilt, applying some of those rules of evi-
dence would enhance rather than frustrate its screening objective. 
Second, Justice Black wanted to avoid the administrative bur-
dens that would be generated by judicial enforcement of a rule pre-
scribing the evidence a grand jury could consider. Since the 
defendant did not have direct access to what transpired before the 
grand jury, Justice Black feared that judicial inquiry into the eviden-
tiary basis of the indictment would foster significant pretrial delay 
because it would require "a kind of preliminary trial to determine 
the competency and adequacy of the evidence before the grand 
jury."149 -Finally, Justice Black argued that such a cumbersome pro-
cedure was unnecessary because it would "add nothing to the assur-
ance of a fair trial," 150 at which the rules of evidence would be 
applied to vindicate the requirements of legal guilt. 151 In other 
words, the grand jury need not screen legal guilt because the defend-
ant's trial will adjudicate it. 
In rejecting Costello's arguments, the Supreme Court more thor-
oughly insulated indictments from judicial review than had Judge 
Hand's opinion. Justice Black concluded that "[a]n indictment re-
turned by a legally constituted and unbiased grand jury, like an in-
formation drawn by the prosecutor, if valid on its face, is enough to 
call for trial of the charge on the merits. The Fifth Amendment re-
147. 350 U.S. at 362. 
148. 350 U.S. at 362. 
149. 350 U.S. at 363. 
150. 350 U.S. at 364. 
151. "In a trial on the merits, defendants are entitled to a strict observance of all the rules 
designed to bring about a fair verdict. Defendants are not entitled, however, to a rule which 
would result in interminable delay but add nothing to the assurance of a fair trial." 350 U.S. at 
364. 
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quires nothing more."152 The breadth of that language combined 
with the Court's refusal to use its supervisory powers to regulate the 
quality of grand jury evidence, might suggest that courts would be 
powerless to dismiss indictments even in an extreme case where the 
grand jury received no probative evidence of the defendant's factual 
guilt. Responding to that implication, Justice Burton's concurring 
opinion repeated Judge Hand's admonition that an indictment 
should be quashed "if it is shown that the grand jury had before it no 
substantial or rationally persuasive evidence upon which to base its 
indictment." 153 
While Costello's holding is limited to indictments based exclu-
sively on hearsay testimony, its assumptions apply with equal force 
to indictments based on other incompetent evidence that could not 
be used to prove legal guilt at trial. The Court has verified that con-
clusion by relying on Costello to preclude attacks against indict-
ments that were based on evidence seized in violation of a 
defendant's fourth and fifth amendment rights. 
In Lawn v. United States, 154 the Court held that the petitioners 
were not entitled to a hearing to examine their "unsupported suspi-
cion" that the grand jury which indicted them had made direct or 
derivative use of materials illegally obtained by a previous grand 
jury. 155 Although Justice Whittaker emphasized that the petitioners 
had "laid no foundation for the holding of a protracted preliminary 
hearing" to prove their "suspicion,"156 he noted that the Court in 
Costello had already declined to "establish a rule permitting defend-
ants to challenge indictments on the ground that they are not sup-
ported by adequate or competent evidence."157 
Justice Whittaker's reference to Costello implied that courts 
should not entertain such challenges even when the grand jury un-
doubtedly considered incompetent evidence. United States v. Blue158 
transformed Lawn's dictum into precedent. In Blue, the district 
court had dismissed a six-count tax-evasion indictment because 
pending tax court proceedings dealing with the same alleged tax de-
152. 350 U.S. at 363 (footnote omitted). 
153. 350 U.S. at 364 (Burton, J., concurring) (quoting Judge Hand's opinion below, 221 
F.2d at 677). Since the same evidence that established probable cause to arrest satisfies Justice 
Burton's factual guilt standard, few indictments would be dismissed under this exception. 
154. 355 U.S. 339 (1958). 
155. 355 U.S. at 350. 
156. 355 U.S. at 349. 
157. 355 U.S. at 350 (quoting Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 364 (1956)). 
158. 384 U.S. 251 (1966). -
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ficiencies had forced Blue to incriminate himself. 159 Writing for the 
Court, Justice Harlan ruled that the indictment should not have been 
dismissed: "Even if we assume that the Government did acquire in-
criminating evidence in violation of the Fifth Amendment, Blue 
would at most be entitled to suppress the evidence and its fruits if 
they were sought to be used against him at trial." 160 Although Blue 
had not argued that the indicting grand jury had considered the 
tainted evidence, Harlan cited both Costello and Lawn as authority 
for the proposition that "in any event our precedents indicate this 
would not be a basis for abating the prosecution pending a new in-
dictment, let alone barring it altogether." 161 
In United States v. Calandra, 162 the Supreme Court dashed any 
remaining hopes of overturning indictments based on illegally seized 
evidence by rejecting a grand jury witness's attempt to apply the 
fourth amendment's exclusionary rule to grand jury proceedings. 163 
In ruling that a grand jury witness may not refuse to answer ques-
tions based on evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amend-
ment, the Court repeated and expanded Lawn's admonition: 
[T]he validity of an indictment is not affected by the character of the 
evidence considered. Thus, an indictment valid on its face is not sub-
ject to challenge on the ground that the grand jury acted on the basis of 
inadequate or incompetent evidence; or even on the basis of informa-
tion obtained in violation of a defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination.164 
Although Justice Powell's opinion did not state whether an accu-
satory grand jury's consideration of illegally seized evidence would 
further or hinder its screening objectives, he did state that litigation 
about the legality of evidence involves "issues only tangentially re-
lated to the grand jury's primary objective."165 While Justice Powell 
did not define that objective in terms of factual or legal guilt, his 
analysis paralleled Justice Black's argument in Costello that the ap-
plication of trial rules to the grand jury would frustrate its dual ob-
jective of investigating alleged criminal activity and accusing 
wrongdoers. Excluding illegally seized evidence "would seriously 
impede the grand jury. Because the grand jury does not finally adju-
dicate guilt or innocence, it has traditionally been allowed to pursue 
159. 384 U.S. at 252-53. 
160. 384 U.S. at 255. 
161. 384 U.S. at 255 n.3. 
162. 414 U.S. 338 (1974). 
163. 414 U.S. at 349-52. 
164. 414 U.S. at 344-45 (citations omitted). 
165. 414 U.S. at 349. 
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its investigation and accusatorial functions unimpeded by the evi-
dentiary and procedural restrictions applicable to a criminal 
trial." 166 
Justice Powell's conclusions are defensible if the grand jury's ac-
cusatorial function is to screen factual guilt because most material 
seized in violation of fourth amendment rights will constitute relia-
ble evidence of a defendant's factual guilt. However, if a grand jury 
should also weed out cases of improbable legal guilt, its screening 
objectives would be impeded by the admission of evidence that 
would not be admissible at trial. But, Justice Powell's discussion of 
the benefits of applying the exclusionary rule to grand jury proceed-
ings indicates that he did not see any compelling reason why grand 
juries should screen legal guilt. After arguing that the exclusionary 
rule's application at trial sufficiently deters illegal searches, he con-
cluded that most prosecutors would not seek indictments based pri-
marily on illegally seized evidence because, "[f]or the most part, a 
prosecutor would be unlikely to request an indictment where a con-
viction could not be obtained." 167 In other words, we must rely on 
the prosecutor, not the grand jury, to screen out cases where proof of 
legal guilt is unlikely. In those exceptional cases where the prosecu-
tor does not perform that screening function,~the trial will rectify the 
prosecutor's error. 
Admittedly, Justice Powell was concerned primarily with how 
the application of the exclusionary rule to an ongoing grand jury 
investigation would disrupt its proceedings and impair its ability to 
detect criminal activity. However, it would make little sense for the 
court to approve the introduction of illegally seized evidence if such 
evidence would invalidate any resulting indictment. 168 Accordingly, 
most federal courts have refused to dismiss indictments based in part 
on illegally obtained evidence. 169 
166. 414 U.S. at 349. 
167. 414 U.S. at 351. 
168. See United States v. Mackey, 405 F. Supp. 854, 863 (E.D.N.Y. 1975). 
169. See, e.g., United States v. James, 493 F.2d 323, 326 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 
849 (1974); United States v. Doe, 455 F.2d 1270, 1274 (1st Cir. 1972). Some federal courts 
have suggested that an indictment based almost completely on tainted evidence might be dis-
missed. See, e.g., Laughlin v. United States, 385 F.2d 287, 291 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 
390 U.S. 1003 (1968); United States v. Kahn, 366 F.2d 259, 264 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 
948 (1966); United States v. Tane, 329 F.2d 848, 853-54 (2d Cir. 1964). 
In a pre-Calandra decision, one circuit suggested that Costello did not bar a federal court 
from dismissing an indictment where the grand jury proceedings themselves violated the de-
fendant's fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Jones v. United States, 342 
F.2d 863, 871-73 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (plurality opinion). Moreover, some federal courts have 
suggested that Calandra does not completely immunize an indictment from challenge on the 
basis of any constitutional exclusionary rule, especially where the grand jury proceedings are 
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Thus, Costello, Lawn, Blue, and Calandra all reflect the Supreme 
Court's view that the grand jury's function is to screen out those 
cases where there are no reasonable grounds for believing that the 
accused committed the crime. Accordingly, the grand jury should be 
free to consider evidence of a defendant's factual guilt regardless of 
whether it would be excluded at an adversarial proceeding to protect 
the defendant's right of confrontation or to deter improper police 
conduct. The Court trusted the grand jury to protect the factually 
innocent and the prosecutor to screen out cases where there was little 
likelihood of securing a conviction. Consequently, the Court con-
cluded that judicial review of the evidentiary basis for the indictment 
would serve little purpose besides generating pretrial delay, increas-
ing administrative burdens on the courts, and interfering with the 
grand jury's investigatory function. 
(3) Costello's legacy for pretrial screening. While the Supreme 
Court viewed the grand jury as a protector of only the factually in-
nocent, its refusal to prescribe the evidence that may be presented to 
the grand jury impaired even that limited screening function. Since 
the validity of an indictment usually does not depend either on the 
quality or sufficiency of the evidence presented to the grand jury, 170 
the lower courts have generally refused to dismiss indictments in 
cases where the prosecutor's evidentiary presentation may have im-
paired the grand jury's ability to assess a defendant's factual guilt. 
For example, some courts have refused to dismiss indictments when 
the prosecutor presented perjured testimony to the grand jury.171 
Others have sustained indictments based exclusively on hearsay tes-
timony in cases where the government offered no substantial justifi-
cation for its failure to present its best evidence. 172 Many courts 
have refused to dismiss indictments in cases where the prosecutor 
failed to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury.173 Until re-
cently, 174 most federal courts have justified their decisions by repeat-
responsible for the constitutional violation. See, e.g., United States v. Hinton, 543 F.2d 1002, 
1008 n.7 (2d Cir. 1976). 
170. See United States v. Kennedy, 564 F.2d 1329, 1338 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 
U.S. 944 (1978); United States v. Klaes, 453 F.2d 1375 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 406 
U.S. 920 (1972). 
171. See, e.g., United States v. Coppedge, 31 I F.2d 128 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 
U.S. 946 (1963). But see text at notes 427-43 i'!fra. 
172. See, e.g., United States v. Klaes, 453 F.2d 1375 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 
406 U.S. 920 (1972). 
173. See, e.g., Loraine v. United States, 396 F.2d 335, 339 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 
933 (1968). But see text at notes 444-77 i'!fra (discussing recent trends to require the prosecutor 
to disclose some exculpatory evidence to the grand jury). 
174. See text at notes 388-506 i'!fra for a discussion of a recent judicial trend to use the 
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ing Costello's reasoning that the grand jury conducts an ex parte 
inquiry that does not decide the ultimate question of defendant's 
guilt or innocence.175 Those courts have assumed that any eviden-
tiary error made before the grand jury will be cured at defendant's 
trial. 
As a result of Costello and its progeny, the federal grand jury can 
hardly be considered an independent screening agency that carefully 
evaluates the merits of each case. In the words of one grand juror, it 
has become 
an indictment mill. Grand jurors are running on this treadmill to 
make it go as fast as possible so business can be finished by the after-
noon. We did not know how to stand up to the U.S. Attorney, we did 
not understand our rights and responsibilities, we did not feel qualified 
to question the govemment. 176 
To keep that mill running smoothly, the prosecutor may present the 
evidence for several cases before the grand jury retires to deliberate. 
In routine federal prosecutions, a grand jury may only deliberate for 
a few minutes on each case before voting to return a true bill. 177 
Given this type of evidentiary presentation, it should not be surpris-
ing that the grand jury usually agrees with the prosecutor's charging 
decisions. After all, it is the third pretrial screen to apply a minimal 
probable cause standard to the government's case. Most cases that 
cannot meet this minimal factual guilt standard have already been 
weeded out of the process. 
Ironically, Costello left the grand jury totally dependent upon the 
prosecutor whose actions it was supposed to review. 178 While ·en-
dorsing the grand jury's historic function to act as an independent 
buffer between the state and the accused, the Supreme Court emas-
culated the grand jury's ability to do so by precluding it from screen-
ing defendants' legal guilt and impairing its ability to assess 
defendants' factual guilt reliably and independently. 
prosecutorial misconduct doctrine to supervise prosecutors' evidentiary presentations before 
the grand jury. 
175. See Loraine v. United States, 396 F.2d 335, 339 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 933 
(1968); United States v. Coppedge, 3ll F.2d 128, 132 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 
946 (1963). 
176. 1977 Hearings, pt. l, supra note 108, at 561 (letter from William P. Gloege). 
177. "Instruction from the U.S. Attorney is like the fox explaining to the chickens how to 
be on guard against foxes. It is very hard for the fox to be effective in this role, no matter how 
sincere he is." Id. at 560. 
178. The grand jury's review of the prosecutor's case serves little purpose in routine prose-
cutions because the prosecutor often presents the government's case through the hearsay testi-
mony oflaw enforcement agents who summarize the results of the government's investigation. 
Obviously, grand juries that consider such evidence cannot evaluate the credibility of the gov-
ernment's witnesses or gauge the strength of its case. 
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One can criticize Costello's implicit model of the pretrial process 
from two perspectives. Even if the Court is correct in viewing the 
pretrial process as essentially a screening mechanism and the trial as 
the primary protector of the system's legal guilt requirements, there 
should still be a more neutral pretrial screener of a defendant's legal 
guilt than the prosecutor. In a system that guarantees that a neutral 
body (magistrate, judge, or jury) will review law enforcement offi-
cials' determinations of factual and legal guilt, some pretrial screener 
should evaluate the prosecution's case to determine whether convic-
tion is sufficiently likely to justify imposing the sanctions of indict-
ment and incurring the expense of holding a defendant for trial. 
However, this analysis about who should screen what begs the 
more basic question of whether the screening model of the pretrial 
process comports with reality. In a system of justice where guilty 
pleas are the norm and trials are the exception, we can no longer 
view the prosecutor's and grand jury's decisions to indict as mere 
interim screening decisions. Since guilty pleas have supplanted trials 
as our primary method of securing convictions, we cannot assume 
that the trial will necessarily deter prosecutors from seeking indict-
ments against defendants whom they could not convict at trial. Nor 
can we safely assume that only factually guilty defendants are in-
dicted since the pretrial process requires only a minimal showing of 
factual guilt. 
This Section has demonstrated that the formal stages of pretrial 
review require only a minimal demonstration of the defendant's fac-
tual guilt before indictment. As a result, the prosecutor now bears 
primary responsibility for screening out cases where factual guilt is 
questionable or where the government cannot satisfy the trial's for-
mal proof requirements. For the vast majority of cases that never 
reach trial, the prosecutor's decision to file charges is the only assess-
ment of legal guilt that will be made before plea-bargaining. Once 
we view our criminal process from this perspective, Costello's reli-
ance on the prosecution as the sole pretrial screener of legal guilt 
becomes far more questionable. Far from being the "sole inquisi-
tional figure in an essentially adversarial landscape,"179 the prosecu-
tor has become the most powerful and important official in our 
criminal process. Therefore, the next Section examines the prosecu-
tor's exercise of charging and plea-bargaining powers to determine 
whether prosecutorial screening e.ff ectively bars either the indictment 
or conviction of factually or legally innocent defendants. 
179. Morris, supra note 46, at 684. 
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II. THE PROSECUTOR 
Costello precluded any effective lay or judicial review of the 
prosecutor's decisions. The Court assumed that the trial's stringent 
proof requirements would deter prosecutors from indicting defen-
dants whom they could not convict at trial. This Section challenges 
that assumption. 
A. Preliminary Standards 
In some federal prosecutions, 180 the prosecutor's first contact with 
the case181 occurs after the defendant's warrantless arrest.182 The 
federal law enforcement agency responsible for the arrest asks the 
Assistant U.S. Attorney to initiate prosecution by drafting or approv-
ing a complaint that sets forth the probable cause for the arrest, in 
compliance with rule 4(a).183 The prosecutor's evaluation of the evi-
dentiary basis for the arrest constitutes a preliminary screen of the 
defendant's factual guilt. Thus, the prosecutor may weed out cases 
at this early stage because the agents clearly lacked probable cause to 
arrest. Theoretically, the prosecutor could also eliminate cases 
180. In other federal prosecutions, the pretrial process begins with the prosecutor's deci-
sion to start a grand jury investigation into the alleged criminal activity of various target de-
fendants. At the start of these grand jury investigations, the federal prosecutor has already 
made some tentative decisions concerning the appropriateness of prosecution against unknown 
or known offenders if sufficient evidence can be developed. Federal prosecutors often use the 
grand jury's investigatory powers most frequently in cases involving political corruption, orga-
nized crime, white collar crime, and complex economic crimes such as commercial fraud, anti-
trust violations, and tax offenses. By using the grand jury's subpoena power to compel 
production of relevant documents and immunity and judicial contempt powers to compel the 
testimony of alleged participants, the federal prosecutor may develop sufficient evidence 
against particular defendants to warrant the return of an indictment. At this juncture, the 
grand jury must shift roles from investigator to screener in order to assess whether there is 
probable cause to charge these putative defendants for various offenses. If the grand jury 
returns an indictment, the indictee loses the right to a judicial evaluation of the probable cause 
basis for arrest because the indictment itself establishes it. See, e.g., Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 
103, 117 n.19 (1975). But see Thompson, supra note 62, for a critical evaluation of the grand 
jury's capacity to make a neutral fourth amendment inquiry. 
Accordingly, a warrant may issue for the indictee's arrest upon the indictment's authority. 
FED. R. CRIM. P. 9(a). After arrest, the defendant will be arraigned on those charges. Since 
the indictment precludes judicial evaluation of the evidentiary basis for the charges, the 
judge's role is limited to apprising the defendant of constitutional rights, setting bail, and fixing 
a trial date. 
181. When a warrant has issued for the defendant's arrest, the prosecutor's first contact 
will occur earlier. The prosecutor may use the grand jury to aid the pre-arrest investigative 
activities of the law enforcement agency. At the very least, the law enforcement agency will 
ask the prosecutor to draft or review the affidavits in support of the application for an arrest 
warrant in those cases. 
182. In practice, arrests routinely occm; without a warrant. See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 
100 S. Ct. 1371 (1980); United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 43 (1976); United States v. 
Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 423-24 (1976) (allowing warrantless arrests in public where there is 
probable cause to arrest). 
183. See note 86 supra. 
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where proof of legal guilt is unlikely, but that decision is usually 
deferred until later in the process. If there is sufficient evidence of 
factual guilt to satisfy the probable-cause-to-arrest standard, the 
prosecutor would probably draft a complaint because evidence may 
still be developed before the case goes to the grand jury. 
However, even a prosecutor who believes the accused is factually 
guilty and convictable may decide not to prosecute because the case 
is not worth the expenditure of scarce criminal justice resources. The 
Justice Department recommends184 a series of selective enforcement 
criteria that may justify a decision not to prosecute, including the de 
minimig nature of the offense, public antipathy toward enforcement 
of the relevant penal statute, a history of nonenf orcement of the stat-
ute, 185 the probable sentence if the accused is convicted, 186 the ac-
cused's relative culpability in connection with the offense, 187 the 
accused's willingness to cooperate with law enforcement officials,188 
the availability of more appropriate civil or administrative reme-
dies, 189 and the possibility that state criminal prosecution pright be 
more appropriate.190 
B. The Decision To Seek an Indictment 
1. Prosecutorial Screening of Factual Guilt 
Justice Department standards bar prosecution unless the 
prosecutor finds probable cause to believe the accused has commit-
ted a federal offense.191 However, that minimal probable-cause-to-
arrest standard does not terminate prosecutorial assessment of fac-
tual guilt. A review of the literature concerning prosecutorial discre-
tion indicates that many prosecutors do not seek an indictment 
unless they are personally convinced that the suspect has in fact 
committed the proscribed off ense.192 In making that determination, 
the prosecutor considers information probative of factual guilt such 
as informer statements, illegally seized items, and hearsay that could 
184. Justice .Department Standards, supra note 109, at 3001. 
185. Thus, some prosecutors have refused to charge for possession of marijuana in cases 
where less than an ounce was involved. Laws prohibiting certain sexual conduct between con-
senting adults are rarely enforced in some jurisdictions. 
186. Justice .Department Standards, supra note 109, at 3002. 
187. Id. 
188. Id. 
189. Id. at 3002-03. 
190. Id. at 3003. For example, federal prosecutors may decide not to prosecute small drug 
dealers so that they may instead direct their efforts to higher-ups, leaving the street dealers to 
be prosecuted by state authorities. 
191. Id. at 3002. 
192. Kaplan, supra note 23, at 178. 
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not be used at trial. For example, a prosecutor may decide not to 
prosecute even when probable cause to arrest exists, because the ac-
cused has passed a lie-detector test. 193 
However, pragmatic considerations may lead prosecutors to seek 
indictments despite their own serious doubts about the defendant's 
factual guilt. Writing about his experience as an Assistant United 
States Attorney, Professor John Kaplan notes that tactical considera-
tions sometimes prompted the indictment of both spouses for tax 
evasion when they both signed a fraudulent return, even though the 
prosecutor felt that only the husband was guilty. 194 In conspiracy 
cases, "those on the fringes might be prosecuted despite genuine 
doubt as to whether their involvement was sufficiently great."195 
Kaplan concluded that, "as a general principle, a far lower degree of 
belief in guilt ( or perhaps even none at all) seemed to be required 
when the question was whether the subject under consideration 
should be joined as a co-defendant with one whom the prosecutor 
did believe to be guilty."196 Apart from those few notable excep-
tions, it seems reasonable to conclude that a federal prose·cutor will 
not knowingly seek indictments against factually innocent defen-
dants. However, prosecutorial assessment of factual guilt may not 
always be as reliable as the prosecutor presumes it to be because of 
its ex parte nature and the quality of the information relied upon. 197 
2. Prosecutorial Screening of Legal Guilt 
a. The directed-verdict standard. Current Justice Department 
guidelines dictate that the prosecutor should select charges that "ad-
equately reflect the nature of the criminal conduct involved,"198 
"provide the basis for an appropriate sentence under all the circum-
stances of the case,"199 and "can be supported by admissible evi-
dence sufficient to sustain a conviction."200 The comments 
accompanying these standards suggest that the last factor - the 
193. Id. 
194. Id. at 179. 
195. Id. 
196. Id. at 179-80. 
197. While nearly "all prosecutors assert they would not proceed with a case where they 
felt the defendant was in fact innocent," most believe "that defendants do not plead guilty if 
they are factually innocent and that the screening process (police and prosecutorial) is suffi-
ciently reliable and error-free so that defendants passing through the screen are in fact guilty." 
L.E.A.A. STUDY, supra note 26, at xix. 
198. Justice J)epartment Standards, supra note 109, at 3003. 
199. Id. 
200. Id. 
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strength of the government's case - should be measured by the di-
rected-verdict standard: 
Experience indicates that many considerations can influence the 
strength ofa prosecution. Foremost among these [is] the weight of the 
evidence that will be available and admissible at trial. . . . At a mini-
mum, the prosecutor should have reason to believe that he will have 
sufficient admissible evidence at trial to sustain a conviction - the 
standard set forth in Rule 29(a), F.R.Cr.P., to avoid a judgment of ac-
quitta1.201 
Those guidelines, as well as some impressionistic accounts of federal 
prosecutorial screening,202 seem to support Costello's reliance on the 
prosecutor to screen legal guilt. While trials may not occur fre-
quently, the possibility of having to prove a compelling case of legal 
guilt at trial forces the prosecutor to review the legal sufficiency of 
the recommended charges. 
However, these guidelines do not compel the prosecutor to de-
cline prosecution when there is insufficient evidence of legal guilt to 
satisfy the directed verdict standard at the time of indictment. The 
comment accompanying the guideline explains that the prosecutor 
"should not . . . recommend in an indictment charges which he can-
not reasonably expect to be able to prove at trial."203 Accordingly, 
prosecutors can use the indictment as an evidence-gathering device 
because they may reasonably believe that the sanctions imposed by 
the indictment will induce defendants to incriminate themselves or 
others in return for a plea-bargain. By failing to require legally suffi-
cient charges at the time of indictment, the guidelines permit the 
government to impose the indictment's sanctions against the accused 
before it has established a minimum case of legal guilt. 
I have already suggested that indictment without some prelimi-
nary showing of legal guilt undermines basic accusatorial principles 
like the presumption of innocence204 and the defendant's privilege 
against self-incrimination.205 The Justice Department guidelines ex-
201. Id. at 3002. 
202. See, e.g., Kaplan, supra note 23, at 182. 
203. Justice .Department Standards, supra note 109, at 3003 (emphasis added). 
204. If one shares Professor Packer's view that the presumption of innocence is a norma-
tive doctrine that requires the government to treat the accused as innocent until legal guilt is 
adjudicated at trial, then the government should be required to make some preliminary show-
ing of convictability before it is permitted to impose the indictment's serious economic, moral, 
and physical sanctions against the accused. See note 77 supra. 
205. The defendant's privilege against self-incrimination promotes a fair state-individual 
balance by requiring the government to prove the defendant's guilt through its independent 
efforts. Permitting the government to indict the accused upon a minimal showing of factual 
guilt dilutes this principle because it allows the government to use the indictment's sanctions to 
induce self-conviction in return for some expected concession from the state. See note 29 
supra. 
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pressly authorize that practice. Of course, the existence of loopholes 
in the guidelines does not mean that prosecutors will always exploit 
them. Left to regulate themselves, many conscientious prosecutors 
will not seek indictments unless they already have sufficient admissi-
ble evidence to meet the directed-verdict test. Indeed, recent studies 
of state prosecutorial screening practices indicate that prosecutors 
dismiss a significant percentage of complaints because critical wit-
nesses will not be available to testify at trial.206 Nevertheless, the 
possibility for abuse clearly exists under the present guidelines.207 
b. The likelihood-of-conviction standard. Once satisfied that the 
government's case will eventually include sufficient admissible evi-
dence to reach the jury, the prosecutor must evaluate the likelihood 
of securing a conviction on that evidence.208 That complex predic-
tion requires the prosecutor to anticipate flaws in the government's 
case as well as defenses that the accused might raise at trial. Does 
the evidence dispel any reasonable doubt about the accused's guilt? 
Will the fact-finder believe the government's witnesses? Will any 
nonevidentiary factors lead a jury to acquit the accused? . Negative 
answers to any of those questions might lead to a decision not to 
prosecute. For example, a prosecutor may screen out cases where 
the jury probably would not convict because the case boils down to 
one witness's word against another's, the government's witnesses are 
reluctant to testify, or the case rests on the testimony of an admitted 
accomplice who is receiving some concession for testifying.209 In 
close or controversial cases, some prosecutors may use the grand 
jury's reaction to its evidence to make that prediction. 
While most prosecutors claim that they would not seek an indict-
ment unless there was a high probability of securing a conviction at 
trial, recent studies of state prosecutorial practices suggest other-
wise. 210 Foremost among the reasons for defective screening oflegal 
206. A recent L.E.A.A. study in 13 jurisdictions, K. BROSI, A CROSS-CITY COMPARISON OF 
FELONY CASE PROCESSING 14-18 (1979), found that prosecutors did not prosecute more than 
half of all felony arrests referred to them. The major reasons for those dismissals were poor 
evidence and problems with witnesses. See 25 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 2318 (1979) for a brief 
summary of the report's findings. 
207. Former Attorney General Bell announced publicly that the Justice Department was 
drafting a new policy governing prosecutions dictating that no prosecution should be recom-
mended unless the evidence presented to the grand jury would be at least likely to produce a 
conviction. "We will not go forward, absent highly unusual circumstances, where we have 
only enough evidence.to withstand a motion to dismiss the prosecution at the close of what 
would be the government's case at trial." Address by the Honorable Griffin B. Bell, University 
of Georgia Law School (Apr. 28, 1979). See also 25 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 2279 (1979). 
208. Id. 
209. See Kaplan, supra note 23, at 183. 
210. See, e.g., L.E.A.A. STUDY, supra note 26, at 101; Alschuler, supra note 25. 
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guilt is the possibility of conviction through plea-bargaining. Many 
state prosecutors find nothing wrong with charging and convicting a 
defendant whom they believe is factually guilty even though the gov-
ernment lacks sufficient admissible evidence to convict at trial.211 
Not surprisingly, they view the doctrine of legal guilt as a technical-
ity that interferes with their own view that justice is done when crim-
inal sanctions are applied to defendants they believe to be factually 
guilty.212 Others accept the doctrine's validity but equate it with the 
exclusionary rule and the trial's formal proof requirements.213 In 
their view, defendants waive214 its requirements when they plead 
guilty because the doctrine applies only to the criminal trial itself. 
Given this prosecutorial ambivalence about the validity of legal 
guilt requirements and their applicability to proceedings other than 
trial, it is not surprising that prosecutors see nothing wrong with se-
curing the guilty plea of a defendant who could not be convicted at 
trial. As one national evaluation of state prosecutorial plea-bargain-
ing practices noted: 
When prosecutors say they would never intentionally convict an "in-
nocent person" they virtually always mean one kind of innocence. A 
prosecutor personally convinced that a defendant did not in fact com-
mit the crime probably will drop the prosecution. On the other hand, 
many prosecutors personally convinced that a defendant committed 
the crime, but who also believe it questionable that the government 
could prove its case at trial, may not dismiss the case . . . . 
Few prosecutors interviewed by project staff are willing to dismiss a 
case solely because it may be difficult to prove at trial. On the con-
trary, virtually all prosecutors regard these weak cases as prime targets 
for plea negotiations.215 
Thus, a prosecutor may seek an indictment when the evidence of 
211. L.E.A.A. STUDY, supra note 26, at 62-63; Specter, Book Review, 76 YALE L.J. 604, 
606-07 (1967). 
212. See L.E.A.A. STUDY, supra note 26, at 108. 
213. Id. 
214. But see notes 15-17 supra and accompanying text. See also notes 29 & 71 supra. 
While certain formal proof requirements like the rules of evidence are designed to promote an 
accurate and reliable determination of guilt in an adversarial forum, the Supreme Court has 
emphasized that legal guilt requirements that preclude the state from establishing a defend-
ant's guilt are not necessarily waived by the guilty plea. See Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 
62 n.2 (1975) (per curiam) (citations omitted): 
Neither Tollett v. Henderson ... nor our earlier cases on which it relied ... stand for 
the proposition that counseled guilty pleas inevitably "waive" all antecedent constitu-
tional violations . . . [I]n Tollett we emphasized that waiver was not the basic ingredient 
of this line of cases . . . . A guilty plea, therefore, simply renders irrelevant those consti-
tutional violations not logically inconsistent with the valid establishment of factual guilt 
. . . . Here, however, the claim is that the State may not convict petitioner no matter how 
validly his factual guilt is established. The guilty plea, therefore, does not bar the claim. 
See also Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 30 (1974). 
215. L.E.A.A. STUDY, supra note 26, at 101 (footnotes omitted). 
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guilt is marginal and then offer an attractive bargain to induce a 
guilty plea. Moreover, the absence of any effective limits on 
prosecutorial discretion in filing charges permits the prosecutor to 
enhance the government's plea-bargaining position by charging the 
defendant with more serious crimes than the evidence or the facts of 
a particular case warrant.216 To prompt a plea in weak217 cases, 
some prosecutors engage in bluffing tactics where they puff the 
strength of the case before offering an attractive bargain. These 
prosecutors regard this practice as legitimate and skillful bargaining 
even in cases where the prosecutor knowingly lacks sufficient evi-
dence of legal guilt to reach the jury.218 
Nor is the possibility of securing a guilty plea the only factor that 
may bias the prosecutor's screening of legal guilt. A law enforce-
ment agency's pressure to prosecute a serious offender may lead the 
prosecutor to seek an indictment in order to preserve interoffice har-
mony when the agency can develop no better case against the ac-
cused. 219 In conspiracy cases, tactical considerations might prompt 
prosecutors to seek indictments ~gainst marginally involved partici-
pants.220 In politically motivated prosecutions, the government may 
ultimately be more interested in the sanctions generated by the in-
216. Prosecutorial overcharging is encouraged not only by plea-bargaining but by the fact 
that the defendant cannot be convicted at trial for more serious crimes than those contained in 
the formal accusation. Accordingly, prosecutors will charge defendants with the most serious 
crimes that the evidence could support. 
The practice of "charging up" because you can convict "down" but not "1,1p" is the 
more rational bureaucratically because that early in the process probably no one believes 
that the final outcome will depend on a precise evaluation of the evidence. . . . Having 
in mind that a negotiated plea of guilty is the probable outcome, the prosecutor has no 
reason at the outset to make a difficult calculation of what crime the defendant actually 
committed and should be convicted for. Although in theory the indictment or informa-
tion is a solemn accusation, in practice it is not meant to reflect that kind of careful deter-
mination. 
L. WEINREB, supra note 12, at 57-58. 
217. Estimating the strength of the prosecution's case is not a simple matter. The accuracy 
of the estimate depends upon the prosecutor's experience and the point in the process when the 
estimation is made. Recent empirical studies have "shown that the prosecutor's estimate is not 
highly correlated with the observed probability of conviction for criminal cases going to trial." 
PROMIS STUDY, supra note 33, at 19. Moreover, what may appear to be a strong case immedi-
ately after arrest may tum out to be a weak one if critical testimony is lost or suppressed. 
The L.E.A.A. Study described five types of weak cases: (1) where evidence linking the 
defendant to the crime is weak; (2) where evidence of the requisite intent is in doubt or an 
applicable defense may exculpate the accused; (3) where critical evidence needed to establish 
guilt may be suppressed; (4) where evidence necessary to go to trial is absolutely unavailable 
(e.g., the critical witness has died); and (5) where such evidence is theoretically unavailable 
(e.g., the critical witness is not in the court's jurisdiction). LE.A.A. STUDY, supra note 26, at 
106-07. These last two categories describe "the ultimate in a weak case," that is, "no case at 
all." Alschuler, supra note 25, at 65, because the prosecutor does not have sufficient evidence 
of legal guilt to reach a jury. See note 71 supra. 
218. LE.A.A. STUDY, supra note 26, at 110-13. 
219. See Kaplan, supra note 23, at 181-82. 
220. See id. at 179. 
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dictment including the public damage to the indictee's reputation 
than in any resulting conviction.221 Any one of these factors may 
lead a prosecutor to seek an indictment despite the unlikelihood of 
conviction at trial. 
Obviously, federal prosecutors are subject to similar pressures. 
Like their state counterparts, they must choose between the concrete 
reality of applying criminal sanctions to someone who has probably 
committed a crime and the abstract ideal of convicting only the le-
gally guilty defendant. "For the working prosecutor who hears of 
the injuries and damages to victims everyday the choice is not diffi-
cult. Securing a half loaf . . . (the conviction of a defendant whom 
the prosecutor presumes is factually guilty) . . . at the expense of 
upholding the pure ideals of the law is a natural choice."222 The 
choice may prove irresistible in prosecutions of indigent defendants 
who in all likelihood will plead guilty anyway because they lack the 
resources to battle the government on equal footing. 
At the very least, prosecutors' ambivalence about legal guilt re-
quirements and their capacity to circumvent most of them by plea-
bargaining, suggest the need for a more neutral pretrial screener of 
legal guilt. Since some factually and legally innocent defendants will 
pass through the grand jury's leaky sieve, the prosecutor's pre-indict-
ment screening decisions and post-indictment bargaining practices 
raise the possibility that factually and legally innocent defendants 
will plead guilty. Whether that possibility can become a reality de-
221. By 1970, all the pieces were in place; all that was required was a Justice Depart-
ment willing to abuse its prosecutorial responsibility. The Nixon administration supplied 
that ingredient. From 1970 to 1973, the ISD [Internal Security Division] conducted over 
100 Guy Goodwin-supervised grand juries in eighty-four cities of thirty-six states, calling 
some 1,000 to 2,000 witnesses by subpoena, returning some 400 indictments. The indict-
ments were often merely proforma, to cover the real investigative purposes of the grand 
juries. The normal conviction rate on grand jury indictment is 65 percent; less than 15 
percent of the 400 ISD indictments were convictions or pleas to lesser charges. Targets 
included the Back [sic] Panther party, Vietnam Veterans Against the War, Daniel Ell-
sberg, the Los Angeles antidraft movement, the Catholic Left, Mayday, the Puerto Rican 
independence movement, the American Indian movement, the Movimiento Chicano, the 
women's movement, Irish unification supporters, labor unions, radical lawyers, and legal 
workers. 
Reform of the Grand Jury System: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong,, 
2d Sess. 214 (1976) (footnotes omitted) (excerpts from M. HALPERJN, J. BERMAN, R, 
BOROSAGE & C. MARWICK, THE LAWLESS STATE (1976)). Considerable commentary has ad-
dressed how the Justice Department's Internal Security Division used the investigatory powers 
of the federal grand jury to harass enemies of the Nixon administration and gather political 
intelligence information about their activities. See generally 1977 Hearings pt. 1 & pt. 2, supra 
note 108; Comment, Federal Grand Jury Investigation of Political .Dissidents, 1 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REv. 432 (1972). 
222. L.E.A.A. STUDY,-supra note 26, at 108-09; 110-15. Some studies have suggested that 
prosecutors would face this choice less frequently if better procedures for maintaining the cus-
tody of evidence were adopted. See PROMIS STUDY, supra note 33, at 73. 
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pends upon the plea-bargaining roles played by the defense attorney 
and the court. 
III. THE DEFENDANT'S PLEA-BARGAINING POSTURE 
As shown above,223 the Supreme Court has assumed that the trial 
adequately protects our system's legal guilt requirements. A defend-
ant who is factually innocent or believes the state cannot prove legal 
guilt may choose to stand trial. If the defendant voluntarily forgoes 
that option upon the advice of competent counsel, the Court has as-
sumed that the plea reliably demonstrates factual guilt224 and intelli- . 
gently surrenders the right to contest legal guilt at trial. 225 I shall 
examine the roles played by the defense attorney and the trial court 
during plea bargaining to demonstrate the lack of foundation for ei-
ther of those assumptions.226 
A. The .Defense Attorney 
If a defendant voluntarily and intelligently enters a plea upon the 
advice of competent counsel, the courts consider such a plea "an ad-
mission of factual guilt so reliable that . . . it quite validly removes 
the issue of factual guilt .... A guilty plea, therefore simply ren-
ders irrelevant those constitutional violations not logically inconsis-
tent with the valid establishment of factual guilt."227 The Supreme 
Court also treats guilty pleas as reliable indicators of defendants' le-
gal guilt: it assumes that a competent defense attorney will evaluate 
whether the government's evidence can satisfy the trial's stringent 
proof requirements before advising a client to plead. In McMann v. 
Richardson,228 the Court emphasized the defense attorney's impor-
tance: 
In the face of unavoidable uncertainty, the defendant and his counsel 
must make their best judgment as to the weight of the State's case. 
Counsel must predict how the facts, as he understands them, would be 
viewed by a court. If proved, would those facts convince a judge or 
jury of a defendant's guilt? On those facts would evidence seized with-
out a warrant be admissible? Would the trier of fact on those facts find 
223. See notes 114-83 supra and accompanying text. 
224. See Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62 n.2 (1975) (per curiam). 
225. See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 770-71 (1970). See also Bordenkircher v. 
Hayes, 434 U.S. 357,363 (1978) ("Defendants advised by competent counsel and protected by 
other procedural safeguards are presumptively capable of intelligent choice in response to 
prosecutorial persuasion, and unlikely to be driven to false self-condemnation."). 
226. The following analysis relies heavily on the findings of a recently published national 
study of state plea-bargaining practices, L.E.A.A. STUDY, supra note 26. 
227. Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62 n.2 (1975) (per curiam) (emphasis deleted). 
228. 397 U.S. 759 (1970). 
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a confession voluntary and admissible?229 
Despite the Court's heavy reliance on defense attorneys to pro-
tect factually and legally innocent defendants from pleading guilty, 
it has not adequately defined what constitutes effective assistance of 
counsel in the plea-bargaining context.230 More importantly, few 
courts have confronted the possibility that the realities of the crimi-
nal process may prevent defense counsel from giving minimally 
competent legal assistance. For example, the courts have assumed 
that defense attorneys will be "devoted solely"231 to the interests of 
their clients without considering whether the attorneys' relationship 
with prosecutors and judges may lead them to adopt a more cooper-
ative attitude towards the institutional norms of the criminal justice 
system. 
One of those norms is the system's preference for plea-bargaining 
as the dominant mode of guilt determination. Since the criminal jus-
tice system would collapse if more defendants contested their culpa-
bility, the system "encourages"232 defendants to plead by making it 
clear they will be punished more severely if convicted after trial. Ne-
229. 397 U.S. at 769-70. See also Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 756-57 (1970). 
230. At a minimum, defense counsel should evaluate the strength of the prosecution's case 
to predict the likelihood of conviction. Some courts require that counsel conduct a complete 
factual and legal investigation to determine appropriate defenses. See, e.g., United States v. 
Decoster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1204 (D.C. Cir. 1973). But cf. United States v. Decoster, No. 72-1283 
(D.C. Cir. July IO, 1979) (examining whether claimed inadequacy constitutes "a serious in-
competency that falls measurably below the performance ordinarily expected of fallible law-
yers" and whether it probably "affected the outcome at trial." Slip op. at 21. Applying that 
standard, the court concluded that the defendant did not satisfy his burden of proving that 
counsel's failure to investigate possible witnesses to support an alibi defense probably affected 
the outcome of the trial. Slip op. at 34); Alschuler, The JJefanse Attorney's Role in Plea-Bar-
gaining, 84 YALE L.J. 1179, 1265-67 (1975) (noting that a number of courts have disputed that 
an effective defense counsel must examine possible defenses before entering a plea of guilty). 
The Supreme Court has refused to vacate guilty pleas when a defense counsel mistakenly 
concluded that a coerced confession would be admissible at trial, McMann v. Richardson, 397 
U.S. 759 (1970), or where defense counsel failed to investigate the possibility that the indict-
ment was returned by a grand jury that had been unconstitutionally selected, Tollett v. Hen-
derson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973). In both cases the Court concluded that the attorney's advice was 
"within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." 411 U.S. at 266 
(quoting 397 U.S. at 771). The Court emphasized that consideration of such factors as "the 
expectation or hope of a lesser sentence, or the convincing nature of the evidence against the 
accused . . . might well suggest the advisability of a guilty plea without elaborate considera-
tion of whether pleas in abatement ... might be factually supported." 411 U.S. at 268. 
For a recent critique of the Court's failure to articulate criteria for measuring counsel's 
competency, see Tague, The Attempt to Improve Criminal JJefanse Rqresentation, 15 AM. 
CRIM. L. REv. 109 (1977). 'See also Brown Transport Corp. v. Alcon, Inc., 439 U.S. 1014 
(1978) (White and Blackmun, JJ., dissenting from denial of certiorari). 
231. Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 725 (1948). 
232. "While confronting a defendant with the risk of more severe punishment clearly may 
have a 'discouraging effect on the defendant's assertion of his trial rights, the imposition of 
these difficult choices [is] an inevitable' - and permissible - 'attribute of any legitimate sys-
tem which tolerates and encourages guilty pleas.'" Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 
(1978) (quoting Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 31 (1973)). 
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gotiated determinations of guilt permit the prosecutor, the defense 
attorney, and the court-to process a high volume of cases efficiently 
while giving the defendant an apparent concession in charge or sen-
tence as fair consideration.233 In the vast majority of cases, an indi-
gent defendant's attorney will urge submission to the systemic 
pressures to plead. Numerous studies234 have shown that both pri-
vate and public defense attorneys suffer from a "bum-out" syn-
drome. High caseloads, sketchy information, and uncoopera~ive 
clients often make attorneys cynical about their clients' factual guilt 
or innocence.235 Although the public is convinced that clever de-
fense attorneys manipulate legal technicalities to free guilty 
criminals, many defense lawyers presume their clients are guilty of 
some crime and justify their failure to investigate the facts or the law 
by assuming that a plea-bargain is the best they can do.236 
Moreover, plea-bargaining often serves a defense attorney's own 
interests. The economics of private practice and the limited re-. 
sources of public defender agencies require criminal defense attor-
neys to handle a high volume of cases. Plea-bargaining makes that 
volume possible. Indeed, prosecutorial overcharging followed by a 
"sweet deal" that dismisses the inflated charges can create the im-
pression that the defense attorney has effectively represented the cli-
ent's interest. 237 
A defense attorney might also consider how an adversarial stance 
in one case may affect future clients. Theoretically, the defense law-
yer has an adversarial relationship with the prosecutor. In practice, 
the defense lawyer "may feel constrained to go along with the system 
because of potential retaliation should accepted norms be 
breached."238 Uncooperative defense attorneys who file too many 
suppression motions may find the prosecutor unwilling to offer at-
tractive bargains or informal discovery privileges in future cases.239 
233. Recent empirical studies of plea-bargaining have suggested that many defendants 
who plead guilty are not getting real b!1rgains because they are receiving sentences that ap-
proximate the penalties they would have received if they had been convicted at trial .. See 
PROMIS STUDY, supra note 33, at 20. 
234. See L.E.A.A. STUDY, supra note 26, at 168. See also A. RosETT & D. CRESSEY, 
JUSTICE BY CONSENT 126-27 (1976). 
235. One study found that many defense attorneys "appear to assume that a defendant is 
guilty of something, thus enhancing a rate of guilty pleas as well as reinforcing a 'presumption 
of guilt throughout the system.' ... Certainty as to factual guilt appears to override investiga-
tion into legal guilt." L.E.A.A. STUDY, supra note 26, at xxxiii. See generally Skolnick, Social 
Control in the Adversary System, 11 J. CONFLICT RESOLUTION 52, 60-62 (1967). 
236. See L.E.A.A. STUDY, supra note 26, at 167. 
237. See L. WEINREB, supra note 12, at 57-58. 
238. L.E.A.A. STUDY, supra note 26, at 189. 
239. ''The inescapable reality, insufficiently appreciated, is that the discretionary power of 
public officers to confer privileges or to be lenient is always intrinsically a discretionary power 
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Conversely, defense counsel who do not insist on time-consuming 
legal technicalities may be rewarded for their cooperation.240 
Even when defense attorneys resist those pressures and zealously 
perform their adversarial role, they often cannot obtain the informa-
tion needed to make an informed judgment about a client's factual 
guilt or the likelihood of conviction at trial. While some courts have 
held that a competent defense attorney should conduct a thorough 
factual and legal investigation,241 many defense attorneys lack the 
necessary time or resources to make such an inquiry.242 Thus, they 
must rely primarily on information gained from the client and from 
the limited243 pretrial discovery rights afforded to them. For exam-
ple, federal defendants are not entitled to see the statements or the 
grand jury testimony of government witnesses until after the wit-
nesses testify at trial. 244 In most cases, the defense cannot even get a 
list of the government witnesses.245 Unless a preliminary examina-
tion was held before the indictment, a defense attorney must rely on 
informal discovery devices, which may convey inaccurate informa-
not to confer a privilege or not to be lenient and is susceptible to many kinds of abuse, includ-
ing the worse sort of discrimination, favoritism, or caprice .... " K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY 
JUSTICE 231-32 (1969). 
240. See generally A. BLUMBERG, CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1967); L.E.A.A. STUDY, supra note 
26, at 183; Skolnick, supra note 235, at 62-64. 
241. E.g., United States v. Decoster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1204 (D.C. Cir. 1973), See generally 
ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO 
PLEAS OF GUILTY, § 3.2 (Approved Draft 1968) [hereinafter cited as ABA PLEA STANDARDS]. 
242. Court appointed attorneys received fees which did not permit the hiring of investi-
gators. Privately retained counsel could hire investigators only in certain kinds of cases 
where the clients had the needed fiscal resources. Public defenders usually had a limited 
investigative support service which could only be used on a selective basis. Where investi-
gations occurred they were restricted to felony cases. 
L.E.A.A. STUDY, supra note 26, at 180. 
243. Most of the states have ... limited a defendant's discovery by a variety of doc-
trines that had their origins in the halting and cautious growth of discovery. The most 
co=on of these doctrines holds that the question of whether to grant discovery is in the 
discretion of the trial court. . . . In addition, many states deny discovery of particular 
categories of information - for example ... the statements of prospective witnesses, and 
the transcript or minutes of grand jury testimony. 
Nakell, Criminal .Discovery for the .Defense and the Prosecution - The .Developing Constitu-
tional Considerations, 50 N.C. L. REv. 437, 474-75 (1972). 
Recognizing this problem, the American Bar Association has reco=ended that the de-
fendant be given sufficient information to make an informed decision to plead. ABA PROJECT 
ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO DISCOVERY AND PROCE• 
DURE BEFORE TRIAL § l.la(ii) (Approved Draft 1970). Some states have recently responded 
to this problem by providing far more liberal discovery privileges. See Appendix note 9 iefra, 
But cf. United States v. Wolczik, 26 CRIM. L. REP. 2287 (W.D. Pa. 1979) (prosecutor not 
required to disclose exculpatory evidence to defense counsel during plea bargaining). 
244. Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1976). Some federal courts have interpreted the Jencks 
Act to permit them to order disclosure of witnesses' statements before trial. See 8 MOORE'S 
FEDERAL PRACTICE f 16.10(2] (2d ed.1978). 
245. The federal rules of criminal procedure do not mandate disclosures of a list of the 
government's witnesses. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(2). See 8 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE~ 
16.03(3] (2d ed. 1978). 
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tion, to determine whether the government has a strong case.246 
The preceding description of the defense attorney's role suggests 
that the Supreme Court has relied too heavily on the defense counsel 
to protect the system's legal guilt requirements during plea-bargain-
ing. First, a counseled guilty plea does not reliably demonstrate the 
defendant's factual guilt in all cases. The defense attorneys' pre-
sumptions of guilt and their inability to investigate factual or legal 
defenses may lead them to advise factually innocent defendants to 
plead guilty. Without adequate advice from counsel, such defen-
dants may even believe they are guilty.247 
It is not unlikely that a large number of defendants are unaware of the 
exculpatory nuances of the law under which they believe they have 
committed a crime. This is especially true where individual elements 
of the crime are each independent preconditions to conviction and 
each necessary of proof, or where the acts themselves are measured in 
fine degree when assessing whether a crime has taken place.248 
Nor can we rely on the attorney's advice to ensure that the defendant 
is intelligently surrendering the right to contest legal guilt at trial. At 
a minimum, the defense attorney should have enough information to 
predict the likely outcome at trial. But defense attorneys' access to 
the state's case is often so limited that they may not even realize that 
the prosecutor lacks sufficient evidence to reach a jury. Indeed, re-
cent empirical studies suggest that defense attorneys often advise cli-
ents to plead guilty to charges that the government could not have 
proven at trial.249 
Increased reliance on the guilty plea to secure convictions, com-
bined with the growing realization that innocent defendants might 
be pleading guilty, prompted the courts to supervise plea-bargaining 
more actively. The next Subsection examines judicial review at the 
246. One of the major sources of informal discovery is the prosecutor, who will often dis-
close some evidence to induce a plea when the case for legal guilt is compelling. Problems 
arise, however, when the prosecutor has a marginal case. Alschuler and others have docu-
mented the co=on prosecutorial practice of bluffing in weak cases. Alschuler, supra note 25, 
at 65-67. See L.E.A.A. STUDY, supra note 26, at 10-15, and notes 217-22 supra and accompa-
nying text. The prosecutor gives the defense counsel whatever evidence formal discovery pro-
cedures require and then exaggerates the strength of the government's case, offering an 
attractive bargain to induce a plea. Some prosecutors regard that practice as legitimate and 
skillful bargaining even when it secures the conviction of legally innocent defendants. 
L.E.A.A. STUDY, supra note 26, at 110-15. 
247. See Barkai, Accuracy Inquiries far All Felony and Misdemeanor Pleas: Voluntary Pleas 
But Innocent .Defendants?, 126 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 88, 96 (1977). 
248. Clicque v. United States, 514 F.2d 923, 931 (5th Cir. 1975). 
249. See PROMIS STUDY, supra note 33, at 20. Using regression equations to predict what 
would have occurred if pleading defendants in the District of Columbia Superior Court had 
gone to trial, the study concluded that "defendants who enter guilty pleas (a) frequently forgo 
a reasonably good chance of acquittal at trial but (b) do not always receive demonstrable 
sentence concessions from the prosecutor or the judge in return." Id. See note 300 i'!fra and 
accompanying text for further discussion of this study's findings. 
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plea hearing and concludes that it does not prevent innocent defen-
dants from pleading guilty or even ensure that their pleas intelli-
gently surrender their right to contest legal guilt at trial. 
B. Judicial Review of the Plea 
I. Voluntariness 
Courts deciding whether to accept a plea consider whether the 
defendant offered it " 'voluntarily.' "25° For a plea to be voluntary, 
the defendant must understand (1) the nature of the charge,251 (2) 
the consequences of the plea, 252 (3) the rights waived by choosing to 
plead,253 and (4) the permissible inducements to the plea.254 Courts 
also assessed the voluntariness of the plea by determining whether 
any impermissible pressures might have induced the defendant to 
plead guilty. Impermissible pressures include violence, threats of vi-
olence, improper inducements, deception, and trickery.255 
One of the most important inducements to plead guilty is the sen-
tencing di.ff erential between conviction by plea and conviction by 
trial: The defendant knows that more severe punishment often fol-
lows conviction by trial than follows a guilty plea to the same of-
fense. Rejecting arguments that this sentencing differential 
unconstitutionally burdens the defendant's right to contest culpabil-
ity at trial, the Supreme Court has concluded that this differential is 
a permissible inducement that does not render the plea involun-
tary.256 
The voluntary nature of the plea becomes suspect, however, 
when one considers the bargaining power of each party. The prose-
cutor can enhance the government's position by bringing or threat-
ening more serious charges than the particular case warrants.257 The 
prosecutor may also off er the most attractive bargains in the weakest 
cases. When the prosecutor applies those pressures to an indigent 
250. E.g., McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 467 (1969). 
251. See Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 645 (1976); FED. R. CRIM. P. l l(c). 
252. See FED. R. CRIM. P. ll(c). The consequences that must be understood are only 
those that flow directly from the plea. Bell v. North Carolina, 576 F.2d 564, 565 (4th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 439 U.S. 956 (1978). 
253. Rights waived include the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to confront 
adverse witnesses, and the right to a trial by jury. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 
(1969). 
254. See Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 493 (1962). 
255. See Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 493 (1962). 
256. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978). Some state trial courts effectuate 
this sentencing differential by assigning judges who typically give stiff sentences to conduct 
trials and judges who give more lenient sentences to take pleas. 
257. See L. WEINREB, supra note 12, at 57-58. 
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defendant who cannot make bail before trial, they may prove 
irresistible. 258 
Several factors enhance the prosecutor's bargaining position when the 
defendant is in custody. If the prosecutor believes that the defendant 
has already been incarcerated for a sufficient period of time and is will-
ing to recommend a "time-in" sentence, the defendant will invariably 
agree to plead guilty to obtain immediate freedom. Even if the prose-
cutor does not agree to a "time-in" sentence, an incarcerated defen-
dant, frightened and demoralized by the prospect of an indefinite 
period of confinement, may be willing to enter a plea and accept a 
fixed period of imprisonment.259 
Since the courts have either ignored or legitimized those pressures, a 
determination that the plea "is voluntary and not the result of force 
or threats or of promises"260 obscures the fact that "the plea agree-
ment is the source of the coercion and already embodies the involun-
tariness."261 
The coercive aspects of plea-bargaining might be less offensive if 
we could say with some assurance that they only occur after the gov-
ernment has independently developed some reliable evidence of the 
defendant's factual and legal guilt. But Sections I and II have indi-
cated that no such showing is required before indictment. The state 
may indict a defendant without making even a prima facie showing 
of legal guilt and then exploit the leverage it gains from the indict-
ment to induce a guilty plea. Thus, the minimal screening standards 
used in the pretrial screening process help tip the balance of advan-
tage betweep. the state and the accused decidedly in the state's favor. 
This fact alone raises serious questions about the accuracy of a deter-
mination of guilt negotiated by two parties with such unequal bar-
gaining power. Concern about the accuracy of the guilty plea has 
prompted the courts to assess whether the defendant understands the 
basic elements of the crime and whether there is a factual basis for 
the plea. 
258. Numerous studies have documented that defendants who remain in custody before 
trial are much more likely to be convicted than those defendants who secure pretrial release. 
One study found that the defendant's pretrial status as a detainee had a far higher correlation 
to an unfavorable disposition than factors such as the defendant's previous record or employ-
ment record. Rankin, 17ze Effect of Pretrial .Detention, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 641, 652-53 (1964). 
The Rankin study found that 64% of those defendants jailed awaiting trial were eventually 
sentenced and sent to prison compared to 17% of those defendants who were out on bail before 
trial; 47% of those bailed were not convicted compared to 27% of those who were detained 
prior to disposition. Id. at 642. 
259. White, A Proposal far Reform of the Plea Bargaining Process, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 439, 
444 (1971). 
260. FED. R. CRIM. P. ll(d). 
261. Langbein, supra note 12, at 14 (emphasis original). See also Thaler, Punishing the 
Innocent: 17ze Need far .Due Process and the Presumption of Innocence Prior to Trial, 1978 Wis. 
L. REv. 441,457. 
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2. Intelligence 
As the Supreme Court explained in McCarthy v. United States,262 
a guilty plea "is an admission of all the elements of a formal criminal 
charge."263 Therefore, "it cannot be truly voluntary unless the de-
fendant possesses an understanding of the law in relation to the 
facts."264 The intelligence requirement is designed to protect inno-
cent defendants from pleading to crimes they did not commit by en-
suring that the defendant understands at least the "essential 
elements"265 of the crime. 
The facts in McCarthy illustrate how potentially innocent de-
fendants might mistakenly conclude that they are guilty. McCarthy 
pleaded guilty to a charge that he "willfully and knowingly" at-
tempted to evade tax payments. The trial judge personally examined 
McCarthy to determine whether he was entering the plea voluntar-
ily, with an understanding of the rights he was waiving and the con-
sequences that could follow.266 The court ordered a presentence 
investigation and continued the case for sentencing. At the sentenc-
ing hearing, McCarthy claimed his "failure to pay taxes was 'not 
deliberate' and that they would have been paid if he had not been in 
poor health."267 After examining the presentencing report and con-
cluding that "'the manner in which [the petitioner's] books were 
kept was not inadvertent,' "268 the judge imposed a one year sen-
tence. 
The Supreme Court reversed McCarthy's conviction because of 
the trial court's failure to inform the defendant personally of the na-
ture of the charge, as required under rule 11.269 While its holding 
rested on an improper method for determining the intelligence of the 
262. 394 U.S. 459 (1969). 
263. 394 U.S. at 466. 
264. 394 U.S. at 466. 
265. See Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 640 n.6 (1976). The Court in Henderson 
affirmed the lower court's judgment vacating the defendant's second-degree murder plea en-
tered upon advice of competent counsel. The record indicated that no one had explained to 
the defendant (who had substantially below average intelligence) that second-degree murder 
required an intent to kill. 426 U.S. at 642. In a footnote, Justice Stevens added that since 
[t]here is no need in this case to decide whether notice of the true nature, or substance, of 
a charge always requires a description of every element of the offense; we assume it does 
not. Nevertheless, intent is such a critical element of the offense ofsecond-degtee murder 
that notice of that element is required. 
426 U.S. at 647 n.18. Accord, United States v. Hedgecoe, 420 F.2d 458, 460 (4th Cir. 1970); 
United States v. Steele, 413 F.2d 967, 969 (2d Cir. 1969), overruled on other grounds, Manley v. 
United States, 432 F.2d 1241, 1245 (2d Cir. 1970). 
266. 394 U.S. at 461. 
267. 394 U.S. at 461. 
268. 394 U.S. at 462. 
269. 394 U.S. at 467. 
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plea,270 the Court emphasized that judicial review of the plea was 
designed to produce a reliable record of the defendant's guilt. Since 
the trial judge had failed to explain that the charge required proof of 
a specific intent and McCarthy had denied that he had acted deliber-
ately, the possibility existed "that if . . . adequately informed [Mc-
Carthy] would have concluded that he was actually guilty of one of 
two closely related lesser included offenses, which are mere misde-
meanors."271 
Thus, judicial inquiry into the intelligence of the plea provides 
some minimal protection of factually innocent defendants by ensur-
ing that they understand the essential elements of the crime. How-
ever, the intelligence inquiry does not require the courts to determine 
whether the defendant understands that some affirmative defense 
might apply, nor does it assess whether the government has sufficient 
admissible evidence other than the defendant's admission to prove 
the essential elements of the crime. 
3. Factual Basis 
Even if defendants understand the essential elements of a crime, 
they may not realize that the questioned conduct does not fall within 
the statute. To deal with that problem, rule 11 requires the court to 
find a "factual basis"272 for the plea before it can enter judgment on 
it. The factual basis inquiry protects factually innocent defendants 
by requiring a judicial determination "that the conduct which the 
defendant admits constitutes the offense charged."273 Whether that 
inquiry adequately protects legally innocent defendants depends 
upon the evidentiary standard used to measure factual basis,274 the 
sources of information relied upon, and the scope of the judicial in-
quiry that occurs when the court is alerted to the possibility that an 
270. 394 U.S. at 464 n.9. 
271. 394 U.S. at 471 (footnote omitted). 
272. See FED. R. CRIM. P. l l(f). While the voluntariness inquiry is constitutionally re-
quired for all guilty pleas, the Court has not held that the factual basis requirement is man-
dated by the Constitution. But see Barkai, supra note 247, at 112 (noting that language in 
McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969), suggests that the factual basis inquiry is a 
federal constitutional requirement for a valid plea because "the voluntariness and factual basis 
requirements are inextricably linked"). 
State courts are constitutionally required to establish a factual basis before accepting guilty 
pleas from defendants who protest their innocence. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 
(1970). See text at notes 287-97 iefra, for discussion of Alford. For a listing of states that use 
some form of a factual basis requirement, see Barkai, supra note 247, at 89 n.6. The majority 
of states have not applied a factual basis requirement for misdemeanors. Id. at 93 n.30. 
273. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11, Advisory Comm. Notes (1966). 
274. For example, if factual basis is measured by a probable cause standard, a judicial 
determination of a factual basis for the plea would not safeguard legally innocent defendants 
or indicate whether there was compelling evidence of factual guilt. It would simply repeat the 
screening performed by the magistrate, prosecutor, and grand jury. 
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innocent defendant might be pleading guilty.275 Unfortunately, rule 
11 inadequately addresses those issues. It neither defines any evi-
dentiary standard for measuring factual basis,276 nor restricts the 
sources of information that the court can rely upon to determine its 
presence. Left without guidance, courts have relied upon sources 
such as the defendant's own admissions,277 presentence reports,278 
the prosecutor's synopsis of his case,279 statements or testimony from 
government witnessses,280 grand jury testimony,281 and even the 
judge's personal knowledge of the case.282 Most trial courts have 
failed to identify a particular evidentiary standard to measure an ad-
equate factual basis. Some appellate courts appear to use a probable 
cause standard,283 others demand evidence of the "essential ele-
ments,"284 while a growing number refer to a probability-of-convic-
tion standard.285 The lack of clarity in defining a minimum standard 
of proof for measuring factual basis prompted one commentator to 
conclude: 
A federal court standard of proof for factual basis is virtually nonexis-
tent. The subjectivity inherent in rule 11, which merely states that a 
court must satisfy itself that a factual basis exists, and the deference 
given to a trial court's discretion in accepting or rejecting pleas have 
275. See Barkai, supra note 247, at ll8. 
276. The Advisory Committee Notes that accompanied the factual basis amendment to 
rule 11 noted that the court could determine a factual basis by inquiry of the defendant or the 
attorney for the government, or by examining the presentence report. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11, 
Advisory Co=. Notes (1966). 
277. Courts will often give a synopsis of the charges including the specific acts and intent 
alleged and then ask the accused if the allegations are true. See, e.g., Ruiz v. United States, 
494 F.2d I (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 899 (1974). Some appellate courts have criticized 
that co=on practice, especially in cases involving complex questions of fact or law. See 
United States v. Untiedt, 479 F.2d 1265, 1266 (8th Cir. 1973) (reading the indictment and 
asking the defendant whether he committed acts charged does not properly establish factual 
guilt). But see Paradiso v. United States, 482 F.2d 409, 413-14 (3d Cir. 1973) (adequacy of the 
procedure depends upon the facts of the particular case). 
278. See McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 463 n.6 (1969); FED. R. CRIM, P. 11, 
Advisory Co=. Notes (1966); ABA PLEA STANDARDS, supra note 241, § 1.6. But cf. United 
States v. Zampitella, 416 F. Supp. 604 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (trial judge's possession of the 
presentence report does not satisfy rule I l's factual basis requirement); Barkai, supra note 247, 
at 137 (''The principal disadvantage in the use of ... presentence reports is that the sources of 
the factual basis will not have any personal knowledge of the alleged crime."), 
279. See Ruiz v. United States, 494 F.2d I, 3 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 899 (1974) 
(factual basis demonstrated by defendant admitting truth of facts alleged in prosecutor's syn-
opsis of case). 
280. See, e.g., Gilbert v. United States, 466 F.2d 533, 534 (per curiam)(Sth Cir. 1972). 
281. See United States v. Romanello, 425 F. Supp. 304, 309-10 (D. Conn. 1975). 
282. See United States v. Maggio, 514 F.2d 80, 87 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1032 
(1975). 
283. Sec People v. Hudson, 7 Ill. App. 3d 800, 803, 288 N.E.2d 533, 535 (1972). 
284. See notes 262-71 supra and accompanying text. 
285. See United States v. Webb, 433 F.2d 400 (1st Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 958 
(1971); Bruce v. United States, 379 F.2d ll3, ll9-20 & n.19 (D.C. Cir. 1967), 
February 1980] Reforming the Federal Grand Jury 517 
resulted in an "I-know-it-when-I-see-it" approach .... 286 
Despite the absence of any general standard for measuring fac-
tual basis, the lower courts have consistently required a stronger 
showing of factual basis for "equivocal" guilty pleas than for "une-
quivocal" ones. Most courts characterize a plea as equivocal when 
the defendant refuses to admit culpability at the plea hearing. In 
North Carolina v. A!ford,281 the Supreme Court considered whether 
such a plea could be accepted despite the pleader's protestation of 
innocence. Charged with a capital offense, Alford pleaded guilty to 
second-degree murder to avoid the death penalty, but he insisted 
that he was innocent at the plea hearing.288 Before accepting Al-
ford's plea, the judge established its factual basis by considering the 
sworn testimony of a police officer and two other witnesses. The 
judge found that their summary of the prosecution's case presented 
sufficient evidence to support a first-degree murder conviction.289 
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of accepting 
such a plea despite the defendant's denial of culpability. The Court 
explained that 
while most pleas of guilty consist of both a waiver of trial and an ex-
press admission of guilt, the latter element is not a constitutional requi-
site to the imposition of criminal penalty. An individual accused of 
crime may voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly consent to the 
imposition of a prison sentence even if he is unwilling or unable to 
admit his participation in the acts constituting the crime.290 
Such equivocal pleas could be accepted as long as they were volun-
tary, intelligent, and supported by a "strong factual basis."291 While 
the Court did not define the evidentiary standard to measure a 
"strong factual basis," it referred with approval to the state judge's 
determination from live testimony that the prosecutor had sufficient 
evidence oflegal guilt to warrant a first-degree murder conviction.292 
The Court seemed to be suggesting that formal proof requirements 
should apply in establishing the factual basis for an equivocal guilty 
plea. 
At minimum, A!ford's definition of "a strong factual basis" re-
quires a trial court to review the legal sufficiency of the government's 
286. Barkai, supra note 247, at 123 (footnote omitted). 
287. 400 U.S. 25 (1970). The Court made it clear that it found no difference between a 
plea where the defendant protested innocence and a plea where a defendant did not admit 
culpability. 400 U.S. at 37. 
288. 400 U.S. at 28. 
289. 400 U.S. at 28. 
290. 400 U.S. at 37. 
291. 400 U.S. at 37-38. 
292. 400 U.S. at 37-38. 
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evidence before accepting a plea.293 That standard serves three dis-
tinct p~rposes. First, it protects factually innocent defendants, since 
judicial verification of a "strong factual basis" demonstrates that the 
government has more than a probable cause basis for believing in 
the defendant's factual guilt. The Court felt that a convincing dem-
onstration of a defendant's factual guilt was needed to negate the 
protestation of innocence and thereby guard against the spectacle of 
an unjust conviction.294 Second, it protects legally innocent defen-
dants who could not possibly be convicted at trial because the gov-
ernment lacks sufficient evidence of legal guilt to reach the jury. 
Finally, a judicial determination that the government's evidence 
could satisfy a trial's formal proof requirements indicates that the 
defendant has intelligently surrendered the right to contest legal guilt 
at trial. As the Court noted in Alford, the strong factual basis for the 
plea indicated that the defendant "had absolutely nothing to gain by 
a trial and much to gain by pleading. Because of the overwhelming 
evidence against him, a trial was precisely what neither Alford nor 
his attorney desired."29s 
Alford reflects the Court's view of the plea as an alternative 
mechanism for resolving criminal disputes. Accordingly, the plea's 
legitimacy depends in part on the fact that the plea reflects the trial's 
probable outcome. The defendant's failure to admit culpability does 
not defeat the plea's legitimacy as long as there are reasonable 
grounds for believing that the defendant would have been convicted 
at trial.296 However, most federal and state courts have assumed that 
293. In Alford, the state trial court actually conducted a mini-trial proceeding before ac-
cepting Alford's plea, hearing live testimony from government witnesses before finding that 
the government's evidence was legally sufficient to warrant a conviction. Thus, the North 
Carolina judge could assess the credibility of the government's witnesses and predict the likeli-
hood of Alford being convicted on that evidence. In effect, the judge was doing more than 
testing the legal sufficiency of the charges; he was independently adjudicating disputed facts, 
At least one commentator has suggested that such mini-adjudication of guilt be required 
before Alford-type pleas are accepted. See Uviller, supra note 17, at 126. I suggest in Section 
IV that the grand jury should perform that mini-adjudication for all federal prosecutions. 
294. 400 U.S. at 37-38. To "minimize the adverse effects of Alford pleas on public percep-
tions of the administration of justice," the Justice Department has advised its prosecutors that 
they "may wish to ask leave of the court to make a proffer of the evidence ... [they) could 
produce at trial to prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Justice J)eparlmenl 
Standards, supra note 109, at 3005. Actually, demonstrating a strong factual basis for the plea 
cannot "verify the accuracy of the resultant judgment of conviction any more than a jury 
verdict can be verified." Uviller, supra note 17, at 126. Instead, it demonstrates that the de• 
fendant has intelligently capitulated his right to contest his legal guilt at trial. Id. I agree with 
Professor Uviller's analysis, but it raises an interesting question. If the real function of the 
strong factual basis standard is to demonstrate that the defendant has intelligently surrendered 
the right to contest legal guilt, why shouldn't it apply to all guilty pleas regardless of whether 
the defendant admits culpability? See text at notes 298-300 infra. 
295. 400 U.S. at 37. 
296. 400 U.S. at 38. 
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such strict judicial scrutiny of the legal sufficiency of the govern-
ment's evidence is unnecessary when the defendant admits culpabil-
ity at the plea hearing. Therefore, they have only applied A!ford's 
strong factual-basis standard to those rare pleas where the defendant 
protests innocence or refuses to admit guilt. 297 
In the vast majority of cases, however, a defendant's "voluntary" 
admission of culpability at the plea hearing is part of the price the 
defendant pays for the plea-bargain. When a defendant offers such 
an ''unequivocal" plea by admitting culpability, the courts will usu-
ally establish the plea's factual basis by correlating the admitted facts 
with the essential elements of the crime. Most courts agree that the 
defendant's admission alone satisfies the factual basis requirement298 
as long as the defendant receives notice of the essential elements of 
the crime. 
Judicial treatment of unequivocal guilty pleas reflects the 
Supreme Court's dual assumptions that the defendant's admission 
reliably demonstrates factual guilt and that the presence of compe-
tent counsel ensures that the plea intelligently surrenders the right to 
contest legal guilt at trial. Section III has demonstrated why these 
assumptions are not always correct. The defendant's admission of 
culpability does not necessarily demonstrate factual guilt because de-
fense counsel may have failed to explore the applicability of an af-
firmative defense that would justify or excuse the defendant's 
criminal conduct.299 Since the defendant's admission does not indi-
cate whether the government had sufficient indepenq.ent proof of le-
gal guilt to warrant a conviction, it cannot possibly demonstrate that 
the defendant has intelligently surrendered the right to contest legal 
guilt at trial. Thus, if the chief risk of an equivocal guilty plea is that 
an innocent defendant might plead guilty, several aspects of our pre-
trial system - the absence of an independent adjudication of factual 
or legal guilt before indictment, prosecutorial overcharging, the coer-
cive aspects of plea-bargaining, and the defense attorney's limited 
297. See, e.g., Bruce v. United States, 379 F.2d 113, I 19-20 & n.19 (D.C. Cir. 1967); United 
States v. Webb, 433 F.2d 400, 403 (1st Cir. 1970). Of course, trial courts will still retain the 
discretion to reject the defendant's guilty plea. See Barkai, supra note 247, at 125. 
298. Alford requires state courts to establish a factual basis before accepting an equivocal 
plea. Many states require a factual basis for unequivocal guilty pleas as well. See Barkai, 
supra note 247, at 89 n.6. A recent national study of 25 states found that "in approximately 
three fourths of the jurisdictions visited, judges determined factual basis and accuracy of the 
plea by simply asking the defendant if he committed the offense to which he had pied." 
L.E.A.A. STUDY, supra note 26, at 282. 
299. See Clicque v. United States, 514 F.2d 923, 931 (5th Cir. 1975); Barkai, supra note 
247, at 128-29. 
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ability to prepare a defense or predict the trial's outcome - render 
many allegedly unequivocal guilty pleas equivocal in fact. 
By distinguishing between unequivocal and equivocal guilty 
pleas, the courts have permitted most defendants to convict them-
selves by their own admissions without requiring any government 
showing of legal guilt. While we cannot calculate how many factu-
ally innocent defendants are convicted through plea-bargaining, 
some studies have concluded that a significant percentage of defen-
dants who plead guilty would not have been convicted at trial. As 
the author of one such study concluded: 
These findings mean that plea-bargaining is expected to increase the 
convictions of the factually guilty by reducing the number of criminal 
cases that are nolled. As such, plea-bargaining is consistent with the 
crime control perspective. Plea-bargaining also increases the convic-
tion of the legally innocent by (1) increasing the conviction of persons 
who otherwise would have been dismissed and (2) by substituting 
guilty pleas for trials. In this instance, plea-bargaining works against 
the normative prescriptions of the due process model. The conflict is 
clearly not moot: on the contrary, even though the estimates are ap-
proximations, they indicate that conviction of the legally innocent is 
likely to incI":ease significantly along with conviction of the factually 
guilty.300 
Those findings support my conclusion that our criminal justice sys-
tem cannot rely solely on the defense attorney and on judicial review 
of the plea-bargaining process to ensure that the defendant's plea 
intelligently surrenders the right to contest legal guilt at trial. 
At the very least, the preceeding analysis demonstrates the need 
for a factual basis inquiry that tests the legal sufficiency of the gov-
ernment's proof.301 But this reform alone would not cure the 
300. PROMIS STUDY, supra note 33, at 72. 
301. To provide greater protection to both the factually and legally innocent defendant, 
Professor Barkai has proposed that the courts use a directed verdict standard to measure fac-
tual basis for all pleas. See Barkai, supra note 247, at 140. 
The choice of the directed verdict standard implies that only admissible evidence may be 
considered for factual basis purposes. This concern for the quality of proof. , , relates to 
the definition of factual and legal innocence. Concern for the admissibility of evidence 
would benefit not only the factually innocent defendant, but also the defendant who, al-
though having committed the offense, would be acquitted at trial because of the inadmis: 
sibility of the evidence. Since trial - for which the plea is a substitute - would protect 
this category of defendants, the plea should do so as well. 
Id. at 140-41. 
See also U.S. NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMN. ON CRIM. JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, 
NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 3.7(8), at Ct.-55 (1973), which pre-
cludes acceptance ofa plea if the "admissible evidence is insufficient to support a guilty verdict 
on the offense for which the plea is offered, or a related greater offense." Under MODEL CODE 
OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 350.4(3) (1975), unless a prior judicial determination of 
reasonable cause was made at the preliminary hearing, the court cannot accept a guilty plea 
until it satisfies itself that reasonable cause exists. Reasonable cause requires more than a 
testing of the legal sufficiency of the evidence accomplished by the directed verdict test. While 
the directed verdict standard requires the judge to consider the evidence in the light most 
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problems described in the first three Sections of this Article. If the 
state can satisfy a directed-verdict ( or likelihood-of-conviction) test 
for factual basis by relying on the defendant's bargained-for admis-
sions, it can still sidestep its accusatorial obligation to develop well-
founded charges against the defendant.302 Accordingly, A!ford's 
strong factual basis standard, which tests the legal sufficiency of the 
government's independent proof oflegal guilt, should be applied to 
all guilty pleas. However, strengthening the factual basis inquiry in 
this manner would still allow the state to bring charges that were not 
supported at the time of the formal accusation by sufficient evidence 
oflegal guilt to support a conviction.303 To ensure a fair accusatorial 
process before guilt is negotiated, the pretrial process must provide 
greater protection of the system's legal guilt requirements before the 
plea hearing. 
SUMMARY OF SECTIONS I, II, AND III 
Our criminal justice system has relied primarily on the trial to 
vindicate values at the ideological heart of an accusatorial system. 
The presumption of innocence, proof beyond a reasonable doubt, lay 
participation in the adjudication of guilt, the privilege against self-
incrimination, formal proof requirements designed to protect factu-
ally and legally innocent defendants - all make their entrance at 
trial. Judicial analysis of the pretrial process reflects this reliance on 
the trial. With the exception of the prosecutor, courts view pretrial 
screeners as making . only interim determinations of factual guilt. 
favorable to the government, see United States v. Amato, 495 F.2d 545, 549 (5th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 419 U.S. 1013 (1974), to find reasonable cause the court must determine that there is 
sufficient credible evidence to support a guilty verdict. See MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGN-
MENT PROCEDURE § 330.5 (1975). 
Since Professor Barkai views the factual basis requirement as a safeguard for the defen-
dant, he would permit any accused who is notified of a deficiency in the factual basis to waive 
its protection. "Possible sources of the deficiency could be conflicting facts, inference of a legal 
defense, a claimed defense, a denial of guilt, a missing element, necessity of inferring specific 
intent, inadmissible evidence, or a violation of a constitutional right." Barkai, supra note 247, 
at 141 n.329. I believe this waiver rule makes sense as long as the deficiency does not negate 
the legal sufficiency of the charges, because defendants should be permitted to conclude that a 
plea is in their best interests. 
302. For example, Professor Barkai observed that the most reliable method of establishing 
the factual basis for defendant's plea "is by direct interrogation of the defendant." Barkai, 
supra note 247, at 135. That conclusion is valid ifwe are using the factual basis inquiry only 
to assess factual guilt. However, that narrow inquiry does not demonstrate whether the gov-
ernment has shouldered its accusatorial burden of gathering reliable evidence of factual and 
legal guilt before it pressured the defendant to plead guilty. 
303. Professor Uviller has suggested that "[n]o defendant should [be] called upon to plead 
except to a well-founded charge," which he defines as one "where the credible and admissible 
evidence is legally sufficient to support a verdict of guilt." Uviller, supra note 17, at 124. 
Howev!)r, he would not require that the prosecution's case meet that test before the plea hear-
ing. He concedes that his "suggestion tolerates a guilty plea to a case sufficient at the time of 
plea though the charge was lodged at a time when the case suffered gaps in proof." Id. 
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Moreover, the courts rely on the trial to ensure that the most power-
ful pretrial official, the prosecutor, does not abuse that office's inves-
tigatory and accusatory powers. Thus, Calandra304 refused to apply 
the exclusionary rule to the grand jury because its application at trial 
sufficiently deters improper police behavior. Similarly, Costel!o305 
assumed that the need to prove legal guilt at trial would deter a pros-
ecutor from indicting individuals who could not be convicted. 
By confining most legal guilt safeguards to a stage of the process 
that most defendants never reach, the courts have seriously diluted 
the basic values of our accusatorial system. The first three Sections 
of this Article have demonstrated how the collapse of the adjudica-
tory model for determining guilt has transformed the pretrial process 
into far more than an interim screening system. In most cases, pre-
trial screening decisions by law enforcement officials, the magistrate, 
the prosecutor, and the grand jury are the only formal determina-
tions of guilt that are made. Instead of presuming innocence, the 
pretrial process presumes guilt. Instead of providing a neutral forum 
to adjudicate a defendant's guilt, the pretrial process relies on the ex 
parte determination of factual guilt made by the police and the pros-
ecutor. The indictment imprints that presumption of guilt, and the 
guilty plea insulates it from those legal guilt requirements at trial 
that are meant to vindicate the defendant's constitutional rights.306 
Lay participation in the adjudication of guilt is limited to the grand 
jury, which is dominated by the prosecutor. While in theory the 
state must develop its case independently, in practice it may use all 
its permissible pressures to induce the defendant to plead guilty 
before it ever has to present reliable evidence of factual and legal 
guilt to an independent adjudicator. As a result, our accusatorial 
system "has become more dependent on proving guilt from the de-
fendant's own mouth than any European 'inquisitorial system.' "307 
Of course, it is far easier to describe the problem than to suggest 
304. 414 U.S. 338 _(1974). See notes 162-69 supra and accompanying text. 
305. 350 U.S. 359 (1956). See notes 142-53 supra and accompanying text. 
306. A guilty plea not only waives the government's obligation to prove factual guilt be-
yond a reasonable doubt at trial, it may also effectively waive the right to appeal various 
pretrial motions made and lost before the plea, see Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973), 
But if. Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62-63 n.2 (1975) (per curiam) (guilty plea does not 
necessarily bar a defendant from raising post-plea claim that a legal guilt requirement like the 
double jeopardy clause precludes the state from establishing factual guilt in any forum). Judi-
cial approval of "conditional" guilty pleas alleviates some of these defects because the defend-
ant retains the right to appeal certain pretrial rulings affecting his fourth and fifth amendment 
rights. See Note, Conditional Guilty Pleas, 93 HARV. L. REV. 564 (1980). While the condi-
tional plea provides greater protection of those legal guilt requirements, this reform does not 
ensure that a reliable and independent adjudication of guilt will be made before application of 
the criminal sanction. 
307. Alschuler, supra note 13, at 42. 
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solutions that stand a chance of enactment. But any attempt to re-
form our system must begin with a sound analysis of the system's 
defects. If we cannot rely solely on the trial to protect our system's 
legal guilt requirements, reform proposals must address the basic 
question of how our system should protect those accusatorial princi-
ples that the trial was designed to vindicate. Section IV suggests that 
present reform proposals inadequately answer that question. 
IV. EXISTING REFORM PROPOSALS 
One's prescriptions for reform depend upon one's diagnosis of 
the problem. Not surprisingly, reformers disagree about the diagno-
sis and treatment for our system's present ills. For purposes of dis-
cussion, I shall distinguish between those proposals that radically 
remodel our criminal process and those that build on existing institu-
tions. 
A. Radical Proposals for Systemic Reform 
I. Abolish Plea-Bargaining308 
Since our accusatorial system has relied primarily on the adver-
sarial trial to protect its legal guilt requirements, the most obvious 
reform would be to abolish plea-bargaining and guarantee trials for 
all defendants. 309 However, when one considers that the trial has not 
been used to process most cases in this century,310 such a reform 
hardly seems feasible. We simply cannot afford to provide for trials 
308. "Plea bargaining is defined as the defendant's agreement to plead guilty to a criminal 
charge with the reasonable expectation of receiving some consideration from the state." 
L.E.A.A. STUDY, supra note 26, at 1-2. That definition includes both explicit bargaining, 
where defendants bargain for express considerations from the state such as charge reductions 
or sentencing recommendations, and implicit bargaining, where no specific consideration is 
negotiated but defendants realize that they will be punished more severely if they go to trial 
than if they plead guilty. See D. NEWMAN, CONVICTION: THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR 
INNOCENCE WITHOUT TRIAL 60 (1966). 
That definition of plea-bargaining recognizes that while defendants entertain reasonable 
expectation of securing some consideration for the plea, they may not get one. See PROMIS 
STUDY, supra note 33, at 43; Shin, .Do Lesser Pleas Pay?: Accommodations in the Sentencing 
and Parole Processes, 1 J. CRIM. JusT. 27, 36-42 (1973) (actions of parole board may negate 
bargain by delaying release date). Given the widespread practice of prosecutorial 
overcharging, charge reductions often create the appearance of a bargain when in fact the 
defendant receives a sentence no different from what would follow conviction at trial. 
Finally, that definition of plea-bargaining does not specify which criminal justice official 
makes the explicit or implicit offer. For example, prosecutors who claim they have abolished 
plea-bargaining in their jurisdiction are actually referring to explicit prosecutorial bargaining 
with defense counsel for charge or sentencing considerations. But implicit plea-bargaining still 
occurs as long as defendants believe they may be treated more leniently if they plead guilty. 
See L.E.A.A. STUDY, supra note 26, at 7. 
309. See Note, The Unconstitutionality of Plea-Bargaining, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1387, 1395-
411 (1970); U.S. NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMN. ON CRIM. JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, 
COURTS 46-49 (1973). 
310. See Alschuler, supra note 13, at 5. See generally R. MOLEY, POLITICS AND CRIMINAL 
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in all cases unless we are willing to commit far more resources than 
are presently allocated to our criminal justice system.311 If a juris-
diction that relies on plea-bargaining to secure ninety percent of its 
convictions decided to cut that reliance to eighty percent, the number 
of trials would double312 and trials are far more expensive and time 
consuming than guilty pleas for all parties concemed.313 In large 
urban districts like New York City,314 the criminal justice system 
would collapse if plea-bargaining were abolished. 
Even if we could abolish plea-bargaining,315 we should not. 
Guilty pleas reduce the delay between arrest and punishment, avoid 
costly trials in uncontested cases, and increase the finality with which 
the criminal sanction is imposed. Moreover, plea-bargaining would 
not subvert our system's legal guilt requirements if sufficient safe-
guards were provided in the pretrial process to ensure that the par-
ties bargained on equal footing and the resulting plea reliably 
approximated the trial's probable outcome.316 
2. Inquisitorial Reforms - The Investigatory Magistrate and the 
Non-Adversarial Trial 
Those who would abolish plea-bargaining see the adversarial 
PROSECUTION 149-92 (1929); Friedman, Plea Bargaining in Historical Perspective, 13 LAW & 
SocY. REv. 247 (1979); Miller, The Compromise of Criminal Cases, 1 S. CAL. L. REV. I (1927). 
311. To suggest that we cannot afford trials in all cases does not mean the rise of plea-
bargaining as the dominant method of guilt determination can be explained purely in eco-
nomic terms. See, e.g., Langbein, Understanding the Short History of Plea Bargaining, 13 LAW 
& SocY. REV. 261 (1979). 
312. See Burger, Stale of the Judiciary, 56 A.B.A.J. 929, 931 (1970). 
313. For example, a California study found that state jury trials took 24.2 hours on the 
average and cost the state over $3,000. Guilty pleas, which require far less preparation time 
for defense counsel and prosecution, were processed in about 15 minutes and cost $215. See 
PROMIS STUDY, supra note 33, at 51. 
314. However, recent statewide data compiled in a national study on plea-bargaining sug-
gest that "the population of the jurisdiction may not be related to the guilty plea rate." 
L.E.A.A. STUDY, supra note 26, at 18. Substantial differentials in the guilty plea rates of differ-
ent jurisdictions with comparable populations within the same state suggest that higher trial 
rates might be possible without increasing costs. Id. at 23. 
315. Reports of the death of plea-bargaining in certainjurisdictions have been greatly ex-
aggerated. In many jurisdictions, explicit charge or sentencing bargaining by the prosecutor's 
office has been sharply curtailed but implicit bargaining still occurs. See id. at 8-15. 
316. See Church, supra note 65. Church argues that plea-bargaining need not subvert 
rational sentencing goals or coerce the defendant to waive the right to trial if the system in-
cludes four requirements: 
(1) The defendant must always have the alternative of a jury trial at which both verdict 
and sentence are determined and can be justified solely on the merits of the case. 
(2) The defendant must be represented throughout negotiations by competent counsel. 
(3) Both defense and prosecution must have equal access to all available information 
likely to bear on the outcome of the case should it go to trial. (4) Both should possess 
sufficient resources to take the case to trial if an acceptable agreement does not result from 
the negotiations. 
Id at 512-13. 
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trial as the solution to our current problems. Other scholars see the 
adversarial process as the cause of our present ills, not their solu-
tion.317 They charge that instead of admitting that the adversarial 
trial is too cumbersome to process a high volume of cases with lim-
ited resources, our system preserves the accusatorial model in form 
while relying in substance upon an inadequate nontrial procedure -
plea-bargaining. One consequence of this "subterfuge"318 is that our 
informal procedures provide less protection of our system's legal 
guilt requirements than could be achieved by developing a more 
workable system to adjudicate guilt. While our formal system re-
flects accusatorial values, our informal procedures rely primarily on 
the official determination of guilt made by state officials, a basic 
characteristic of inquisitorial systems.319 But the dominant official in 
our system is the prosecutor, 320 whereas inquisitorial systems rely 
more on judicial officials to ensure that guilt will be determined in a 
manner that satisfies the substantive and procedural goals of the sys-
tems. 321 
Proponents of the inquisitorial model suggest that we explicitly 
abandon the adversarial system and replace it with some of the best 
features of continental criminal procedure. Professor Weinreb has 
proposed that we strip the police of all investigatory powers beyond 
those incidental to their peace-keeping and emergency functions.322 
He would also divest the prosecutor of all investigatory, accusa-
tory, and adjudicative duties.323 A judicial officer, the investigatory 
magistrate, 324 would assume all of those powers. Patterned after 
France's juge d' instruction, the investigating magistrate would con-
duct an official inquiry to determine whether the accused is guilty, 
considering any probative evidence and questioning the accused in a 
noncoercive manner. A defense attorney and the prosecutor would 
317. See L. WEINREB, supra note 12, at 82; Langbein, supra note 12, at 20-21. 
318. Langbein, supra note 12, at 20-21: 
But subterfuges are intrinsically overbroad, precisely because they are not framed in a 
careful, explicit, and principled manner directed to achieving a proper balance between 
repression and safeguard. The upshot is that the criminal justice system is saddled with a 
lower level of safeguard than it could and would have achieved if it had not pretended to 
retain the unworkable formal system. 
319. See notes 4-5 supra. 
320. Our criminal justice system has relied on the trial to check the prosecutor's broad 
powers. The trial also insured a proper division of responsibilities, as the prosecutor would be 
responsible for the charging decision, the jury would adjudicate the defendant's guilt, and the 
judge would determine the appropriate sentence. Plea-bargaining merges all of these functions 
and delegates them to the prosecutor. See Langbein, supra note 12, at 18. 
321. Id 
322. L. WEINREB, supra note 12, at 118-19. 
323. See note 320 supra. 
324. L. WEINREB, supra note 12, at 122-31. 
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suggest witnesses or lines of inquiry. Thus, instead of two partisan 
investigations designed to produce evidence favorable to a particular 
party, one official investigation would determine the truth.325 The 
magistrate would prepare a complete evidentiary record Or dossier) 
to substantiate all :findings. Prosecutorial discretion in filing charges 
would be eliminated as the magistrate would make all charging deci-
sions. Instead of a prosecutor bringing the most serious charges that 
could possibly apply, the magistrate would formally accuse only if 
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt for the 
specific crime charged. 326 
Once the magistrate concluded the investigation and filed 
charges, Weinreb and Langbein327 suggest that the case should pro-
ceed quickly to a nonadversarial trial. Plea-bargaining would be 
abolished. 328 The charge would reflect the crimes for which the state 
sought conviction, and a defendant's confession would not negate 
the state's obligation to adjudicate guilt fairly and carefully at trial. 
A presiding judge would direct the presentation of evidence. The 
defense attorney and the prosecutor would advise the court by sug-
gesting witnesses, lines of inquiry, and ways to interpret the evi-
dence. A mixed panel of professional and lay members would then 
adjudicate the defendant's guilt.329 
If such inquisitorial safeguards function as advertised, they are 
attractive because they provide for lay participation in a neutral 
body that adjudicates the defendant's guilt. However, I must agree 
with Dean Norval Morris that these proposals do not offer a politi-
cally realistic solution to our present dilemma because their enact-
ment would require a radical restructuring of our entire criminal 
process. 330 Although our system already contains inquisitorial ele-
ments, 331 these inquisitorial reforms would alter the traditional legal 
roles of the American prosecutor332 and the defense counsel by dras-
325. Id at 133. 
326. Id at 134-37. 
327. See Langbein, supra note 12, at 22. See generally J. LANGBEIN, COMPARATIVE CRIM· 
INAL PROCEDURE: GERMANY (1977); Langbein & Weinreb, supra note 38. 
328. See L. WEINREB, supra note 12, at 138. 
329. Id at 137-44. 
330. Morris, supra note 41, at 1368-69. 
331. See Goldstein, Reflections on Two Models: Inquisitorial Themes in American Criminal 
Procedure, 26 STAN. L. R.Ev. 1009, 1018 (1974). 
332. For example, the effectiveness of West Germany's compulsory prosecution rule, 
which requires the prosecutor to bring charges for which there is a sufficient factual and legal 
basis, rests in part upon the special career role and training of the West German prosecutor. 
The prosecutorial staff is "a career service with strictly meritocratic promotion standards." 
Langbein, Land Without Plea Bargaining- How the Germans l)o It, 78 MICH. L. REV. 204, 
211 (1979). "German prosecutors undergo periodic departmental review on a variety of fac-
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tically curtailing their powers and importance. Moreover, the career 
patterns and training of our judiciary would have to change because 
we presently have no analogue to the career role of the European 
judiciary.333 As Morris has remarked, "the outcry from those who 
have settled themselves into careers based on the old procedural sys-
tem would coalesce with the force of general institutional inertia to 
make such reforms unlikely."334 
At the very least, proponents of such radical change bear the bur-
den of persuading the body politic that the inquisitorial safeguards 
function as described. The current academic controversy over those 
safeguards' effectiveness in controlling police investigations and lim-
iting prosecutorial discretion suggests that this burden has not yet 
be~n met.335 While proponents insist that their description of inquis-
itorial procedures is not idealized,336 other scholars have concluded 
that the pure inquisitorial model describes the continental systems' 
processing of most cases no more accurately than the due process, 
accusatorial model describes our system's performance.337 
tors including dispatch in handling caseloads (~eluding dismissals as well as prosecution); 
intra-office relations; legal analysis and drafting; and avoidance of judicial rebuke and citizen 
complaint." Id. at 217. Citizen complaints may occur where the victim of a crime challenges 
the prosecutor's decision not to prosecute. The victim of the crime may first obtain departmen-
tal review of the prosecutor's no-go decision. If the department supports the prosecutor, the 
citizen may then appeal to the courts to compel the prosecution. The prosecutor's desire to 
keep his personnel record free of citizen complaints or judicial rebuke provides a strong incen-
tive to abide by the compulsory prosecution rule. 
While Langbein concedes that the American system lacks "the procedural institutions" that 
would permit adoption of a compulsory prosecution rule, he stresses the absence of a "work-
able trial procedure" as the major procedural obstacle to implementing such a rule. Id. at 212. 
However, the American system also lacks the institutional analogue to the West German 
prosecutorial system itself. Moreover, serious constitutional questions concerning the separa-
tion of powers doctrine would be posed by any reform that empowered American courts to 
compel the prosecutor to bring a prosecution. See Inmates of Attica Correctional Facility v. 
Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1973). 
333. Morris, supra note 41, at 1369. 
334. Id. 
335. Compare Goldstein & Marcus, The Myth of Judicial Supervision in Three "Inquisito-
rial" Systems: France, Italy, and Germany, 87 YALE L.J. 240 (1977), with Langbein & Wein-
reb, supra note 38. 
336. Professor Langbein has cited West Germany's system as an example of how "ad-
vanced industrial societies can institute efficient criminal procedures that nevertheless provide 
for lay participation and for full adjudication in every case of serious crime." Langbein, supra 
note 12, at 21. Although no plea-bargaining occurs for serious crimes, confessions are still 
tendered "not because they are rewarded, but because there is no advantage to be wrung from 
the procedural system by withholding them." Id. at 22. While such confessions abbreviate the 
time of the trial, trials without confessions do not take appreciably greater time because the 
procedure is "shorn of all the excesses of adversary procedure and the law of evidence." Id. 
337. See Goldstein & Marcus, supra note 335. The authors contend that the pure inquisi-
torial model greatly exaggerates the role of judicial supervision in the pretrial process for most 
cases. In France, the juge d'instruction's examination is mandatory only for serious crimes. In 
the vast majority of criminal prosecutions for less serious offenses called de/its, the prosecutor 
has the discretion to order a judicial examination but rarely exercises it. The prosecutor can 
also circumvent the mandatory examination for serious crimes by treating them as de/its. For 
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That discrepancies may exist between the inquisitorial model and 
its day-to-day functioning should not be surprising. With the excep-
tion of Professor Herbert Packer's crime control model,338 models of 
example, the authors report that in 1971 only 14.5% of all crimes and de/its were considered by 
ajuge d'instruction. Id at 250-51. Moreover, they claim that the inquisitorial model exagger-
ates the degree of judicial control exercised over the police's investigation for those cases that 
receive judicial examination. They suggest that in most cases the investigation is completed by 
the police befqre the case is sent to the juge d'instruction. Even where the investigation has not 
been completed before it is sent to the juge d'instruction, a judicial examination 
generally means only that a judge must formally authorize certain aspects of the criminal 
investigation in advance - for example, the length of the detention, the interrogation, the 
search, the medical tests. But ... this authorization often occurs after the fact and con-
firms the validity of "informal" measures already taken by the police. The judge's investi-
gative role, therefore, is essentially reactive and interstitial. 
Id at 250. Thus the "overwhelming proportion of de/its is likely to proceed to trial with a 
dossier that is little more than a police report," id at 255, because the judges do not carefully 
screen the dossiers to determine whether the charges were supported by sufficient evidence, 
Id at 263. Given these findings, the authors contend that pretrial judicial supervision in most 
cases does not function as effectively as its proponents suggest. Id. at 263-64. Indeed, they 
conclude that "[i]n Continental systems, as in ours, truth is pursued in most cases in much the 
same way: police gather facts, put them into a file, and through processes of acquiescence and 
consensus, the file and the prosecutor's characterization of it usually govern the result." Id. at 
280-81. 
Goldstein and Marcus also argue that the absence of careful judicial pretrial screening is 
not cured by the nonadversarial trial that follows. While the inquisitorial model assumes that 
the court will aggressively pursue the truth, "genuinely probing trials take place only in those 
few cases in which the defendant actively contests the charges against him." Id. at 265. For 
the majority of cases where the defendant admits guilt or does not contest culpability, the 
nonadversarial trial offers a public recapitulation of the dossier's findings. Id. at 266. In 
France, the presiding judge at the correctional court that hears all de/its, id. at 250-5 I, need not 
call witnesses if their statements are contained in the dossier. Id. at 266 & n.26. In Germany, 
the defendant can secure a noncustodial sentence by admitting the commission of a minor 
offense. The defendant can then be dealt with by a "penal order'' that allows the court to 
convict without any trial at all. "At least one-half of all criminal cases are disposed of by this 
direct analogue of the American guilty plea." Id. at 267. In other words, implicit bargaining 
can and does occur because defendants know that they can receive more lenient treatment 
when their cooperation enables the prosecutor to handle the case summarily. Bui see 
Langbein, supra note 332. Langbein argues that the analogy between American plea-bargain-
ing and the nonpenal order is exceedingly misleading. First, the nonpenal order only applies 
to those misdemeanor prosecutions where imprisonment is not an issue. Second, it lacks the 
most coercive aspect of American plea-bargaining: the sentencing differential bet~een convic-
tion by plea and conviction after trial. While the West German prosecutor is not formally 
precluded from recommending a stiffer penalty after trial than that offered in a penal order 
that the accused rejected, interviews with German defense counsel, prosecutors, and judges 
provide no evidence that such a sentencing differential exists. Id. at 215. 
338. As Professor Goldstein points out, Packer's crime control model "is less a procedural 
model than a ge_neral tendency to resist legal restraints in the pursuit of highly desired ends." 
Goldstein, supra note 331, at 1015. Its major goal is to repress criminal conduct by applying 
the criminal sanctions to defendants that the police and prosecutor determine are probably 
factually guilty. While it describes some central themes of how our pretrial process determines 
guilt in most cases, it does not present a completely accurate picture. 
While factual guilt concerns predominate, pretrial officials will consider legal guilt require-
ments at least informally. Even if the legality of police conduct in securing evidence is not 
litigated, defense counsel may use the possibility of raising a successful suppression motion to 
get a more lenient bargain from the prosecutor. Although the prosecutor is not required to 
present a prima facie case of legal guilt to the grand jury, many conscientious prosecutors will 
not seek indictments unless they can satisfy such a standard. Courts can rely on a defendant's 
admission to an offense to satisfy the factual basis requirement, but a few courts have inquired 
into possible constitutional violations, see Clicque v. United States, 514 F.2d 923 (5th Cir. 
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criminal procedure usually describe how guilt is adjudicated when a 
case receives the full process of the system. But no system of justice 
has the resources necessary to vindicate the principles of its full proc-
ess in all prosecutions. The inquisitorial principles of compulsory 
prosecution and judicial supervision, as well as the accusatorial prin-
ciple of an adversarial adjudication, demand the impossible. "Inevi-
tably, adjustments must be made in the way in which the principle is 
to be applied; where formal law or ideology does not permit these 
adjustments, informal processes are created that do."339 
Our present models of criminal procedure inadequately describe 
how informal processes compromise the system's principles. Ac-
cordingly, institutional reform cannot be simplistically reduced to a 
choice between alternative models. The strong inquisitorial themes 
in our pretrial system should not compel us to borrow inquisitorial 
safeguards or to purify our accusatorial model by requiring adver-
sarial trials in all cases. 
Since any criminal justice system must compromise principles 
that would be vindicated through its full process, the critical ques-
tion for reformers is how to mold a more summary process of guilt 
adjudication that accommodates the competing concerns of re-
pressing criminal conduct and respecting individual rights. The next 
Subsection and Section V propose reforms that use existing pretrial 
procedures to provide greater protection of our system's legal guilt 
requirements without sacrificing some of the valuable benefits of 
plea-bargaining such as speed, efficiency, and finality. 
B. Reforming Pretrial Procedures 
To protect accusatorial values, the government should be re-
quired to present reliable evidence of a defendant's factual and legal 
guilt to a neutral screener when it files charges. Such a requirement 
would limit the prosecutor's discretion in filing charges. It would 
also prevent the state from imposing the indictment's moral stigma, 
economic sanctions, and potential loss of liberty upon defendants 
who could not be convicted at trial. Finally, this requirement would 
preclude conviction without adjudication because the state would be 
forced to make an independent and reliable demonstration of the 
defendant's guilt before securing the defendant's conviction through 
plea-bargaining. 
Because few people take the grand jury's screening function seri-
1975), or affirmative defenses, see Carreon v. United States, 578 F.2d 176, 179 (7th Cir. 1978), 
before accepting the plea. 
339. Goldstein & Marcus, supra note 335, at 280. 
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ously,340 most commentators341 have selected the preliminary hear-
ing as the ideal forum to effectuate these types of reforms. The 
magistrate would protect defendants who could not be convicted at 
trial by applying a "reasonable cause"342 standard. A .finding of rea-
sonable cause would be an adequate substitute for full adjudication 
at trial because the adversarial hearing would permit the defendant 
to expose flaws in the prosecution's case. The magistrate would also 
be able to determine whether the state had complied with other rele-
vant legal guilt requirements.343 Finally, the preliminary hearing 
would off er the defendant an opportunity to discover the prosecu-
tion's case, preserve the testimony ofwitnesses,344 and, if transcribed, 
provide an evidentiary foundation for a subsequent guilty plea. 
This reform would require major changes in how most jurisdic-
340. See notes 385-86 infta and accompanying text. 
341. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE§ 330.1 (1975) (defen-
dant's right to preliminary hearing cannot be preempted by indictment); Anderson, The Pre• 
liminary Hearing - Better Alternatives or More of the Same?, 35 Mo. L. REV. 281, 284-86 
(1970); Graham & Letwin, supra note 18; Robison, The .Determination of Probable Cause in 
Illinois- Grand Jury or Preliminary Hearing, 7 LoY. CHI. L.J. 931 (1976); Weinberg & Wein-
berg, The Congressional Invitation to Avoid the Preliminary Hearing: An Analysis of Section JOJ 
of the Federal Magistrates Act of 1968, 67 MICH. L. REv. 1361, 1368-79 (1969); Comment, The 
Preliminary Examination in the Federal System: A Proposal for a Rule Change, 116 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1416 (1968). 
342. To find reasonable cause, the magistrate must find sufficient evidence to support a 
guilty verdict and find it credible. See MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE 
§ 330.6(3) (1975). Therefore, reasonable cause is a more stringent screening standard than the 
directed-verdict test that requires the screener to consider the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the government. 
Both the directed verdict and reasonable cause standards protect legally innocent defen-
dants because they evaluate the legal sufficien_cy of the government's evidence. I believe the 
reasonable cause standard should be used because it empowers magistrates to make their own 
credibility judgments. Since the preliminary hearing will be the only opportunity for adjudica-
tion of most defendants' legal guilt in information jurisdictions, the presiding official should be 
able to resolve factual disputes that involve credibility questions. See Jones v. Superior Court, 
4 Cal. 2d 660, 666, 483 P.2d 1241, 1244-45, 94 Cal. Rptr. 289, 293-94 (1971) (magistrate can 
properly dismiss rape charges when he believes defendant's testimony that the prosecutrix had 
consented despite contrary account given by prosecutrix); Myers v. Commonwealth, 363 Mass. 
843, 853, 298 N.E.2d 819, 826 (1973). C.f. Thaler, Punishing the Innocent: The Need far J)ue 
Process and the Presumption of Innocence Prior to Trial, 1978 WIS. L. REV. 441. Thaler pro-
poses a "probable guilt" hearing whose purpose "is to obtain a more accurate determination of 
legal guilt before an accused can be further detained for trial." Id. at 473-74. At this hearing, 
"the state must show by clear and convincing evidence that there is a substantial likelihood of 
conviction." Id. at 474. 
Unlike my proposal, which seeks to improve the quality of pretrial adjudication of legal 
guilt for all prosecutions, Thaler is more concerned with protecting the due process rights of 
defendants who are incarcerated before trial. Therefore, his probable guilt hearing does not 
replace the preliminary hearing and is only held for those who remain incarcerated after their 
bail has been determined. Id. at 481-82. 
343. For example, the magistrate could rule on suppression motions before the start of the 
preliminary hearing. If evidence was suppressed, the magistrate would not consider it in deter• 
mining whether the government had sufficient evidence to hold the defendant for trial. See 
MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE§ 330.3 (1975); Note, supra note 60, at 780. 
344. See notes 60-62 supra. 
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tions conduct their preliminary hearings. As Section I noted, the 
federal preliminary examination presently screens only factual 
guilt.345 Unrestricted by rules of evidence, the hearing determines 
only whether there is probable cause to hold the defendant for fur-
ther action. While most states use the preliminary examination as 
their major pretrial screening device, many use the same probable-
cause-to-arrest standard employed at the federal level346 and there-
fore do not apply the rules of evidence to the hearing.347 Obviously, 
the preliminary hearing cannot protect legal guilt requirements if it 
applies such a minimal factual guilt standard. 
Accordingly, most state jurisdictions would have to adopt the fol-
lowing reforms if they wished to use the preliminary hearing as a 
legal guilt screening device: 
(1) Apply the rules of evidence, with certain limited exceptions, to the 
hearing. 348 
(2) Permit the defense to raise suppression motions before or during 
the hearing so the magistrate's screening decision is not influ-
enced by illegally seized evidence.349 
(3) Require the prosecutor to present credible350 evidence on every 
element of the crime (the reasonable-cause standard).351 
345. See text at notes 94-98 supra. 
346. The quantum of evidence of the screening standard applicable to the preliminary 
hearing is usually stated in terms of probable cause but is not further defined. Because the 
same term is used to state the standard applicable to arrests and because the hearing often 
serves the function of reviewing the legality of the arrest in addition to screening cases for 
trial, the two standards are often confused and many courts apply the arrest standard to 
the preliminary hearing. 
MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 330.5, at 596-97 (1975). See generally 
Note, The Rules of Evidence as a Factor in Probable Cause in Grand Jury Proceedings and 
Preliminary Examinations, 1963 WASH. U. L.Q. 102, 119-24. 
347. See Comment, Preliminary Examination - Evidence and .Due Process, 15 KAN. L. 
REV. 374, 376-77 (1967). Cf. F. REMINGTON, D. NEWMAN, E. KIMBALL, M. MELLI & H. 
GOLDSTEIN, CRIMINAL JUSTICE ADMINISTRATION 563 (1969) (citing an American Bar Foun-
dation report that concludes that rules of evidence are generally applied regardless of whether 
they are formally required by law). 
348. See Myers v. Commonwealth, 363 Mass. 843, 849 n.6, 298 N.E.2d 819, 824 n.6 (1973); 
Note, supra note 60, at 779-80. While the rules of evidence should generally apply so the 
magistrate can evaluate legal guilt, exceptions could be made. For example, hearsay evidence 
may be admitted if the magistrate determines that it is reliable, that it would be unduly bur-
densome to produce the primary evidence at the hearing, and that competent evidence would 
be presented at trial to provide the testimony furnished by the hearsay. See MODEL CODE OF 
PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 330.4(4) (1975). See also N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW. §§ 
180.60(8), 190.30(2) (McKinney Supp. 1979) (permitting the admission of certain scientific re-
ports). However, mere inconvenience should not by itself justify admitting a hearsay account 
of a critical government witness's testimony that is contested by the defendant. Otherwise, the 
defendant's confrontation rights would be easily nullified. 
349. See State v. Jacobsen, 106 Ariz. 129, 130, 471 P.2d 1021, 1022 (1970); Priestly v. Supe-
rior Court, 50 Cal. 2d 812, 815, 330 P.2d 39, 41 (1958); People v. Walker, 385 Mich. 565, 574-
75, 189 N.W.2d 234, 238-39 (1971). See also MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCE-
DURE § 330.3 (1975). 
350. See note 356 infra. 
351. See note 342 supra. 
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(4) Permit defendants to cross-examine the government's wit-
nesses,352 subpoena witnesses,353 and present testimony in their 
own behalf,354 including evidence of an affirmative defense.355 
(5) Permit dismissal of the charges if the magistrate disbelieves the 
prosecution's essential witnesses.356 
The major obstacles to implementing these reforms are their ex-
pense, the pretrial delay they might generate, and the administrative 
burdens they would impose on prosecutors, defense counsel, and the 
courts. While proponents of these reforms can point to the success-
ful experience of those states357 that use their preliminary hearing to 
screen legal guilt, essential differences between state and federal pre-
trial screening systems make these reforms far less feasible for the 
federal system. 
I. State Reform - Remodeling the Preliminary Hearing 
Since most states already rely on the preliminary hearing to 
screen most criminal prosecutions,358 using it and not the grand jury 
to protect legal guilt requirements before trial makes considerable 
352. Most jurisdictions permit defendants to cross-examine government witnesses, but 
some do not permit them to confront witnesses not called by the prosecution. Note, supra note 
60, at 778 n.28. 
353. See MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 330.4(5) (1975). Bui see 
Note, The Preliminary Hearing - An Interest Analysis, 51 IOWA L. REV. 164, 170 (1965) 
(While the accused has the right to introduce witnesses in his own behalf, a controversy exists 
as to whether the accused has the right to have witnesses summoned. To circumvent the prob-
lem, some courts have held that magistrates lack authority to subpoena witnesses). 
354. See CAL. PENAL CODE§ 866 (West 1970); FED. R. CRIM. P. 6.1; MODEL CODE OF 
PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 330.4(5) (1975); Note, supra note 60, at 781. 
While many jurisdictions permit the defendant to offer testimony, this right may be ne-
gated in practice. Some magistrates end the hearing at the close of the government's case 
because they are satisfied that the government has established probable cause. See id. at 777-
78 n.27. This proposal would prohibit that practice as the magistrate would be required to 
consider all evidence including any presented by the defendant. See Myers v. Common-
wealth, 363 Mass. 843, 851, 298 N.E.2d 819, 824 (1973). 
355. See Jennings v. Superior Court, 66 Cal. 2d 867, 879-80, 428 P.2d 304, 312-13, 59 Cal. 
Rptr. 440, 448-49 (1967) (entrapment); Myers v. Commonwealth, 363 Mass. 843, 851, 298 
N.E.2d 819, 825 (1973); MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE§ 330.4(5) (1975); 
Note, supra note 60, at 781. 
356. Defendants' right to cross-examine government witnesses or introduce evidence on 
their own behalf, including affirmative defenses, would serve little purpose if the magistrate 
was precluded from making any credibility judgment. See Note, supra note 60, at 782-83. See 
also Myers v. Commonwealth, 363 Mass. 843, 851, 298 N.E.2d 819, 825-26 (1973). The hear-
ing should not only assure the legal sufficiency of the charge but also preliminarily adjudicate 
the defendant's guilt. Thus, magistrates must have the power to dismiss a charge where they 
disbelieve testimony that would satisfy a directed-verdict standard. 
357. Massachusetts has adopted all of these reforms. See Myers v. Commonwealth, 363 
Mass. 843, 298 N.E.2d 819 (1973). California's preliminary examination approximates this 
model. 
358. See note 43 supra. Even in those jurisdictions that require prosecution by indictment 
for all felonies, defendants usually receive a preliminary hearing before their case is consid-
ered by a grand jury. While most state courts have held that the return of the indictment 
eliminates the need for the preliminary hearing, see, e.g., Lataille v. District Court, 366 Mass. 
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sense. Since preliminary examinations already take place in most 
cases, requiring them for all prosecutions would not impose intoler-
able financial or administrative burdens.359 Furthermore, the grand 
jury's screening function would be duplicated only in the few cases 
that were initiated by indictment. Therefore, the only significant ob-
stacles to this reform would be the timing of the hearing and the 
added costs of expanding the hearing's scope, both of which appear 
surmountable. 
a. Timing 
Most jurisdictions require a preliminary examination soon after 
arrest360 so that the magistrate can promptly determine the legality 
of the defendant's custody. At first glance, this seems to pose a prob-
lem: the later the hearing, the less fourth amendment protection it 
provides, 361 but a hearing held promptly after arrest might prevent 
the prosecutor from preparing an adequate case of legal guilt. Nev-
ertheless, both these timing concerns may be accommodated. The 
fourth amendment could be satisfied by the magistrate's ex parte 
finding of probable cause for arrest at the defendant's initial appear-
ance. 362 A defense attorney wishing to challenge the arrest could 
525, 320 N.E.2d 877 (1974); State v. Boykin, 113 N.J. Super. 594, 274 A.2d 620 (Law Div. 
1971), 
[S]tate prosecutors generally do not follow the common federal practice of "mooting" 
almost all scheduled preliminary hearings by obtaining a prior indictment. In many juris-
dictions that practice would not be feasible since the grand jury is not available for 
prompt consideration of requested charges . . . . In other jurisdictions, where grand jury 
review would be available at the same point as the preliminary hearing, the hearing pre-
sumably is not mooted because of its significant screening role. 
Y. KAMISAR, w. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 43, at 975. 
Accordingly, my proposal to use the preliminary hearing to screen legal guilt applies to all 
those indictment jurisdictions where preliminary hearings are held before indictment in the 
majority of prosecutions. To avoid duplicated screening, the defendant's election to receive a 
preliminary hearing should waive the right to grand jury screening unless indictment by grand 
jury is a jurisdictional requirement that cannot be waived. See MODEL CoDE OF PRE-
ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE§ 330.1(3) (1975). 
359. The California Supreme Court has held that all indictees are entitled to post-indict-
ment preliminary hearings to insure that indictees receive the same procedural rights accorded 
to defendants who are charged by an information followed by a preliminary hearing. Hawkins 
v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. 3d 584, 586 P.2d 916, 150 Cal. Rptr. 435 (1978). In a concurring 
opinion, Justice Mosk noted that such a requirement would not be unduly burdensome to the 
state because only 3.9% of felony filings were prosecuted by indictment in California. "The 
actual duplication of prosecutorial effort and administrative burden resulting from providing 
indicted defendants with a preliminary hearing would thus be minimal." 22 Cal. 3d at 606, 
586 P.2d at 930, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 449. 
360. See, e.g., MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 276 § 38 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1968) (the hearing 
must be held "as soon as may be" after the defendant's initial appearance); Wis. STAT. 
§ 970.03(2) (1977) (hearing must be held within 10 days of the defendant's initial appearance if 
in custody; within 20 days otherwise). 
361. See note 90 supra and accompanying text. 
362. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 123-25 (1975). 
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still do so at the preliminary examination. Moreover, in routine state 
prosecutions, 363 neither the prosecutor nor the defense attorney 
should need more than twenty days to prepare for the preliminary 
hearing. 
b. Administrative burdens 
A more serious objection is that this proposal would convert the 
preliminary examination into a mini-trial, imposing intolerable ad-
ministrative burdens on the courts and generating further delay. But 
the fear of turning preliminary hearings into mini-trials is un-
founded: tactical considerations would usually lead defense attor-
neys to use the hearing as a discovery mechanism.364 Most 
defendants do not present a defense at the preliminary hearing be-
cause they do not want to disclose their case to the prosecutor or 
expose their witnesses to searching cross-examination.365 The expe-
rience of those few jurisdictions that use their hearings to screen le-
gal guilt suggests that the added costs and delay are tolerable.366 
363. A more serious objection might arise in complex criminal prosecutions: an early 
hearing that screens legal guilt may deter prosecutors from arresting any suspects until they 
have developed a prima facie case. But since the prosecutor will probably be involved in the 
investigation of such complex cases, this delay really does not prejudice the prosecutor. 
364. See F. BAILEY & H. ROTHBLATI, SUCCESSFUL TECHNIQUES FOR CRIMINAL TRIALS 
18-19 (1971). 
365. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 197 (1970) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Myers v. 
Co=onwealth, 363 Mass. 843, 856, 298 N.E.2d 819, 829 (1973); 8 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE~ 5.102(3], at 5.1-12 (rev. 2d ed. 1979). 
366. For example, California municipal courts handled 48,601 felony filings in 1965-1966. 
16,200 cases were disposed of by guilty pleas or dismissals without any hearing. 31,896 in-
volved hearings at which the defendant did not contest the state's evidence. People v. Gibbs, 
255 Cal. App. 2d 739, 743 n.2, 63 Cal. Rptr. 471, 475 n.2 (1967). · 
Admittedly, these statistics do not conclusively demonstrate the preliminary hearing's suit-
ability for screening legal guilt for several reasons. First, they refer to a time period when 
indicted defendants had no right to a preliminary hearing. Accordingly, California could ex-
pect at least a 4% increase in the number of hearings after its decision that mandated post-
indictment preliminary hearings. See Hawkins v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. 3d 584, 586 P.2d 
916, 150 Cal. Rptr. 435 (1978). But this minimal increase in the number of hearings conducted 
is not the only cost. California prosecutors often use indictments in complex criminal prosecu-
tions with multiple defendants. 22 Cal. 3d at 606, 586 P.2d at 930, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 449 (Mosk, 
J., concurring). Therefore, "the relatively small number of indictments might yield a dispro-
portionate increase in consumed court time because complex cases ... would require rela-
tively lengthy adversary hearings." 22 Cal. 3d at 606, 586 P.2d at 930, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 449 
(Mosk, J., concurring). 
Justice Mosk suggested that those additional burdens might be offset by the fact that these 
hearings "would likely yield a greater number of dismissals or guilty pleas as the parties would 
have a superior opportunity to appraise the relative strengths and weaknesses of their por-
tions." 22 Cal. 3d at 606, 586 P .2d at 930, 150 Cal. Rpir. at 449 (Mosk, J,, concurring). More-
over, the rules governing the conduct of the preliminary hearing can alleviate this concern. 
For example, hearsay testimony could be used under certain limited circumstances to remove 
undue inconvenience or unnecessary delay. See note 347 supra. Cf. MODEL CODE OF PRE• 
ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE§ 330.4(6) (1975) (court can promote expeditious hearing by limit-
ing length of examination and the number of witnesses to be called). 
Even if these safeguards limiting the scope of the hearing prove ineffective and the result-
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2. Federal Reform 
Using the federal preliminary examination to screen legal guilt 
faces similar objections of expense, administrative burden, and pre-
trial delay, but the objections carry far greater force. Unlike most 
states, the federal system relies primarily on the grand jury, and not 
the preliminary hearing, to screen prosecutions because the fifth 
amendment367 requires that all federal prosecutions for felonies 
commence by indictment.368 In contrast to most states,369 only about 
twenty percent of federal prosecutions involve preliminary examina-
tions because370 most defendants are indicted before the hearing is 
ing administrative burdens are not offset by an increase in dismissals or guilty pleas, increasing 
the scope of the hearing would probably not impose intolerable costs and delay. Expanding 
the hearing's scope might demand more preparation time by the prosecutor and the defense 
attorney and increase the time spent at the hearing by all participants. But a significant in-
crease in the number of hearings would be far more expensive because of the increased need 
for prosecutors, defense counsels, and judges. 
I have not discovered any empirical data that compares the expense and duration of pre-
liminary hearings that screen factual guilt (probable cause) with those that screen legal guilt 
(directed verdict). My own observations as a criminal defense attorney in Massachusetts 
before and after Myers v. Commonwealth, 363 Mass. 843, 298 N.E.2d 819 (1973), lead me to 
conclude that the additional time and expense is not unduly burdensome. Before Myers, some 
district court judges conducted the preliminary hearing like its federal counterpart. Police 
officers gave hearsay summaries of the prosecution's witnesses over the defense counsel's ob-
jections. Some judges would end the hearing before the defense had an opportunity to cross-
examine witnesses or introduce testimony. After Myers, those practices were clearly illegal. 
Accordingly, preliminary hearings in these courts were somewhat longer because the court 
could not end the hearing prematurely after testimony of one government witness. However, 
defense counsel rarely raised affirmative defenses. Indeed, defense testimony was rarely of-
fered. Post-Myers hearings were somewhat longer than pre-Myers hearings because defense 
counsel had a greater opportunity to discover the prosecution's case. 
367. See note 45 supra. 
368. The fifth amendment requires indictment for all "infamous" crimes. FED. R. CRIM. 
P. 7(a) equates an infamous crime with an offense punishable by imprisonment for a term 
exceeding one year. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(a), Advisory Comm. Note I. All crimes punish-
able by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year are felonies; all other crimes are misde-
meanors. While the fifth amendment does not require indictments for misdemeanors, 
prosecutors may commence prosecutions for misdemeanors by either indictment or informa-
tion. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(a). 
The indictment requirement for felonies cannot be waived in a capital case. See Smith v. 
United States, 360 U.S. I (1959). Defendants are permitted to waive the indictment require-
ment for other felonies, see Barkman v. Sanford, 162 F.2d 592 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 
816 (1947), and defendants who have decided to plead guilty frequently do waive,indictment. 
See 8 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE ~ 7.03(1), at 7-9 (rev. 2d ed. 1979). The prosecutor may 
proceed by filing an information for any misdemeanor and any noncapital felony in which 
indictment has been waived. Id. ~ 7.02, at 7-7. 
369. Many states permit the prosecutor to proceed on an information that will be followed 
by a preliminary hearing. See note 43 supra. Even in some jurisdictions that require an in-
dictment for all felonies, the defendant-receives a preliminary hearing before the grand jury 
considers the case. See note 358 supra. 
370. In fiscal year 1976, 24,991 criminal prosecutions were commenced by indictment, 
12,278 were commenced by information where indictment was waived, and 11,543 were com-
menced by information. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED 
STATES COURTS, Table 37,254 (1977). Preliminary examinations were conducted in only 5,502 
cases. Id. at 122. In the Southern District of New York, 1,129 original criminal prosecutions 
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held and the indictment obviates the need for the hearing.371 There-
fore, a reform that mandates preliminary hearings for all federal 
prosecutions would be far more expensive for the federal system 
than for the states. While some defendants would decide to plead 
guilty before the hearing, it is unlikely that the hearing's stiffened 
standard of proof will increase the number of pleas that are presently 
made before the hearing. Indeed, a more rigorous standard of proof 
should encourage defendants to delay bargaining until the govern-
ment passes this preliminary hurdle.372 Any significant rise in the 
number of hearings held would require a tremendous increase in the 
prosecutorial, defense, and judicial resources presently expended. 
This proposal would also clash with Congress's commitment to guar-
antee federal defendants a speedy trial:373 pretrial delay would be 
lengthened by the increased number of preliminary examinations374 
(including misdemeanors and petty offenses) were filed, id at 358, Table DIAC, and only one 
preliminary examination was conducted, id at 293, Table 51. 
371. FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(c). 
312. Contra, Note, supra note 60, at 791. The Note argues that the federal preliminary 
hearing should screen legal guilt. Though conceding that "the expense might well be intolera-
ble," if every felony defendant in the federal system were given such a hearing, the author 
suggests that most defendants who now plead guilty before trial would probably plead guilty 
before this hearing was conducted. Id That prediction is based on the author's belief that the 
government will have little to gain by bargaining once the prosecutor "has gone to the trouble 
of producing sufficient evidence to avoid a direct acquittal and has generally memorialized its 
case." Id 
That argument ignores several reasons why defendants would exercise their right to a pre-
liminary examination. First, if the hearing is held promptly after arrest and before the case is 
sent to the grand jury, many defense attorneys will use the hearing as a discovery device to 
determine the strength of the government's case. Second, although the government may pass 
this directed-verdict hurdle at the hearing, conviction at trial is not a foregone conclusion. 
Witnesses might change their testimony; evidence might be lost or suppressed. Moreover, a 
magistrate's determination at this early stage that there is sufficient evidence of legal guilt to 
support a conviction does not mean that the same evidence will convince a jury beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Finally, the strength of the prosecution's case is not the only factor that 
fosters plea-bargaining. A defendant's plea after the hearing will still spare prosecutors con-
siderable effort and expense preparing for trial. Admittedly, the defendant's negotiating posi-
tion will be weaker after the prosecutor passes this hurdle, but an incentive to bargain remains. 
373. 18 u.s.c. §§ 3161-3174 (1976). 
314. See note 370 supra. Proponents of reform measures such as H.R. 94, which calls for 
preliminary hearings in all federal prosecutions, have suggested that such a reform is a com-
promise. They insist that requiring preliminary hearings in all cases would be less time-con-
suming than those grand jury reform bills that "have suggested 'mini-trials' at which a 
defendant would have the right to object to the sufficiency of the evidence[,] the admissibility 
of the evidence, and other legal improprieties before the grand jury .... " 1977 Hearings, pt. 
2, supra note 108, at 1593 (Memorandum by Alfred M. Little and Martin H. Belsky). Support-
ers assert that H.R. 94 would not mandate such mini-trials but would rather apply the existing 
machinery, (the preliminary examination) to insure that the prosecutor has sufficient admissi-
ble evidence to proceed to trial. Id That argument overlooks that the existing machinery is 
rarely used and that using it for most federal prosecutions would dramatically increase pretrial 
delay. 
Ironically, the proponents of H.R. 94 have retained the hearing's probable cause to arrest 
standard even though they intended the hearing to screen legal guilt. Id at 1593-94. 
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and by the expanded scope of the hearing. 375 
Finally, the reform inflicting these costs would duplicate the 
grand jury's screening function for most federal prosecutions. Since 
passage of a constitutional amendment abolishing the indictment re-
quirement is unlikely,376 most federal prosecutions would have to 
pass through both the grand jury and the preliminary hearing. Two 
full-dress presentations of the prosecution's case are hard to jus-
tify.377 If the preliminary hearing preceded the grand jury and the 
prosecutor's case satisfied the hearing's stringent legal guilt stan-
dards,378 why should the prosecutor repeat379 that performance 
before a lay body that applies a less stringent factual guilt standard? 
375. I discounted this problem at the state level because of the routine nature of most state 
criminal prosecutions. However, the adversarial presentation of a prima facie case of legal 
guilt for many complex federal crimes (e.g., antitrust, tax, fraud prosecutions) could prove 
time-consuming. See 1977 Hearings, pt. 2, supra note 108, at 794 (testimony of Bruce Babbitt, 
Arizona Attorney General), which states in part: 
The second area of specific concern is the provision of Section 9 requiring a preliminary 
hearing, in addition to the present Fifth Amendment requirement of a grand jury indict-
ment for all infamous crimes. The clear effect of this will be to tum the present two step 
criminal process into a three tiered proceeding. In complex paper cases this extra step, 
interposing an additional adversary proceeding, will burden both prosecution and courts 
to the breaking point. 
Our office has prosecuted and is presently prosecuting complex fraud cases, often in-
volving the reconstruction of several years of business transactions and accumulated 
financial records. These cases routinely require a year or more of investigation by many 
investigators and lawyers aided by the grand jury's subpoena power .... After indict-
ment, this type of case will then require several months of trial time. 
. . . In our experience, complex paper cases cannot be effectively handled through the 
preliminary hearing route. 
Absent the strictures of the Fifth Amendment, many federal cases would probably be 
more suitable for a preliminary hearing than grand jury action. I believe that in many 
types of cases both prosecutors and defense counsel would generally agree that the prelim-
inary hearing is a superior alternative. 
But in some areas, particularly complex financial cases, the preliminary hearing, as a 
form of mini-trial, is not feasible. The largi: case involving multiple defendants, scores of 
witnesses and literally rooms of paper is a new phenomenon that presents special 
problems. Few jurisdictions outside the Federal government have experience in this area. 
The apparent lack of objection from many states to the preliminary hearing proposal of 
H.R. 94 should not be interpreted as endorsement based on experience with this type of 
prosecution. 
376. Resolutions have been introduced calling for constitutional amendments. H.R. 62 
would eliminate the constitutional requirement of the grand jury but permit Congress to au-
thorize investigatory grand juries and to require indictments in certain cases. H.R. 61 would 
eliminate the indicting grand jury but permit retention of the investigatory grand jury. 1977 
Hearings, pt. 2, supra note 108, at 1003. These resolutions have attracted little support in 
Congress. 
377. See 1977 Hearings, pt. 1, supra note 108, at 722 (statement of Benjamin R. Civiletti, 
Asst. Attorney General, U.S. Dept. of Justice). 
378. H.R. 94 makes even less sense since the bill does not purport to change the hearing's 
minimal probable cause standard. 1977 Hearings, pt. 2, supra note 108, at 1593-94 (memoran-
dum by Alfred M. Nittle and Martin H. Belsky). 
379. There would not be duplication in every prosecution because more defendants would 
waive indictment once the prosecution had passed the preliminary hearing's more stringent 
hurdle. But cf. A. AMSTERDAM, B. SEGAL & M. MILLER, TRIAL MANUAL FOR THE DEFENSE 
OF CRIMINAL CASES§ 156 (2d ed. 1971) (generally recommending against waiver even when 
indictment is a virtual certainty). 
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Conversely, the value of the grand jury would be seriously dimin-
ished if a magistrate could veto its :findings after seeing an identical 
evidentiary presentation. 
Proponents of this reform respond in two ways, neither of which 
resolves the dilemma. First, they argue that no duplication in 
screening occurs because the grand jury merely rubberstamps the 
prosecutor's decision.380 That argument assumes the grand jury's in-
stitutional incapacity to screen the prosecutor's case. It thus begs the 
basic question of whether the grand jury could be reformed to per-
form a valuable screening function, thereby avoiding duplicated 
screening. Second, they suggest that when the grand jury functions 
properly, it serves different purposes from the preliminary examina-
tion. The grand jury is an ex parte proceeding that allows the com-
munity to check oppressive executive power by interjecting 
community notions of justice. In contrast, the preliminary examina-
tion's adversarial format and professional magistrate promote a 
more accurate determination of factual guilt and weed out those 
cases where proof of legal guilt is unlikely.381 But that argument 
overlooks the fact that neither the grand jury nor the preliminary 
hearing presently screens legal guilt. It compares the grand jury's 
present limited screening function with a reformed preliminary hear-
ing that would screen legal guilt. Although the two proceedings 
would then appear to serve different screening purposes, they would 
still require two dress-rehearsals of the prosecution's case. More-
over, the preliminary hearing's stringent review should deter bad-
faith prosecutions, thereby rendering the grand jury's function of 
checking oppressive executive action fairly superfluous.382 
Unlike many states, the federal system has a choice: it could use 
either the constitutionally compelled grand jury or the preliminary 
hearing to screen legal guilt. Skepticism about the grand jury's abil-
ity to perform an independent screening function coupled with our 
system's preference for adversarial rather than ex parte proceedings 
have led reformers to choose the preliminary hearing. In an ideal 
world with unlimited resources, I would make the same choice. But, 
in a federal system that rarely conducts preliminary hearings, this 
reform would be a step in the wrong direction. Instead of adding 
another major procedural step in an already cumbersome pretrial 
380. See Note, supra note 60, at 802. 
381. Id. at 803. 
382. The grand jury could still serve an equitable function by refusing to indict when it 
believed that justice would not be served by a literal application of the criminal law. See 
United States v. Ciambrone, 601 F.2d 616,629 (2d Cir. 1979) (Friendly, J., dissenting); United 
States v. Asdrubal-Herrera, 470 F. Supp. 939 (N.D. Ill. 1979). 
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process, federal reform efforts should consider how the grand jury 
and some limited form of judicial review could be used to preclude 
conviction without adjudication. 
V. REFORMING THE FEDERAL GRAND JURY'S ACCUSATORY 
FUNCTION 
Section IV concluded that the pretrial process should provide for 
a preliminary adjudication of a defendant's factual and legal guilt 
before the state secures a conviction through plea-bargaining. This 
Section evaluates whether the federal grand jury can be reformed to 
perform that function. Subsection A examines how some federal 
courts have revitalized the prosecutorial misconduct doctrine to im-
prove the quality of grand jury screening. Expanding on the reforms 
suggested in those cases, Subsection B offers several proposals that 
would enable the grand jury to vindicate some of the accusatorial 
values embodied in the concept of legal guilt. 
A. Prosecutorial Misconduct .Doctrine 
While the grand jury was enshrined in our Constitution because 
of its reputed ability to protect the innocent from unfounded prose-
cution, 383 few scholars take its screening function seriously today.384 
Critics of the grand jury argue that inexperienced and untrained citi-
zens cannot possibly screen out unwarranted prosecutions in an ex 
parte proceeding where they hear only the government's side of the 
case and depend on the prosecutor for all legal advice and direction. 
Relying on empirical studies indicating that the grand jury rarely 
refuses to indict, 385 those critics have concluded that the grand jury 
can serve no useful accusatorial function. 386 
The question often overlooked in these broadside attacks is 
whether the grand jury's tendency to rubberstamp the prosecutor's 
decisions stems from some inherent institutional defect or from some 
383. Supporters of the grand jury have often responded to critics' charges by pointing to its 
historic role as an independent buffer between the state and the innocent accused. However, 
recent accounts of the grand jury's history both in England and in this country indicate that 
the grand jury extended its protection in a highly politicized manner. See, e.g., L. CLARK, THE 
GRAND JURY 16-18 (1975); Schwartz, .Demythologizing the Historic Role of the Grand Jury, 10 
AM. CRIM. L. REv. 701 (1972). 
384. See, e.g., Campbell, supra note 46; Antell, supra note 48. 
385. See, e.g., Morse, A Survey of the Grand Jury System, 10 OR. L. REV. 101, 217, 295 
(1931). Cf. Dession, From Indictment to Information - Implications of the Sh!ft, 42 YALE L.J. 
163, 178-79 (1932) (arguing in part that grand jury's high rate of concurrence with prosecutor's 
decisions merely demonstrates excellent pretrial screening by prosecutor). 
386. In 1976, federal grand juries returned approximately 23,000 indictments and reported 
only 123 no true bills. 1977 Hearings, pt. 1, supra note 108, at 738 (testimony of Benjamin R. 
Civiletti, Asst. Attorney General, U.S. Dept. of Justice). 
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other cause that can be remedied without turning its ex parte inquiry 
into a full-fledged adversarial hearing. One cannot answer this ques-
tion by pointing to the grand jury's past failures, because the courts 
have not given the grand jury an opportunity to prove its institu-
tional value. 387 As Section I suggested, the courts have weakened 
the grand jury's capacity to perform a valuable accusatory function 
by assigning it a minimal factual guilt screening standard and by 
granting the prosecutor complete control over the quality of evidence 
presented to it. 
Recognizing this problem, some federal courts have cautiously 
begun to supervise the prosecutor's evidentiary presentation to the 
grand jury. To do so, they have used a revitalized prosecutorial mis-
conduct doctrine to circumvent Costello's prohibition against di-
rectly evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence presented to the 
grandjury.388 Seizing upon Justice Black's caveat that an indictment 
must be returned by an "unbiased" grandjury,389 some lower courts 
have posited a series of evidentiary duties that the prosecutor owes 
the grand jury to ensure the return of an "unbiased" indictment. 
When the prosecutor violates those duties, these courts will find 
prosecutorial misconduct, which may justify dismissal of the indict-
ment. 390 While the prosecutorial misconduct doctrine is not new, the 
courts had traditionally applied it only when the prosecutor had ac-
ted outrageously toward a witness391 or had unfairly pressured the 
grand jury into returning a true bill.392 This Subsection examines 
the courts' expanded application of the doctrine to determine 
whether it offers a principled standard for system-wide reform. 
387. See text accompanying notes 170-79 supra. Admittedly, one cannot say for certain 
whether the grand jury would reliably adjudicate the defendant's factual guilt once these disa-
bilities were removed. However, I believe a lay body can perform a valuable fact-finding 
function like its counterpart at trial if appropriate safeguards are enacted. We should give the 
grand jury an opportunity to prove its value before we give up on the one lay body that partici-
pates in federal criminal prosecutions. 
388. See text at note 164 supra. 
389. 350 U.S. at 363. 
390. See, e.g., United States v. Samango, 450 F. Supp. 1097 (D. Hawaii 1978), ajfd., 607 
F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1979). 
391. See, e.g., United States v. Wells, 163 F. 313 (D. Idaho 1908) (indictment dismissed 
because prosecutor badgered defendant's witnesses in his questioning, entered grand jury 
room during its private deliberations, and urged them to indict). Bui see United States v. 
Bruzgo, 373 F.2d 383 (3d Cir. 1967) (court criticized prosecutor for threatening one grand jury 
witness with jail and calling her a "racketeer'' but refused to dismiss the defendant's indict-
ment). q: United States v. Serubo, 604 F.2d 807 (3d Cir. 1979) (vacating judgment on sen-
tence and remanding case so that district court could determine whether prosecutorial 
misconduct tainted grand jury which returned indictment). 
392. See, e.g., United States v. Wells, 163 F. 313 (D. Idaho 1908). 
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l. Excessive Use of Hearsay Evidence 
Costello legitimated a common prosecutorial practice in routine 
cases of presenting the government's case through the hearsay testi-
mony of federal law enforcement agents.393 That practice saves time 
and minimizes inconvenience to government witnesses. It also pre-
vents the grand jury from predicting the likelihood of conviction by 
precluding any assessment of the credibility of the government's trial 
witnesses. Finally, such a practice permits the prosecutor to secure 
indictments when there may be insufficient legally admissible evi-
dence to warrant a conviction at trial. Concern about the quality of 
grand jury screening under such circumstances prompted the Second 
Circuit to reevaluate Costello's approval of indictments based exclu-
sively on hearsay testimony. 
The first signs of judicial dissatisfaction came in a dissenting 
opinion by Judge Friendly in United States v. Payton.394 Judge 
Friendly noted that the use of government agents to summarize 
voluminous financial records in Costello made sense because their 
hearsay testimony would be admissible at trial once the proper ex-
pert foundation had been established.395 To require presentation of 
that foundation to the grand jury would have converted its ex parte 
inquiry into a prolonged mini-trial. Moreover, "the agent's lack of 
direct knowledge must have been apparent" to the Costello grand 
jurors.396 Judge Friendly concluded, however, that Costello did not 
justify the use of hearsay testimony in routine prosecutions where 
more reliable evidence was readily available. Relying on Justice 
Burton's concurring opinion in Costello, he suggested that the prose-
cutor who presents hearsay evidence . 
must make clear to the jurors the shoddy merchandise they are getting 
so they can seek something better if they wish, thus pressing the prose-
cution for more reliable evidence - particularly important in these 
narcotics prosecutions where there is often a problem of the reliability 
of an agent's identification.397 
Echoing Judge Friendly's concern, a three-judge panel in United 
States v. Umans398 observed that excessive reliance on hearsay testi-
mony "tends to destroy the historical function of grand juries in as-
393. See 8 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE ~ 6.03(2), at 6-44 (rev. 2d ed. 1979). 
394. 363 F.2d 996 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 993 (1966). 
395. 363 F.2d at 1000 (Friendly, J., dissenting). 
396. 363 F.2d at 1000. 
397. 363 F.2d at 1000. 
398. 368 F.2d 725 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 389 U.S. 80 
(1967). 
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sessing the likelihood of prosecutorial success."399 Writing for the 
panel, Circuit Judge Waterman warned government prosecutors that 
"[h]earsay evidence should only be used when direct testimony is 
unavailable or when it is demonstrably inconvenient to summon wit-
nesses able to testify to facts from personal knowledge."400 
Apparently the courts' sanctionless warnings did not have their 
intended effect. Two years after Umans, Judge Weinstein noted in 
United States v. Arcuri401 that "[t]he practice revealed in the case 
before us, where the indictment was handed down some two months 
after the decision in Umans, suggests the need for a stronger rule and 
more uniformly applied sanctions to enforce it."402 Accordingly, he 
announced a prospective rule that indictments would be dismissed 
without a showing of prejudice to the defendants "if it is clear that 
hearsay alone was deliberately relied upon when better evidence was 
readily available for presentation to the grand jury."403 Judge Wein-
stein justified this stringent best-evidence requirement by explaining 
that the government's practice of offering only hearsay testimony ob-
structed the grand jury's screening functions. While Judge 
Friendly's Payton dissent had emphasized that the excessive use of 
unreliable hearsay testimony weakens the grand jury's ability to 
screen factual guilt, Judge Weinstein emphasized how it impairs the 
grand jury's ability to evaluate the likelihood of a conviction at trial. 
To make that prediction of legal guilt, the grand jury must be given 
the opportunity to judge the credibility of the government's principal 
trial witnesses. 
The practice - as in the instant case - of relying on hearsay rather 
than upon the testimony of eye-witnesses is pernicious for two reasons. 
First, it habituates the grand jury to rely upon "evidence" which ap-
pears smooth, well integrated and consistent in all respects. Particu-
larly because neither cross-examination nor defense witnesses are 
available to them, grand jurors do not hear cases with the rough edges 
that result from the often halting, inconsistent and incomplete testi-
mony of honest observers of events. Thus, they are unable to distin-
guish between prosecutions which are strong and those which are 
relatively weak. All cases are presented in an equally homogenized 
form. A grand jury so conditioned is unable to adequately serve its 
function as a screening agency. It cannot exercise its judgment in re-
fusing to indict in weak cases where, technically, a prima facie case 
may have been made out. It is, moreover, unlikely to demand addi-
399. 368 F.2d at 730. 
400. 368 F.2d at 730. 
401. 282 F. Supp. 347 (E.D.N.Y.), qffd., 405 F.2d 691 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 
913 (1969). 
402. 282 F. Supp. at 351. 
403. 282 F. Supp. at 351. 
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tional evidence.404 
A year later, in United States v. Leibowitz,405 the Second Circuit 
applied a far less rigorous standard of review in considering the 
same prosecutorial practice condemned by Judge Weinstein. Instead 
of calling its chief trial witness, who would have testified about the 
critical events underlying the indictment from personal knowledge, 
the prosecutor called an FBI agent who presented a hearsay sum-
mary of the government's evidence.406 Without even a passing refer-
ence to Arcuri, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's refusal 
to dismiss the indictments. The court attempted to rebut the govern-
ment's argument that its Umans warning was inconsistent with Cos-
tello. After noting that the Second Circuit had consistently upheld 
indictments based upon hearsay testimony despite its Umans admo-
nition, Judge Hays concluded that indictments based exclusively on 
such testimony should not be dismissed, "unless it appears that dis-
missal is required to protect the integrity of the judicial process."407 
He then identified two seemingly independent criteria for determin-
ing when judicial integrity was at stake: (1) where the grand jury "is 
misled into thinking it is getting eye-witness testimony from the 
agent whereas it is actually being given an account whose hearsay 
nature is concealed,"408 or (2) where "the defendant could show that 
there is a high probability that with eye witness rather than hearsay 
testimony the grand jury would not have indicted."409 
The differences between Judge Weinstein's suggested rule in 
Arcuri and the Leibowitz rule for improper use of hearsay are strik-
ing. To predict the likelihood of conviction, a grand jury must con-
sider the evidence that the government intends to use at trial. Arcuri 
promotes that legal guilt screening function by forcing the prosecu-
tor to present the best available evidence. On the other hand, Leibo-
witz offers only minimal protection of the grand jury's factual guilt 
screening function by encouraging prosecutors not to mislead grand 
jurors about the quality of the evidence they are considering. Even 
when that occurs, Leibowitz leaves open the possibility of sustaining 
indictments where the defendant fails to convince the court that the 
404. 282 F. Supp. at 349. 
405. 420 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1969). 
406. 420 F.2d at 41. 
407. 420 F.2d at 42. 
408. 420 F.2d at 42. 
409. 420 F.2d at 42. Applying this test to the facts before it, the court found that the 
district court had correctly denied the defendant's motion to dismiss because the grand jury 
knew it was receiving hearsay evidence and probably would have indicted Leibowitz if it had 
considered the government's best evidence. 
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grand jury would not have issued the indictment had it heard the 
best evidence available. 
Not surprisingly, federal prosecutors continued their hearsay 
presentations to grand juries after Leibowitz. Defendants' challenges 
to these practices met with little success until 1972 when a three-
judge panel decided United States v. Estepa,410 the only reported 
Second Circuit decision to reverse a conviction and dismiss an in-
dictment solely because of the prosecutor's hearsay presentation to 
the grand jury. The only witness before the Estepa grand jury was a 
police officer who testified about events he did not witness and state-
ments he did not hear.411 The prosecutor did not call any of the 
police officers who had more intimate knowledge of the narcotics 
investigation and the subsequent arrests for distributing heroin even 
though they were available to testify.412 Moreover, except for one 
comment, the Assistant U.S. Attorney did not alert the grand jury to 
the limits of the testifying officer's knowledge.413 
The court reversed Estepa's conviction and dismissed the indict-
ments because the prosecutor had misled the grand jurors about the 
quality of the evidence they were considering.414 In justifying dis-
missal as a proper exercise of the court's supervisory power, Judge 
Friendly pointedly noted that the government's persistent refusal to 
heed the Umans warning left the court with little choice. 
The many opinions in which we have affirmed convictions despite the 
Government's needless reliance on hearsay before the grand jury show 
how loath we have been to open up a new road for attacking convic-
tions on grounds unrelated to the merits. We have been willing to al-
low ample, many doubtless think too ample, latitude in the needless 
use of hearsay, subject to only two provisions. We cannot, with proper 
respect for the discharge of our duties, content ourselves with yet an-
other admonition; a reversal with instructions to dismiss the indictment 
may help to translate the assurances of the United States Attorneys 
into consistent performance by their assistants.415 
Estepa and Leibowitz attempted to fashion a rule consistent with 
Costello that would trigger judicial intervention only when the pros-
ecutor egregiously impairs the grand jury's ability to screen guilt. 
Far from signalling a new judicial willingness to require the prosecu-
tor to present the government's best evidence to the grand jury,41 6 
410. 471 F.2d 1132 (2d Cir. 1972). 
411. 471 F.2d at 1134. 
412. 471 F.2d at 1134. 
413. 471 F.2d at 1134-35. 
414. 471 F.2d at 1137. 
415. 471 F.2d at 1137. 
416. Post-Estepa cases reflect the Second Circuit's continued unwillingness to dismiss in-
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Este_pa merely expressed the court's pique with federal prosecutors 
who continued to violate the minimal obligations placed on them by 
Leibowitz. The ironic result is a rule that accomplishes little417 but is 
nonetheless inconsistent with Costello. Before an indictment can be 
dismissed under Leibowitz, a court must determine whether the 
grand jury would have indicted the defendant had it heard the gov-
ernment's trial witness instead of a hearsay ac9ount. That inquiry 
requires the trial judge to evaluate the sufficiency and quality of the 
other evidence presented to the grand jury. Yet, Costello suggested 
that "dismissal of the indictment is not required by the court's inter-
ests in reliable fact finding,"418 and Justice Black specifically rejected 
Costello's request that the Court use its supervisory powers to pro-
mote judicial inquiry into the evidentiary bases of indictments.419 
Indeed, the Second Circuit has recently suggested that cases like Ca-
landra may have undermined Este_pa's validity.420 
2. Indictments Based in Part on PeJJ"ured Testimony 
Since most federal courts understood Costello to bar judicial in-
quiry into the sufficiency or quality of evidence relied upon by the 
indicting grand jury, they have usually refused to dismiss indict-
ments based in part on perjured testimony, as long as the grand jury 
heard some other competent evidence. For example, in Coppedge v. 
dictments because of the prosecutor's undue reliance upon hearsay testimony before the grand 
jury. See, e.g., United States v. Harrington, 490 F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1973): 
Estepa was thus not intended to modify broadly the rule recognizing the acceptability of 
hearsay evidence in grand jury proceedings. See Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 
359 . . . . Rather, it was intended as manifest warning that it is impermissible to have 
law enforcement officers who have no first-lrand knowledge of the subject the grand jury 
is investigating testify as if they possessed that knowledge. 
490 F.2d at 489. 
417. Under Leibowitz, the defendant m~t demonstrate that there was a high probability 
that the grand jury would not have returned an indictment had it heard the government's trial 
evidence. See text at note 409 supra. In cases where the grand jury did not request the govern-
ment's best evidence from the prosecutor after being notified of the "shoddy merchandise" it 
was getting, a district court judge will probably conclude that the grand jury would have in-
dicted the defendant even if it had considered the government's best evidence. At the appel-
late level, this prejudice requirement imposes an insurmountable burden on a defendant whose 
legal guilt has been convincingly demonstrated at trial. How can an' appellate court say that 
the grand jury would not have indicted the defendant if it had received the government's trial 
evidence when that evidence convinced the trial's fact-finder to convict the defendant? Obvi-
ously, at this stage any defect in the presentation of evidence before the grand jury could be 
considered harmless error. See note 521 infra and accompanying text. For the vast majority 
of criminal defendants who plead guilty after indictment, Estepa offers little protection besides 
insuring that the grand jurors were not misled about the quality of evidence they were consid-
ering. 
418. United States v. Mackey, 405 F. Supp. 854,, 863 (E.D.N.Y.(975). 
419. 350 U.S. at 364. , 
420. See United States v. Marchand, 564 F.2d 983, 1001 n.29 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 
434 U.S. 1015 (1978). 
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United States421 then Circuit Judge Burger relied on Lawn v. United 
States,422 an early progeny of Coste/lo, in affirming a district court 
judge's refusal to dismiss an indictment that was based in part on 
perjured testimony. Judge Burger interpreted the unbiased-grand 
jury requirement to mean only that a grand jury would be tainted if 
"it was improperly constituted, or . . . its members were necessarily 
biased."423 Apparently, the grand jury's consideration of some com-
petent evidence apart from the perjured testimony indicated that it 
was not "necessarily biased."424 While Judge Burger conceded that 
the prosecutor should not present unreliable witnesses to the grand 
jury, he concluded that Coste/Io's progeny precluded invalidation of 
the indictment because "the critical and final place to detect perjury 
is the trial."425 
Increasing judicial discomfort over Coste/Io's reliance on the trial 
to cure errors before the grand jury has prompted some federal 
courts to reject Coppedge's approach.426 Thus, a Ninth Circuit panel 
· ruled in United States v. Basurto4~1 that the "Due Process Clause of 
the Fifth Amendment is vio1ated when a defendant has to stand trial 
421. 311 F.2d 128 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 946 (1963). 
422. 355 U.S. 339 (1958), discussed in text at notes 154-57 supra. 
423. 311 F.2d at 132. 
424. 311 F.2d at 131-32. 
425. 311 F.2d at 132. 
426. In United States v. Serubo, 604 F.2d 807 (3d Cir. 1979), the court vacated the judg-
ments of sentence and remanded the case to the district court for determination of whether 
prosecutorial misconduct before the first grand jury tainted the second grand jury's considera-
tion of the case. The prosecutor in Serubo did not present perjured testimony to the first grand 
jury. Instead, he badgered witnesses who were uncooperative, commented unfavorably about 
some witnesses' credibility, tried to connect the defendants with organized crime without 
presenting any evidence to support the charge, and attacked the testimony of witnesses who 
did not link the defendants with organized crime. 604 F.2d at 815. In commenting on the 
appropriateness of dismissing indictments, the court noted that the trial itself was not a suffi-
cient deterrent to curb prosecutorial abuse before the grand jury. 
We recognize that dismissal of an indictment may impose important costs upon the 
prosecution and the public. At a minimum, the government will be required to _present its 
evidence to a grand jury unaffected by bias or prejudice. But the costs of contmued un-
checked prosecutorial misconduct are also substantial. This is particularly so before the 
grand jury, where the prosecutor operates without the check of a judge or a trained legal 
adversary, and virtually immune from public scrutiny. The prosecutor's abuse of his spe-
cial relationship to the grand jury poses an enormous risk to defendants as well. For 
while in theory a trial provides the defendant with a full opportunity to contest and dis-
prove the charges against him, in practice, the handing up of an indictment will often 
have a devastating personal and professional impact that a later dismissal or acquittal can 
never undo. Where the potential for abuse is so great, and the consequences of a mistaken 
indictment so serious, the ethical responsibilities of the prosecutor, and the obligation of 
the judiciary to protect against even the appearance of unfairness, are correspondingly 
heightened. 
We suspect that dismissal of an indictment may be virtually the only effective way to 
encourage compliance with these ethical standards, and to protect defendants from abuse 
of the grand jury process. 
604 F.2d at 817. 
427. 492 F.2d 781 (9th Cir. 1974). 
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on an indictment which the Government knows is based partially on 
perjured testimony, when the perjured testimony is material, and 
when jeopardy has not attached."428 Writing for the majority, Judge 
Ferguson rejected Judge Burger's reasoning in Coppedge that the 
trial could cure any error made by the grand jury.429 Indeed, the 
facts in Basurto strongly support Judge Ferguson's point because the 
perjured testimony caused Basurto to be indicted for violating a stat-
ute with a mandatory minimum sentencing provision. Without that 
perjured testimony, he would have been indicted under a newer stat-
ute with far more flexible sentencing provisions.430 As in Coppedge, 
the prosecutor did not learn of the perjury until after the return of 
the indictment.431 He immediately informed the defense attorney 
who promptly moved to dismiss the indictment. The trial court de-
nied the motion and Basurto was convicted by a jury that knew of 
the witness's perjury before the grand jury.432 
. In reversing Basurto's conviction, the court insisted that its ruling 
was consistent with Costello because it rested on prosecutorial mis-
conduct before the grand jury that violated due process, and not on 
the quality of evidence received by the grand jury.433 The court held 
that the prosecutor had a constitutional duty to inform the grand 
jury of the perjured testimony immediately, so that an accurate su-
perseding indictment could have been returned before jeopardy at-
tached.434 Relying on a series of Supreme Court decisions that had 
established the prosecutor's constitutional duty not to use perjured 
testimony knowingly at trial to obtain a tainted conviction,435 the 
Basurto panel concluded that this duty implied a concomitant obli-
gation not to allow a defendant to "stand trial on an indictment . . . 
based in part upon perjured testimony."436 To say the least, that im-
plication is strained. The Basurto conviction, where the prosecutor 
alerted the defense attorney before trial about the perjured grand 
jury testimony and revealed the perjury to the trial jury in his open-
428. 497 F.2d at 785. 
429. The consequences to the defendant of perjured testimony given before the grand 
jury are no less severe than those of perjured testimony given at trial, and in part may be 
more severe. The defendant has no effective means of cross-examining or rebutting per-
jured testimony given before the grand jury, as he might in court. 
497 F.2d at 786. 
430. 497 F.2d at 784. 
431. 497 F.2d at 784. 
432. 497 F.2d at 784. 
433. 497 F.2d at 785. 
434. 497 F.2d at 785. 
435. See, e.g., Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 
(1935). 
436. 497 F.2d at 786. 
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ing remarks,437 hardly reflects the injustice promoted by a prosecutor 
who knowingly used perjured trial testimony to obtain a convic-
tion.438 
The Ninth Circuit's analysis is striking for its refusal to acknowl-
edge in theory what it was doing in practice. The court unconvinc-
ingly distinguished Costello by emphasizing that its ruling in Basurto 
rested on prosecutorial misconduct and not on the quality of the evi-
dence presented to the grand jury. Subsequent Ninth Circuit deci-
sions, however, have indicated that the prosecutor's duty to inform 
the grand jury that it had considered perjured testimony only arises 
when, as in Leibowitz, that testimony impairs the grand jury's factual 
guilt screening function.439 To limit judicial review of the evidence 
presented to the grand jury, post-Basurto decisions have authorized 
dismissal of an indictment only in flagrant cases440 where the per-
jured testimony "creates a reasonable doubt of guilt that did not 
otherwise exist."441 If the perjured testimony does not meet that nar-
row definition of materiality, the prosecutor has no obligation to in-
form the grand jury of the perjury or to seek a dismiss~! of the 
437. 497 F.2d at 784-85. 
438. Indeed, Circuit Judge Hufstedler could not accept the majority's strained due process 
analysis. In her concurring opinion, she justified the panel's decision as an appropriate exer-
cise of the court's supervisory power to protect the integrity of the administration of justice. 
497 F.2d at 793. She argued that the court could impose a duty on the prosecutor to inform the 
grand jury that it had considered material perjured testimony to promote the grand jury's 
ability "to stand between the prosecutor and the accused, and to determine whether the charge 
was founded on credible testimony." 497 F.2d at 794 (quoting Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 59 
(1906)). So informed, the grand jury could take corrective action, but Judge Hufstedler ob-
served that the prosecutor should specifically request that the tainted indictment be dismissed. 
497 F.2d at 794. 
439. See United States v. Kennedy, 564 F.2d 1329, 1338 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 425 
U.S. 944 (1978); United States v. Bowers, 534 F.2d 186, 193 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 
942 (1976). See also United States v. Bracy, 566 F.2d 649 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 
818 (1978). "[W]e believe that [B=rto~] requirement that the prosecutor has an obligation to 
immediately inform the court and opposing counsel is weakened if not destroyed by the 
Supreme Court decision in United Stales v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976) .... " 566 F.2d at 655. 
The panel noted that Agurs had held that the prosecutor's failure to disclose exculpatory evi-
dence at trial did not constitute constitutional error unless "the omitted evidence creates a 
reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist." 566 F.2d at 656. The Bracy panel applied the 
Agurs standard to the prosecutor's failure to disclose perjured testimony before the Bracy 
grand jury and concluded that the prosecutor had not violated that standard "where incom-
plete disclosure of the perjured testimony before the grand jury in no way suggested an ab-
sence of guilt on the part of the appellants." 566 F.2d at 656. 
440. See, e.g., United States v. Kennedy, 564 F.2d 1329, 1338 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 
435 U.S. 944 (1978) ("(O]nly in a flagrant case, and perhaps only where knowing perjury, 
relating to a material matter, has been presented to the grand jury should the trial judge dis-
miss an otherwise valid indictment returned by an apparently unbiased grand jury. To hold 
otherwise would allow a mini-trial as to each presented indictment contrary to the teaching of 
Mr. Justice Black in Costello."). 
441. United States v. Bracy, 566 F.2d 649, 656 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 818 
(1978). Since the perjured testimony in Bracy did not meet this standard, the court refused to 
find constitutional error. 
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indictment. In other words, the propriety of the prosecutor's conduct 
depends upon whether it impaired the grand jury's screening func-
tion.442 Thus, like the Second Circuit's attempt to regulate the prose-
cutor's use of hearsay, the ironic result is a rule that accomplishes 
very little but is nevertheless inconsistent with Costello .443 
3. The .Duty To .Disclose Exculpatory Evidence 
The grand jury cannot possibly screen out unwarranted prosecu-
tions when the prosecutor fails to present exculpatory evidence that, 
if believed, would negate the defendant's guilt. Despite that obvious 
truth, most courts have refused to dismiss indictments when the 
prosecutor did not disclose exculpatory evidence to the grand jury. 
Relying on Supreme Court decisions like Costello, Blue, Holt, and 
Calandra, the lower courts initially ruled that the prosecutor had no 
obligation to disclose such evidence to the grand jury.444 Those 
courts assumed that the duty to disclose exculpatory evidence was 
triggered by the adversarial context oftrial.445 Therefore, they found 
no prosecutorial duty to present exculpatory evidence to the grand 
jury because its sole function is to determine ex parte ''whether crim-
inal proceedings should be instituted against any person."446 
Even those courts that have recognized a duty to disclose excul-
patory evidence have emphasized the difficulty of implementing 
such a rule. Some courts have examined the problem of what evi-
dence should be deemed· exculpatory at this early stage of the pro-
442. As one co=entator noted, "[b]ecause the federal courts, in addressing the issue of 
grand jury abuse, have typically weighed evidence demonstrating guilt against the nature of 
the prosecutorial misconduct, the decisions establish no consistent standard for dismissal." 
Holderman, Preindictment Prosecutorial Conduct in the Federal System, 71 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 17 (1980). Compare United States v. Scheufler, 599 F.2d 893, 895-97 (9th Cir. 
1979), and United States v. Cathey, 591 F.2d 268, 272 (5th Cir. 1979), with United States v. 
Asdrubal-Herrera, 470 F. Supp. 939,943 (N.D. Ill. 1979), and United States v. Sousley, 453 F. 
Supp. 754, 758 n.l (W.D. Mo. 1978). 
443. For example, the panel in Bracy noted that "if the suppression of evidence results in 
constitutional error, it is because of the character of the evidence, not the character of the 
prosecutor." United States v. Bracy, 566 F.2d 649, 656 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 
818 (1978). Yet Costello rejected the argument that the court should use its supervisory power 
to regulate the character of the evidence presented to the grand jury. 
444. See, e.g., United States v. Y. Hata & Co., 535 F.2d 508 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 
U.S. 828 (1976); Loraine v. United States, 396 F.2d 335 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 933 
(1968) (prosecution not obligated to disclose evidence in its possession that would have under-
mined the credibility of three of its grand jury witnesses). 
445. See, e.g., United States v. Y. Hata & Co., 535 F.2d 508, 512 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 
U.S. 828 (1976); United States v. Ruyle, 524 F.2d 1133, I 135-36 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 
425 U.S. 934 (1976); Loraine v. United States, 396 F.2d 335, 339 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 
U.S. 933 (1968). 
446. United States v. Y. Hata & Co., 535 F.2d 508, 512 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 828 
(1976) (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343-44 (1974)). 
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ceedings.447 Others have expressed concern about how to assess the 
significance of the withheld evidence without reviewing the quality 
and sufficiency of the other evidence considered by the grandjury,448 
an inquiry that Costello prohibited. Finally, some courts have sug-
gested that Costello precludes the lower courts from using their su-
pervisory powers to regulate the prosecutor's discretion over grand 
jury evidence absent some extraordinary situation where judicial ac-
tion is required "to preserve the integrity of the judicial process and 
to avoid any fundamental unfairness."449 
The first major departure from the consensus view came in a 
state decision, Johnson v. Superior Court.450 The facts in Johnson 
starkly illustrate the grand jury's inability to act as a protective 
screen when the prosecutor has complete control over what evidence 
it considers. Johnson and his codefendant, Sherman, were arrested 
for a series of drug offenses. Johnson had agreed to cooperate with 
Sherman in a sale to two undercover agents and then had followed 
him to a motel where Sherman had made the sale.451 At his prelimi-
nary hearing, Johnson testified that he had agreed with a local dis-
trict attorney to provide information concerning narcotic deals and 
he had accompanied Sherman only to gather such information.452 If 
believed, that exculpatory evidence would have negated the requisite 
mens rea for the offenses. The magistrate dismissed all charges 
against him when the state offered no evidence to rebut his claim.453 
The district attorney then asked a grand jury to indict Johnson on 
the same charges. In presenting his case to that grand jury, the dis-
trict attorney did not reveal Johnson's exculpatory testimony at the 
preliminary examination. Instead, he presented the testimony of the 
arresting officers and gave the grand jury the erroneous impression 
that Johnson had refused to comment on the charges upon the order 
of his attorney.454 The grand jury indicted Johnson on all three 
charges. 
447. See United States v. Mandel, 415 F. Supp. 1033, 1040(0. Md. 1976),a.ff'd., 602 F.2d 
653 (4th Cir. 1979) (en bane); cert. denied, 48 U.S.L.W. 3662 (1980). 
448. 415 F. Supp. at 1041-42. 
449. United States v. Chanen, 549 F.2d 1306, 1313 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 825 
(1977). See also note 440 supra. 
450. 38 Cal. App. 3d 977, 113 Cal. Rptr. 740 (1974), ajfd. on statutory grounds, 15 Cal. 3d 
248, 539 P.2d 792, 124 Cal. Rptr. 32 (1975) (en bane) (there is no published court of appeals 
opinion at 38 Cal. App. 3d 977 because the Supreme Court of California granted a hearing on 
the case). 
451. 113 Cal. Rptr. at 742. 
452. 113 Cal. Rptr. at 742-43. 
453. 113 Cal. Rptr. at 743. 
454. 113 Cal. Rptr. at 743. 
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Although the magistrate's dismissal did not bar the prosecutor 
from seeking an indictment for the same offense,455 the Third Dis-
trict California Court of Appeals ruled that the prosecutor's failure 
to disclose Johnson's exculpatory testimony precluded the grand jury 
from independently evaluating Johnson's guilt.456 In a sweeping 
opinion, Associate Justice Friedman argued that the absence of the 
adversarial safeguards that courts often associate with due process 
does not "exclude a special institutional variety of due process, in-
digenous to the grand jury, imparted to it by 'the law of the land' 
and investing it with a fundamental fairness peculiar to itself."457 
Justice Friedman then identified the grand jury's protective function 
of safeguarding accused persons against unfounded charges "an at-
tribute of due process inherent in grand jury proceedings."458 Thus, 
the court concluded that the prosecutor violated Johnson's due pro-
cess right to a fair and independent grand jury evaluation of proba-
ble cause when he made a "twisted presentation"459 of evidence. 
The Court of Appeals opinion in Johnson recognizes that the 
grand jury's ex parte nature imposes special responsibilities on the 
prosecutor to ensure " 'that justice shall be done.' "460 Unlike some 
of the earlier federal cases that had assumed that the prosecutor's 
duty to disclose exculpatory evidence was triggered by the adver-
sarial context of trial,461 Johnson recognized that the absence of ad-
versarial safeguards in grand jury proceedings provided the most 
compelling reason for imposing a duty on the prosecutor to disclose 
exculpatory evidence. As Justice Friedman observed, "if the prose-
cutor does not produce the evidence, no one will. The grand jury 
can perform its central function as an independent adjudicator of 
probable cause only if the prosecutor's duty ... includes an affirma-
tive obligation to produce evidence in his possession or control 
which tends to negate guilt.''462 
455. 113 Cal. Rptr. at 745 (citing People v: Uhlemann, 9 Cal. 3d 662, 666, 511 P~2d 609, 
611, 108 Cal. Rptr. 657, 659 (1973)). 
456. 113 Cal. Rptr. at 750. 
457. 113 Cal. Rptr. at 746. 
458. 113 Cal. Rptr. at 749. 
459. 113 Cal. Rptr. at 749. 
460. United States v. Ciambrone, 601 F.2d 616, 628-29 (2d Cir. 1979) (Friendly, J., dissent-
ing) (citing Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935)). 
461. See note 445 supra. But c.f. United States v. Ciambrone, 601 F.2d 616, 622-23 (2d Cir. 
1979) (prosecutor not obligated to search for and submit evidence negating guilt when not 
requested to do so by the grand jury; but if "aware of any substantial evidence negating guilt 
he should . . . make it known to the grand jury, at least where it might reasonably be expected 
to lead the jury not to indict"). 
462. 113 Cal. Rptr. at 749 (citations omitted). The court concluded that the prosecutor 
must disclose exculpatory evidence even if his other evidence establishes sufficient proof of 
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The California Supreme Court accepted the lower court's duty 
analysis, but rested its holding on statutory grounds.463 Justice Clark 
interpreted a statute requiring a grand jury to consider "evidence 
within its reach that will explain away the charge"464 as imposing a 
duty on the prosecutor to disclose such exculpatory evidence to the 
grand jury.465 Justice Clark refused to construe the statute as a mere 
admonition to the grand jury to consider such evidence if it so de-
sired,466 because such an interpretation would undermine the stat-
ute's purpose of promoting the grand jury's protective function. 
Since the "grand jury cannot be expected to call for evidence of 
which it is kept ignorant,"467 the court held that "when a district 
attorney seeking an indictment is aware of evidence reasonably tend-
ing to negate guilt, he is obligated under section 939.7 to inform the 
grand jury of its nature and existence, so that the grand jury may 
exercise its power under the statute to order the evidence pro-
duced."468 
Despite the absence of an analogous federal statute, several fed-
eral courts have used Johnson's reasoning to support their conclusion 
that the federal prosecutor must disclose exculpatory evidence to the 
grand jury.469 Whether those decisions will improve the quality of 
probable cause because the "reviewing court cannot know what the grand jury might have 
decided had the prosecutor set out the complete array of available evidence." 
463. 15 Cal. 3d 248, 255, 539 P.2d 792, 796, 124 Cal. Rptr. 32, 36 (1975) (en bane). How-
ever, the California Supreme Court accepted Judge Friedman's constitutional analysis in a 
later decision, People v. Backus, 23 Cal. 3d 360, 392-93, 590 P.2d 837, 856, 142 Cal. Rptr. 710, 
729 (1979) (defendants have a due process right to an independent evaluation of the evidence 
by the grand jury that is violated if prosecutor's presentation of the evidence substantially 
impairs the grand jury's ability to reject unfounded charges). 
464. CAL. PENAL CODE § 939.7 (West 1970). 
465. 15 Cal. 3d at 255, 539 P.2d at 796, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 36. 
466. 15 Cal. 3d at 254, 539 P.2d at 795-96, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 35-36. 
467. 15 Cal. 3d at 251, 539 P.2d at 794, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 34. 
468. 15 Cal. 3d at 255, 539 P.2d at 796, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 36. 
469. See, e.g., United States v. Provenzano, 440 F. Supp. 561 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). 
Provenzano, a reputed Mafia boss, was charged with conspiracy to offer kickbacks lo influence 
trustees of a labor pension fund. 440 F. Supp. at 562. The government's only evidence of 
Provenzano's participation in the conspiracy was the eyewitness testimony of a government 
informer, Goldfarb, who testified before the grand jury that he was present al a meeting be-
tween the defendants and heard Provenzano make an allegedly incriminating statement about 
the need to offer some kickbacks. 440 F. Supp. at 563-64. The government's case against 
Provenzano rested on Goldfarb's testimony because its own surveillance of the building where 
the alleged meeting occurred did not produce any evidence that Provenzano was in the build-
ing. 440 F. Supp. at 566. 
Events after Goldfarb's grand jury testimony raised serious questions about the reliability 
of his identification and his general credibility. After the original grand jury indicted 
Provenzano, Goldfarb told the prosecutor he had not actually looked at Provenzano but had 
just heard the statement. 440 F. Supp. at 563. Goldfarb had never seen or met the defendant 
before this meeting. Moreover, he was not sure that the statement about the alleged kickbacks 
related to the proposed mortgage loan noted in the indictment. 440 F. Supp. at 564. Finally, 
Goldfarb was the government's chief witness at an unrelated trial where all the defendants 
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prosecutorial and grand jury screening depends in part on how 
courts define the prosecutor's duty. Because the courts have failed to 
specify what screening functions should be served by the grand jury, 
there is considerable confusion in the case law as to what constitutes 
exculpatory evidence for purposes of grand jury screening. Does the 
duty extend to evidence that suggests that the defendant did not 
commit the proscribed act?470 Should the duty encompass any evi-
dence that creates a reasonable doubt about the defendant's guilt, 
regardless of whether it negates a material element of the crime471 or 
establishes some affirmative defense?472 Must the prosecutor be per-
sonally aware of this exculpatory evidence before the duty at-
taches?473 Must the prosecutor actually present the evidence or 
merely notify the grand jury of its existence?474 Once notified, is the 
were acquitted, suggesting that the trial jury had entertained some doubts about his credibility. 
440 F. Supp. at 565. Despite Goldfarb's doubts about the accuracy of his testimony, the prose-
cutor submitted the transcript of his grand jury testimony to a new grand jury that returned a 
superseding indictment against Provenzano. The government did not call Goldfarb to testify 
before this second grand jury and did not inform the grand jurors that Goldfarb had expressed 
doubts about the validity of his identification. 440 F. Supp. at 565. 
Judge Bonsal dismissed the superseding indictment because the prosecutor's failure to dis-
close the exculpatory material prevented the second grand jury from making "an independent 
evaluation of the case." 440 F. Supp. at 565. He dismissed the original indictment because the 
prosecutor's failure to disclose Goldfarb's substantial recantation of his testimony to the origi-
nal grand jury precluded it from screening out unwarranted prosecutions. Judge Bonsal ex-
plicitly rejected Costello's assumption that the trial was the only proper forum to cure such 
evidentiary defects and concluded that it would make little sense to hold Provenzano for trial 
on the basis of evidence which would not support a conviction. 440 F. Supp. at 566. 
See also United States v. Ciambrone, 601 F.2d 616, 622-23 (2d Cir. 1979), discussed at note 
461 supra; United States v. Samango, 450 F. Supp. 1097 (D. Hawaii 1978), qffd., 607 F.2d 877 
(9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 435 F. Supp. 610 (N.D. Okla. 1977) 
(indictment for intentional failure to report taxable income dismissed in part because prosecu-
tor failed to disclose exculpatory testimony that, if believed, negated intent); United States v. 
Braniff Airways, Inc., 438 F. Supp. 579, 586 (W.D. Tex. 1977). But see United States v. Lasky, 
600 F.2d 765, 768 (9th Cir. 1979) (rejecting duty to disclose exculpatory evidence). 
470. See, e.g., United States v. Provenzano, 440 F. Supp. 561 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), which is 
discussed in note 469 supra. 
471. See, e.g., United States v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 435 F. Supp. 610 (N.D. Okla. 1977). 
472. See, e.g., United States v. Braniff Airways, Inc., 438 F. Supp. 579, 586 (W.D. Tex. 
1977) (suggesting that the prosecutor is not required to inform a grand jury of possible de-
fenses to be asserted at trial). See also People v. Snow, 72 Cal. App. 3d 950, 956-59, 140 Cal. 
Rptr. 427, 430-32 (1977), overruled on other grounds, People v. Wetmore, 22 Cal. 3d 318, 583 
P.2d 1308, 149 Cal. Rptr. 265 (1978) (evidence suggesting defendant's insanity does not consti-
tute exculpatory evidence for purposes of grand jury screening). 
473. Most federal courts have not required the prosecutor to seek out exculpatory evi-
dence. See United States v. Ciambrone, 601 F.2d 616 (2d Cir. 1979), discussed in note 461 
supra; United States v. Ruyle, 524 F.2d I 133, 1135-36 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 
934 (1976). However, the prosecutor may have a duty to disclose exculpatory evidence in the 
possession of his investigative agents. See People v. Trolia, 69 Ill. App. 3d 439,388 N.E.2d 35 
(1979). 
474. Most courts simply require the prosecutor to inform the grand jury of its existence. 
See United States v. Ciambrone, 601 F.2d 616 (2d Cir. 1979); People v. McAlister, 54 Cal. 
App. 3d 918, 926, 126 Cal. Rptr. 881, 886, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 850 (1976). 
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grand jury obligated to call for that evidence?475 And finally, how 
will violations of this duty be detected476 and what remedies should 
apply? 
Whether Johnson will improve grand jury screening depends on 
how the courts answer those questions. An overly broad definition 
of exculpatory evidence may impose impossible administrative bur-
dens on the prosecution and elongate the grand jury proceedings 
into a mini-trial.477 An unduly narrow definition may eliminate the 
rule's practical force. Even if those difficult questions are resolved, 
implementing the Johnson duty and detecting its violation will be 
exceedingly difficult unless other grand jury reform measures are ap-
proved. I shall suggest some tentative answers to those questions in 
Subsection B. 
4. Resubmission of Cases to Subsequent Grand Juries 
Problems concerning perjured testimony, exculpatory evidence, 
and the excessive use of hearsay testimony often arise when the pros-
ecutor presents a new grand jury with transcripts of testimony given 
to another grand jury that had been previously involved in the case. 
Resubmission often occurs when the prosecutor requests a supersed-
ing indictment from the second grand jury to cure defects that 
tainted the first grand jury's indictment.478 Recently, a few federal 
courts have considered whether a prosecutor who presents the sec-
ond grand jury with hearsay testimony (the transcripts) or fails to 
inform it of the evidentiary problems that tainted the first grand 
jury's proceedings is guilty of misconduct justifying dismissal of the 
superseding indictment. 
United States v. Gallo419 and United States v. Chanen480 exem-
plify the varied outcomes engendered when courts use the 
prosecutorial misconduct doctrine to circumvent Costello. In Gallo, 
a crucial witness, Jerome Buckley, admitted during his second ap-
415. See People v. McAlister, 54 Cal. App. 3d 918, 926-27, 126 Cal. Rptr. 881, 886, cerl, 
denied, 429 U.S. 850 (1976) (interpreting CAL. PENAL CODE § 939.7 (West 1970), the court 
concluded that a grand jury is not obligated to pursue potential exculpatory evidence once 
notified of its existence). _. 
476. Unless defendants are given greater access to the grand jury's transcript, detection of 
prosecutorial misconduct before the grand jury will be haphazard at best. See Holderman, 71 
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY I, 18, 30 (1980). 
411. See United States v. International Paper Co., 457 F. Supp. 571 (N.D. Texas 1978) 
(prosecutor need not disclose all evidence that could be characterized as exculpatory). 
478. Alternatively, the first grand jury may have been acting solely in its inquisitorial ca-
pacity to gather evidence of alleged criminal activity. In such cases, the prosecution may sub-
mit the transcripts of testimony given to the first grand jury to a second, accusatory grand jury. 
479. 394 F. Supp. 310 (D. Conn. 1975). 
480. 549 F.2d 1306 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 825 (1977). 
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pearance before a grand jury that part of his original testimony was 
untrue.481 That grand jury returned an indictment, but the prosecu-
tor sought a superseding indictment to correct technical defects in 
the first that were unrelated to Buckley's retracted perjury. The 
prosecutor presented the transcript of Buckley's complete testimony 
to the second grand jury482 and told them that the new indictment 
merely cured the technical defects of the first. 
District Judge Zampano dismissed the superseding indictment on 
grounds of prosecutorial misconduct. The judge held that the prose-
cutor's use of the Buckley transcripts prevented the second grand 
jury from making "the charge on its own judgment"483 because it 
could not personally evaluate Buckley's credibility. Citing both 
Umans484 and Estepa,485 Judge Zampano found that the prosecutor 
should have: (1) alerted the grand jury to the hearsay quality of the 
evidence it was considering;486 (2) informed the grand jurors that 
Buckley was available for live testimony if they wanted to evaluate 
his credibility for themselves;487 (3) alerted the grand jurors to the 
perjurous portions of Buckley's testimony488 (citing Basurto);489 and 
(4) presented the second grand jury with available corroborating evi-
dence from the first grand jury proceedings.490 Judge Zampano's 
analysis of what evidentiary duties the prosecutor owes the grand 
jury far exceeds Estepa's minimal obligation not to mislead the 
grand jury.491 In effect, the court dismissed the superseding indict-
ment because the prosecutor had not given the second grand jury his 
best evidence. 
In Chanen, the Ninth Circuit considered similar resubmission 
problems but concluded that they did not demonstrate prosecutorial 
481. 394 F. Supp. at 312. 
482. 394 F. Supp. at 313. 
483. 394 F. Supp. at 314 (quoting Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 219 (1960)). But 
ef. United States v. Schlesinger, 598 F.2d 722, 726 (2d Cir. 1979) (Because of a defec!. in the 
first indictment, the prosecutor sought a superseding indictment from a second grand jury that 
was unfamiliar with the case. The prosecutor gave a hearsay account of the allegations in the 
first indictment, summarized the testimony of witnesses before the grand jury, and then offered 
to have transcripts of their testimony read to the second grand jury. Relying on Costello, the 
court refused to dis~ss the superseding indictment). 
484. 368 F.2d 11§ (2d Cir. 1966), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 389 U.S. 80 
(1967). See text at notes 398-400 supra. 
485. 471 F.2d 1132 (2d Cir. 1972). See text at notes 410-20 supra. 
486. 394 F. Supp. at 315. 
487. 394 F. Supp. at 315. 
488. 394 F. Supp. at 315. 
489. 497 F.2d 781 (9th Cir. 1974). See text at notes 427-43 supra. 
490. 394 F. Supp. at 315. 
491. See text at notes 419-20 supra. 
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misconduct justifying dismissal of the resulting indictment. The 
prosecutor in Chanen had presented the first grand jury with the live 
testimony of five witnesses but had not sought an indictment.492 
Four months after the first grand jury was discharged, the govern-
ment requested and received an indictment from a second grand 
jury, which heard an FBI agent's summary of the witnesses' testi-
mony before the first grand jury.493 A district court judge dismissed 
that indictment because only hearsay testimony had been offered 
and no court reporter had transcribed it.494 Six months later, with a 
court reporter present, the government obtained another indictment 
by reading the first grand jury's transcript to a third grand jury. 
These transcripts contained references that the witnesses had submit-
ted false affidavits and the prosecutor advised the third grand jury 
that these witnesses had made prior inconsistent statements.495 The 
district court again dismissed the indictment because the third grand 
jury did not have the same opportunity as the first to evaluate live 
testimony.496 
The Ninth Circuit reversed that last dismissal. Unlike Gallo, the 
Chanen panel believed that both Costello and the separation of pow-
ers doctrine should usually preclude the courts from interfering with 
the prosecutor's decision as to "what evidence to present to the grand 
jury and how to present it."497 Accordingly, the court held that it 
~
ould not use its supervisory power to dismiss an indictment where 
the prosecutor failed to present the government's best evidence to the 
grand jury unless such a sanction was necessary "to preserve the in-
egrity of the judicial process and to avoid any fundamental unfair-
ness."498 Unfortunately, the court failed to articulate any standard 
to identify when prosecutorial conduct jeopardized these interests. It 
reviewed earlier prosecutorial misconduct cases499 and found that 
492. 549 F.2d at 1308. 
493. 549 F.2d at 1308. 
494. 549 F.2d at 1308. 
495. 549 F.2d at 131 I. 
496. 549 F.2d at 1308-09. 
497. 549 F.2d at 1313. 
498. 549 F.2d at 1313. The court insisted that this caveat was not'.fu:onsistent with Cos-
tello because the court would only dismiss indictments because of prosecutorial misconduct 
and not because of concern about the qualitative or quantitative sufficiency of the evidence 
presented to the grand jury. 549 F.2d at 1309 n.3. However, the court's discussion and appli-
cation of the prosecutorial misconduct doctrine to the facts before it demonstrated that one of 
the primary criteria for determining improper prosecutorial conduct is whether the prosecu-
tor's evidentiary presentation impaired the grand jury's screening function. 
499. "Almost every court dealing with the issue raised here has confronted a novel set of 
facts. The range of prosecutorial conduct capable of inspiring allegations of unfairness ap-
pears unlimited. Indeed, the facts of this case are unlike those of any other we have been able 
to find." 549 F.2d at 1309. But see note 502 infra. 
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they provided no clear standard to distinguish permissible from im-
permissible conduct. Nevertheless, it concluded: 
Although the holdings of all these cases may be difficult to recon-
cile, we believe that they make it plain that the manner in which the 
prosecution secured the indictment in the present case cannot serve as 
the basis for a dismissal. Reading transcripts of sworn testimony, 
rather than presenting live witnesses, simply does not constitute, on the 
facts of the case, "fundamental unfairness" or a threat to "the integrity 
of the judicial process."500 
The court buttressed this question-begging conclusion by noting that 
the prosecutor had alerted the third grand jury about possible credi-
bility problems.501 
What seems clear from the preceding analysis of prosecutorial 
misconduct cases is that the doctrine does not off er any intelligible, 
principled way of deciding whether a prosecutor's conduct is inimi-
cal to the integrity of the judicial process. Federal courts often use 
the doctrine to circumvent Costello and dismiss indictments when 
they are convinced that the prosecutor's presentation of evidence has 
produced a miscarriage of justice. Defining such a miscarriage in 
this setting depends largely upon the particular court's view of the 
grand jury's screening functions. Because the courts have been un-
able to agree on those purposes or on how they are impaired by the 
types of evidence presented to the grand jury, the prosecutorial mis-
conduct cases do not establish a consistent standard for dismissal. 502 
Courts which assume that the grand jury should screen factual guilt 
will find misconduct only in those rare cases where the prosecutor 
deliberately biases the grand jury's determination of factual guilt by 
flagrantly abusive conduct. 503 Thus, the Chanen panel, after citing 
500. 549 F.2d at 13 I I. 
501. 549F.2dat 1311. 
502. For example, compare Chanen with United States v. Samango, 607 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 
1979), a case involving quite similar resubmission problems. In both cases, the superseding 
indictments were based solely on hearsay evidence: the transcripts of testimony given by wit-
nesses to previous grand juries. In both cases, the prosecutor was aware of information that 
raised serious questions about the credibility of the witnesses. In Chanen, a government agent 
read the transcripts to the indicting grand jury. The transcripts themselves revealed that some 
of the witnesses had filed false affidavits and the prosecutor advised the grand jury that two of 
the witnesses whose ·transcripts were read had made prior inconsistent statements. In 
Samango, the prosecutor left the transcripts with the grand jurors so they could read them. 
607 F.2d at 881. The Ninth Circuit found no prosecutorial misconduct justifying dismissal of 
the indictments in Chanen but affirmed a district court's dismissal of a superseding indictment 
in Samango. While the Chanen panel found that the grand jury had received sufficient notice 
of the witnesses' questionable credibility, 549 F.2d at 1311, the Samango court concluded that 
the prosecutor should have presented the live testimony of a witness whose veracity was in 
question so that the grand jury could "observe [his] demeanor and determine on its own 
whether [he] was a credible witness." 607 F.2d at 882. 
503. See United States v. Kennedy, 564 F.2d 1329, 1338 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 
U.S. 944 (1978). 
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cases that emphasized the trial as the proper forum to resolve credi-
bility questions, concluded that the grand jury probably would have 
indicted Chanen ifit had considered live testimony.504 Courts which 
assume that the grand jury should receive sufficient evidence to as-
sess the likelihood of conviction will find misconduct when the pros-
ecutor precludes the grand jury from personally assessing the 
credibility of an important government witness whose veracity is in 
doubt.505 
Thus, despite its label, the courts have used the prosecutorial 
misconduct doctrine in many cases to determine whether the prose-
cutor's evidentiary presentation impaired the grand jury's screening 
functions. As one district court judge observed: 
Although the concept of prosecutorial conduct which deprives the de-
fendant of an unbiased grand jury is a useful one . . . the label 
"prosecutorial misconduct" is not. The term suggests uncharacteristic, 
extraordinary, and reprehensible conduct. Usually, the indiscreet pros-
ecutor is just acting like all prosecutors. 506 
Since Costello prohibits courts from imposing an obligation on the 
prosecutor to present the grand jury with reliable proof of a defend-
ant's factual and legal guilt, the prosecutorial misconduct doctrine is 
at best a stopgap measure. It can mitigate the worst excesses gener-
ated by Costello but it does not acknowledge that Costello is the 
source of the problem. The next Subsection presents a series of re-
form proposals that address the disease instead of its symptoms. 
B. Reform Proposals 
Congress should repudiate Costello and require federal prosecu-
tors to present the grand jury with admissible evidence that would 
support a conviction at trial. Specifically, prosecutors should not 
present hearsay testimony to a grand jury absent some special justifi-
cation. They should not present evidence that they know was ob-
tained in violation of a defendant's constitutional rights. A 
prosecutor who is aware of evidence that, if believed, negates one of 
the material elements of the crime or undermines the credibility of 
one of the government's critical trial witnesses should present that 
504. 549 F.2d at 1311-12. However, the Chanen panel did note the prosecutor had alerted 
the grand jury to possible credibility problems. 
505. In effect, Gallo and United States v. Samango, 607 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1979), discussed 
in note 502 supra, require the grand jury to make its own credibility judgment by evaluating 
the live testimony of a witness with credibility problems. In contrast, Chanen does not man-
date such first-hand evaluation of the witness's veracity as long as the prosecutor has not mis-
led the grand jury about the quality of evidence it was considering. 
506. United States v. Samango, 450 F. Supp. 1097, 1102 (D. Hawaii 1978), qffd., 607 F.2d 
877 (9th Cir. 1979). 
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evidence to the grand jury. If aware of evidence thaf, if believed, 
would preclude conviction at trial (such as a possible affirmative de-
fense), the prosecutor should alert the indicting grand jurors to its 
existence and inform them of their right to call for such evidence. 
These evidentiary requirements would promote a fairer ex parte 
evaluation of the government's case. Accordingly, the grand jury 
should be instructed that its most important function is to screen out 
cases where it believes a jury would not find the government's case 
strong enough to support a conviction. Specifically, it should be told 
that the prosecutor must introduce sufficient legally admissible evi-
dence of each element of the crime to carry the case to a trial jury 
( directed-verdict screen) and to justify a conviction (predictive 
screen). To implement that standard, the grand jury should be told 
not to indict unless it finds clear and convincing evidence of the de-
fendant's guilt. 507 
These reforms will not work unless sanctions are provided for 
their violation. The grand jury is a lay body that will naturally turn 
to the prosecutor for advice about the applicable legal guilt require-
ments. While it is the most appropriate body to·perform a predictive 
screening function, it does not have the legal expertise to know 
whether the prosecutor is actually presenting legally admissible evi-
dence. Accordingly, reform of the grand jury's accusatory function 
should include some limited, post-indictment judicial review to en-
sure that the prosecutor has complied with the applicable legal guilt 
requirements. Therefore, I propose that the federal rules be 
amended to permit a motion to dismiss an indictment that is not 
supported by legally sufficient evidence. The court's review would 
be limited to examining the indicting508 grand jury's transcript509 to 
507. See note 538 infra. 
508. Judicial review of voluminous grand jury transcripts from a prolonged grand jury 
investigation could impose a serious burden on the courts. For this as well as other reasons, I 
believe that the inquisitorial and accusatorial functions should be performed by different 
grand juries. See notes 553-57 infra and accompanying text. Accordingly, the judge would 
review the shorter transcript of the indicting grand jury. 
509. Federal rule of criminal procedure 6(e)(l) has been amended to require mandatory 
recordation of all proceedings before a federal grand jury except its private deliberations and 
voting. The amendment added a new provision 6(e)(l) that took effect August I, 1979. See 25 
CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 2255-56 (June 13, 1979). This mandatory recording requirement should 
improve the fairness of grand jury proceedings. First, it precludes prosecutors from circum-
venting the Jencks Act by failing to record a witness's grand jury testimony. Second, it should 
deter prosecutors from making improper comments about any grand jury witness that might 
bias the grand jury. See 1977 Hearings, pt. I, supra note 108, at 845 (prepared statement of 
Rodney Sager, former United States Attorney for Virginia). Third, it promotes the trustwor-
thiness of the testimony given before grand juries because "the restraint of being subject to 
prosecution for perjury ... is wholly meaningless ... if the testimony is unrecorded .... " 
United States v. Cramer, 447 F.2d 210,222 (2d Cir. 1971) (Oakes, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 
404 U.S. 1024 (1972). Fourth, it supports the prosecution's case at trial because a grand jury 
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determine whether the prosecutor presented sufficient legally admis-
sible evidence to satisfy the directed-verdict standard. That review 
would ensure that prosecutors present the grand jury with a prima 
facie case oflegal guilt.510 It intentionally duplicates the grand jury's 
directed-verdict screen because lay persons cannot determine the le-
gal admissibility of the evidence presented to them. However, the 
court's review of the transcript will not duplicate the grand jury's 
more important predictive function.511 The grand jury's assessment 
of the credibility of the government's witnesses should not be dis-
turbed if the directed-verdict standard is met.512 Accordingly, the 
court should examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
government.513 
Judicial review could operate as follows: after indictment, the 
defendant would receive a transcript of the entire grand jury pro-
ceedings. 514 The defendant can then use that transcript to prepare a 
motion to dismiss. Given access to the grand jury transcript, the de-
fendant would have no valid reason for delaying the motion until 
after the trial has started and jeopardy has attached. Accordingly, 
failure to challenge the grand jury proceedings in a pretrial motion 
should waive those claims. If the defendant moves to dismiss, the 
court should evaluate the grand jury transcript to determine whether 
the prosecutor presented a prima facie case of legal guilt, measured 
by the directed-verdict standard. In making that determination, the 
trial court can consider hearsay evidence presented to the grand jury 
only if it falls within a specific statutory exception authorizing its use 
witness's testimony may be admitted at trial when the witness is unavailable to testify. See 
United States v. Garner, 574 F.2d 1141 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 936 (1978) (court held 
that grand jury testimony of a witness unavailable to testify at trial may be admitted at trial 
under federal rule of evidence 804(b)(5) without violating the defendant's right of confronta-
tion where that grand jury testimony possessed strong indicators of reliability). But see United 
States v. Gonzales, 550 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1977). Finally, if my reforms for the indicting 
grand jury are adopted, the government could satisfy the factual basis requirement at the plea 
hearing by submitting a copy of the indicting grand jury's transcript. But see note 585 i'!fra. 
510. I rejected the use of a post-indictment preliminary hearing to perform this function at 
the federal level because the hearing would require a second presentation of the government's 
evidence and its adversarial procedures would generate significant administrative costs and 
pretrial delay. Judicial review of the indicting grand jury's transcript will impose an adminis-
trative burden on the courts that could foster some pretrial delay, but those costs are not com-
parable to those that would be generated by a mini-trial, adversarial proceeding. 
511. Moreover, judicial review of the transcript does not require the time-consuming du-
plication of another evidentiary presentation. 
512. See People v. Eckert, 2 N.Y.2d 136, 138 N.E.2d 794, 157 N.Y.S.2d 551 (1956). 
513. See People v. Backus, 23 Cal. 3d 360, 391, 590 P.2d 837, 855, 152 Cal. Rptr. 710, 728 
(1979) ("A reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for that of the grand jury ..• in 
determining the sufficiency of the evidence and must draw all reasonable inferences in support 
of the indictment or information."). 
514. See notes 563-79 i'!fra and accompanying text. 
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or if the grand jury transcript reveals a compelling reason for its 
presentation.515 However, the grand jury's consideration of such in-
competent evidence, including hearsay or illegally seized evidence, 
will not invalidate the indictment if there is sufficient competent evi-
dence to satisfy the directed-verdict standard.516 
If the court denied the motion to dismiss, its order would be ap-
pealable only if the defendant subsequently pleaded guilty.517 The 
government would be permitted to appeal a pretrial order dismissing 
the indictment,518 but a dismissal without prejudice would permit 
the government to cure any evidentiary defect by simply resubmit-
ting519 its case with additional competent evidence to a new520 grand 
jury. After conviction at trial, the defendant should not be allowed 
to appeal a pretrial order sustaining the indictment because a valid 
trial verdict establishes the defendant's legal guilt.521 
To implement these reforms without causing undue administra-
tive burdens or pretrial delay, Congress should enact statutes522 em-
515. See notes 523-29 i'!fra and accompanying text. 
516. One possible exception to this rule is where "the extent of incompetent and irrelevant 
evidence before the grand jury is such that ... it is unreasonable to expect that the grand jury 
could limit its consideration to the admissible, relevant evidence .... " People v. Backus, 23 
Cal. 3d 360, 393, 590 P.2d 837, 856, 152 Cal. Rptr. 710, 729 (1979). See United States v. 
Asdrubal-Herrera, 470 F. Supp. 939 (N.D. Ill. 1979) (court dismissed an indictment for immi-
gration offenses despite sufficient evidence of probable cause because a government agent erro-
neously informed the grand jury that the defendant was involved in illegal transportation of 
.firearms). 
517. As Professor Robert Dawson has pointed out to me, several alternatives are possible 
here. First, the defendant might be given the right to immediate appeal because denial of the 
defense motion arguably raises the collateral issue of the power of the government to place the 
defendant on trial at all. See Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977) (Court held that 
under 18 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976), a defendant could appeal a denial of a pretrial motion to 
dismiss on double jeopardy grounds). Such a proposal, however, would foster serious addi-
tional pretrial delay and its chances of being enacted are remote. Second, a defendant could 
be authorized to appeal following conviction by plea or trial. One could argue that the trial 
verdict does not render the pretrial motion's denial harmless because the defendant never 
should have been brought to trial on charges that were not supported by legally sufficient 
evidence at the time of the indictment. While an error has occurred, I do not believe it to be of 
sufficient magnitude to justify the reversal of a trial verdict that demonstrates sufficient proof 
of legal guilt at the time of conviction. I have chosen the third option of allowing appeal after 
a guilty plea because I believe some appellate review is necessary to ensure honest application 
of the directed-verdict standard at the trial court level. 
518. See 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1976). 
519. Of course, federal courts could still dismiss indictments with prejudice when they find 
serious prosecutorial misconduct that justifies such a stringent sanction. See note 426 supra. 
See also United States v. Gallo, 394 F. Supp. 310 (D. Conn. 1975). But see United States v. 
Chanen, 549 F.2d 1306 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 825 (1977). 
520. Resubmitting the case to the same grand jury that returned the first indictment would 
not ensure an unbiased and fresh evaluation of the prosecution's case. See United States v. 
Hinton, 543, F.2d 1002 (2d Cir. 1976). 
521. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW. 210.30(6) (McKinney 1971). 
522. For examples of model grand jury statutes implementing these reform proposals, see 
Appendix. 
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bodying the following -principles. 
I. Hearsay Evidence 
Absent statutory authorization or a compelling just!ftcation for its use, 
the grand jury should not receive evidence that would be inadmissible at 
trial Just!ftcation for the use of inadmissible evidence should be made on 
the record at the time of its presentation. However, the fact that the grand 
jury received inadmissible evidence should not void an indictment flit also 
received sufficient competent evidence to establish a prima fade case of 
legal guilt. 
This ptjnciple would force the prosecutor to present the govern-
ment's best evidence unless some special justification warrants the 
presentation of hearsay testimony. Thus, the prosecutor could not 
prevent the grand jury from judging the credibility of available523 
witnesses.524 However, the rule does not preclude all use of hearsay 
because a complete prohibition might stretch some grand jury pro-
ceedings into a mini-trial. New York's experience suggests that 
grand juries can function efficiently while allowing only legally ad-
missible evidence, as long as suitable exceptions are permitted. 525 
523. See ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING 
TO THE PROSECUTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION§ 3.6(a) (Approved Draft 1971) [hereinaf-
ter cited as ABA STANDARDS - PROSECUTION FUNCTION] These standards preclude the use 
of hearsay except "in appropriate cases the prosecutor may present witnesses to su=arize 
admissible evidence available to him which he believes he will be able to present at trial"), 
The Co=entary suggests that the use of hearsay should be avoided unless "cogent reasons" 
justify its use. Examples of such compellingjustifications are the need to su=arize available 
evidence in cases involving voluminous records, the written statement of a witness who is not 
available under circumstances requiring prompt grand jury action, and the hearsay statement 
from a seriously injured victim or from a witness whose safety requires concealed identity. For 
example, when the government has reasonable grounds to believe that a witness's safety may 
be jeopardized by personally appearing before the grand jury, a transcript of the witness's 
statement could be read to the grand jury. See United States v. Russo, 413 F.2d 432 (2d Cir. 
1969); United States v. Carella, 4ll F.2d 729 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 860 (1969). 
However, mere inconvenience in calling a witness does not justify the use of hearsay testi-
mony. See United States v. Narciso, 466 F. Supp. 252, 299 n.6 (E.D. Mich. 1977). If the 
prosecutor presents hearsay testimony, he should alert grand jurors to this fact and tell them 
that they can call the original source of information if they have any doubts about the testi-
mony's validity. 
Adoption of this proposal would also prevent prosecutors from circumventing the Jencks 
Act requirement that the grand jury testimony of prosecution trial witnesses be disclosed after 
the close of their testimony. Prosecutors have sometimes undercut the Act's intent by giving 
the grand jury hearsay accounts of their trial witnesses' expected testimony. See 8 MOORE'S 
FEDERAL PRACTICE~ 16.10[2], at 16-149 to 150 (rev. 2d ed. 1979). 
524. Several states have adopted statutes that require the grand jury to receive only evi-
dence that would be admissible at trial. See N.M. STAT. ANN.§ 31-6-11 (Supp. 1979). Bui see 
Maldonado v. State, 604 P.2d 363 (N.M. 1979) (statute does not authorize post-indictment 
judicial review of the legal sufficiency of the evidence presented to the grand jury), 
525. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 190.30(2) (McKinney Supp. 1979), permits admission of 
reports of a physicist, chemist, coroner, medical examiner, firearms identification expert, 
fingerprint technician, "or an expert or technician in some comparable scientific or profession-
al field, concerning the results of an examination, comparison or test performed." Section 
190.30(3) permits hearsay admission of perfunctory types of testimony involving true owner-
ship of stolen property, qualification of a dealer or expert who evaluated property, the expert 
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For example, New York prosecutors can present a hearsay report of 
expert findings or a hearsay summary of voluminous records like 
those in Coste!lo.s26 
Although the prosecutor should not use hearsay evidence absent 
statutory authorization or special justification, the legal admissibility 
of some evidence may remain uncertain until trial. 527 Therefore, the 
rule does not invalidate indictments based in part on inadmissible 
evidence if the remaining evidence satisfies the directed-verdict stan-
dard.528 Moreover, a court could consider hearsay evidence in deter-
mining whether the prosecutor presented a prima facie case of legal 
guilt if it found a compelling justification for its presentation to the 
grand jury and if it determined that legally admissible evidence 
would be available at trial to establish the same facts.529 
2. Illegally Seized Evidence 
Prosecutors should not present grand juries with evidence that they 
know was obtained in violation of the target defendant's constitutional 
rights. s3o Before ruling on a defendant's motion to dismiss an indictment 
because of insufficient proof of legal guilt, the trial court should rule on 
any motions to suppress evidence. Should the court grant a motion to 
suppress evidence, it should not consider that evidence as part of the pros-
ecution's proof of legal guilt when evaluating the grand jury transcript. 
opinion of its value, and the basis for the opinion. This type of evidence may be introduced by 
either written or oral statements under oath. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW§ 190.30(3) (McKinney 
Supp. 1979). 
526. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW.§ 190.30(3) (McKinney Supp. 1979). 
521. See Note, Exclusion ef Incompetent Evidence from Federal Grand Jury Proceedings, 72 
YALE L.J. 590, 596-97 {1963). 
528. See People v. Leary, 305 N.Y. 793, 113 N.E.2d 303 (1953); People v. Briggs, 50 Misc. 
2d 1062, 272 N.Y.S.2d 211 (Rensselaer County Ct. 1966); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW§ 190.65(1) 
(McKinney 1971), construed in People v. Dunleavy, 41 A.D.2d 717, 341 N.Y.2d 500, ajfd., 33 
N.Y.2d 573,301 N.E.2d 432,347 N.Y.S.2d 448 (1973). Contra, People v. D'Andrea, 26 Misc. 
2d 95, 207 N.Y.S.2d 215 (Kings County Ct. 1960). The one possible exception to this rule 
would be in those cases where the nature, extent, and prejudicial effects of the incompetent 
evidence presented to the grand jury indicates that the grand jury may not have indicted the 
defendant if it had only considered the competent evidence presented to it. See note 516 
supra. 
529. See generally MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE§ 330.4(4) (1975). 
530. The Justice Department has issued a series of internal regulations applicable to all 
federal prosecutors who conduct grand jury proceedings. Because the guidelines are designed 
primarily for internal administrative purposes, federal courts have held that their violation 
does not confer judicially enforceable rights on trial parties. See United States v. Shulman, 
466 F. Supp. 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). See also United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 (1979) 
(failure of I.R.S. agent to follow internal regulations before recording conversations between 
taxpayer and agent not grounds for suppression of recordings). These guidelines prohibit 
prosecutors from presenting evidence to the grand jury that the prosecutor knows was uncon-
stitutionally obtained. See I977 Hearings, pt. I, supra note 108, at 712 (statement of Asst. 
Attorney General Benjamin R. Civiletti). See also Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41 
(1972). 
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Ca!andra's531 refusal to apply the exclusionary rule to grand jury 
proceedings rested to some degree upon the Court's concern that liti-
gation over fourth amendment questions raised by grand jury wit-
nesses would disrupt and delay continuing grand jury investigations. 
Moreover, permitting grand jury witnesses to raise fourth amend-
ment objections to questions asked by the prosecutor would promote 
"extended litigation of issues only tangentially related to the grand 
jury's primary objective."532 Justice Powell's conclusion is defensi-
ble if the grand jury screens only factual guilt, because most evi-
dence seized in violation of the defendant's fourth amendment rights 
has probative value. But if the accusatory grand jury's primary ob-
jective is to screen legal guilt, it should not consider evidence that 
would be excluded at the defendant's trial. 
Attributing the latter objective to the grand jury, some proposed 
reform statutes require that an indictment be dismissed if a court 
finds that it was based in part on evidence seized in violation of the 
defendant's constitutional or statutory rights.533 My objection to 
those proposals is that they penalize what may have been a prosecu-
tor's good faith belief that the submitted evidence was legally ob-
tained. Given the complexity of the constitutional principles 
involved, dismissal of an indictment seems too high a price for the 
prosecutor's error, especially if the other evidence presented to the 
grand jury provides sufficient proof of the defendant's legal guilt. 
My principle would impose an ethical obligation on prosecutors 
not to present evidence to the grand jury that they know was pro-
cured in violation of the putative defendant's constitutional rights.534 
In the rare case where a prosecutor knowingly presents illegally 
seized evidence, the resulting indictment should be dismissed regard-
less of any independent proof of legal guilt. However, in the more 
typical case where legitimate doubt exists about the constitutionality 
of some government evidence-gathering procedure, the grand jury's 
consideration of that evidence should not automatically invalidate 
the indictment. Instead, the court should disregard that evidence 
when it determines whether the government has presented the grand 
jury with sufficient proof of legal guilt. To implement this rule, the 
531. 414 U.S. 338 (1974). 
532. 414 U.S. at 349. 
533. See S. 1449, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3330C(d)(4) (1977), reprinted in 1977 Hearings, pt. 
2, supra note 108, at I 169-70 (providing that the district court shall dismiss an indictment if it 
finds that the prosecutor has submitted to the grand jury "evidence seized or otherwise ob-
tained ~by an unlawful act or in violation of the witness' constitutional right or of rights estab-
lished or protected by any statute of the United States"). 
534. See note 530 supra. 
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court should rule on the defendant's suppression motion before it 
reviews the grand jury's transcript. 
Admittedly, this principle will not save all defendants from in-
dictment based on illegally seized evidence, because it does not per-
mit suppression motions to be considered before indictment. 
However, when prosecutors realize that courts will dismiss indict-
ments based on insufficient proof of legal guilt, they will have more 
incentive to evaluate honestly the admissibility of evidence they 
present to the grand jury. 
3. Exculpatory Evidence 
If the prosecutor is aware of exculpatory evidence that, !f believed, 
would negate a material element of the crime or undermine the credibility 
of a crucial government witness, the prosecutor should present that evi-
dence to the grand jury. Failure to do so should invalidate any indict-
ment, even !f the grand jury received sufficient evidence to meet the 
directed-verdict standard If the prosecutor is aware of any exculpatory 
evidence (such as a possible affirmative defense) that, !f believed, would 
raise a reasonable doubt about the defendant's guilt, the prosecutor 
should alert the grand jury to its existence and inform them of their right 
to call for its presentation. If the prosecutor fails to do so, the subsequent 
indictment should not be dismissed unless the omitted exculpatory evi-
dence is so compelling that it probably would have led the grand jury to 
return a no bill Absent special circumstances, the prosecutor should no-
t!fy putative defendants that a grand jury is considering indictments 
against them and that they have a right to test!fy before it and to present 
the prosecutor with any evidence they consider exculpatory. 
As Johnson535 clearly demonstrated, the grand jury cannot elimi-
nate unwarranted prosecutions if the prosecutor does not present ex-
culpatory evidence that negates the defendant's guilt. Thus, the 
American Bar Association has recognized that the prosecutor should 
disclose exculpatory evidence to the grand jury536 and the Justice 
Department has amended its manual for U.S. Attorneys to include _ 
such a duty.537 But, like the Johnson decision itself, the significance 
of these standards is muddied by the failure of the drafters to define 
what they mean by "exculpatory'' or to suggest what sanctions 
should be triggered by a violation of this duty. 538 
535. 38 Cal. App. 3d 977, 113 Cal. Rptr. 740 (1974), ajfd on statutory grounds, 15 Cal. 3d 
248, 539 P.2d 792, 124 Cal. Rptr. 32 (1975) (en bane). See text at notes 450-59 supra. 
536. ABA STANDARDS - PROSECUTION FUNCTION, supra note 523, § 3.6(b). 
537. See U.S. ATTORNEY'S MANUAL§ 9-11.334 (1978) (''when a prosecutor conducting a 
grand jury inquiry is personally aware of substantial evidence which directly negates the guilt 
of a subject of the investigation, the prosecutor must present or otherwise disclose such evi-
dence to the grand jury before seeking an indictment against such a person"). 
538. Congress has considered some grand jury reform bills that bear the same defects. 
Former Congressman Eilberg's comprehensive grand jury reform bill required the prosecutor 
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Confusion over the proper scope of the duty and what sanctions 
should be imposed for its violation stems from the failure of both 
courts and commentators to evaluate the grand jury's screening func-
tions carefully. I have suggested that the grand jury should screen 
both factual and legal guilt. Since post-indictment judicial review of 
the transcript will ensure that the prosecutor has presented the grand 
jury with sufficient evidence to warrant conviction (the directed-ver-
dict screen), the grand jury's most important function is to predict 
whether a jury would find that evidence sufficiently credible and 
compelling to convict the defendant. Requiring the grand jury to 
find clear and convincing evidence of the defendant's guilt ensures a 
reliable pretrial adjudication of a defendant's factual and legal guilt 
by a lay body for all felony prosecutions. 
Viewed from that perspective, any evidence that, if believed, 
raises a reasonable doubt about the defendant's guilt could be con-
sidered exculpatory for purposes of grand jury screening. But, such 
a broad standard might force prosecutors to present all evidence that 
undermines the reliability or credibility of the government's case or 
supports a possible affirmative defense. Imposing such a broad 
mandatory duty of disclosure would transform prosecutors into sur-
rogate defense counsel in the grand jury room because they would be 
required to anticipate the defense's objections to the state's case. 
Forcing the prosecutor to present all evidence that might possibly 
defeat conviction at trial would also transform the grand jury's ex 
parte inquiry into a prolonged mini-trial. Moreover, the broader the 
scope of the duty, the more difficult it will be for prosecutors to de-
termine what evidence in their possession is exculpatory. The gov-
ernment already faces a dilemma when it examines its files to 
determine what Brady539 material it possesses that must be disclosed 
to the defendant. As Judge Mansfield observed: 
[I]n the absence of a preview of the defendant's proposed defenses 
before trial, [the government] may often be insufficiently appraised to 
to "periodically advise the grand jury of the nature and existence of evidence, as yet not re• 
ceived, which might tend to materially affect the credibility of any witness or tend to negate the 
guilt of any prospective defendant." H.R. 94, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3329(c) (1977), reprinted 
in 1977 Hearings, pt. 2, supra note 108, at 978. Although the bill defined exculpatory evidence 
broadly, it was completely silent as to what sanction, if any, should result from its violation. 
Former Senator Abourezk introduced a bill that required the district court to dismiss an in-
dictment if "the attorney for the Government has not presented to the grand jury all evidence 
in his or her possession which the attorney knows will tend to negate the guilt of the person 
indicted." S. 1449, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3330(c)(d)3 (1977), reprinted in 1977 Hearings, pt. 2, 
supra note 108, at 1169-70. While the sanction is clear, the bill does not define the scope of this 
duty. 
539. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), requires the prosecutor to disclose exculpatory 
evidence to defense counsel before trial. 373 U.S. at 87-88. See also United States v. Agurs, 
427 U.S. 97 (1976). 
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be able to select all exculpatory materials from its files. Indeed, the 
question of whether certain evidence is "exculpatory," like that of what 
evidence is "relevant," is frequently a matter of opinion, which can be 
resolved only in the light of all other evidence introduced at trial.540 
Judge Mansfield's point applies with even greater force to the prose-
cutor's evaluation of the files before presenting a case to the grand 
jury. For example, Judge Lacey argued that House Resolution 94's 
broad exculpatory evidence standard,541 which required the prosecu-
tor to disclose evidence that might materially affect the credibility of 
any witness, would be ''vague and impossible to interpret"542 in the 
grand jury context. "Every complex fact pattern includes inconsis-
tencies, varying observations, differences in recollection or ability to 
narrate, and credibility considerations . . . which are not susceptible 
to easy analysis at the grand jury stage."543 If the prosecutor chose 
not to disclose all possible inconsistencies, the courts would be 
forced to examine all of the government's evidence that might have 
been presented to the grand jury and speculate about how that evi-
dence might have altered the grand jury's deliberations. Thus, adop-
tion of a broadly defined exculpatory evidence standard could spawn 
a great deal of time-consuming and administratively burdensome lit-
igation. 
I 
Describing the problem is far easier than suggesting a solution 
that accommodates the conflicting interests of efficiency and fairness. 
Those who oppose a broad definition of exculpatory evidence argue 
that such a broad duty to present evidence would duplicate the trial's 
function at the grand jury stage. But duplication would rarely occur 
since most defendants never receive a trial. On the other hand, if we 
had sufficient resources to support a mini-trial proceeding during the 
pretrial process, it might make more sense to rely on the preliminary 
hearing rather than the grand jury as the appropriate forum because 
of its adversarial safeguards. 
Accordingly, one must define the exculpatory evidence standard 
in a manner that gives the grand jury sufficient information to adju-
dicate the defendant's guilt reliably without transforming its pro-
ceedings into a mini-trial. My tentative suggestion is a standard that 
distinguishes between evidence that directly negates a material ele-
ment of the crime and evidence that suggests a possible affirmative 
540. United States v. Cobb, 271 F. Supp. 159, 163 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). 
541. See note 538 supra. 
542. 1977 Hearings, pt. 1, supra note 108, at 206 (statement of Frederick B. Lacey, U.S. 
District Judge, District of New Jersey, representing the Judicial Conference of the United 
States). 
543. Id 
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defense. The prosecutor should be obligated to pr~sent the grand 
jury with evidence that suggests either that the defendant lacked the 
requisite criminal intent544 or that someone other than the defendant 
might have committed the act.545 For example, if aware of witnesses 
who would testify to an alibi defense, the prosecutor should present 
their testimony to the grand jury. If the government's sole eyewit-
ness to a crime has identified someone other than the defendant or 
given a description of the perpetrator that varies significantly from 
the defendant's special features, the prosecutor should present that 
information to the grand jury.546 If the prosecutor is aware of relia-
ble information that raises substantial doubt about the credibility of 
a material witness whose testimony is essential to show that the de-
fendant committed the crime, 547 that information should go to the 
grand jury. If the prosecutor fails to present the grand jury with evi-
dence that, if believed, would negate one of the material elements of 
the crime, the court should dismiss the indictment.548 Conversely, if 
aware of evidence that suggests grounds for an affirmative defense549 
544. See Johnson v. Superior Court, 38 Cal. App. 3d 977, 113 Cal. Rptr. 740 (1974), q/fd. 
on statutory grounds, 15 Cal. 3d 248, 539 P.2d 792, 124 Cal. Rptr. 32 (1975); United States v. 
Phillips Petroleum Co., 435 F. Supp. 610 (N.D. Okla. 1977). 
545. See United States v. Provenzano, 440 F. Supp. 561 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), discussed in note 
469 supra. 
546. See United States v. Provenzano, 440 F. Supp. 561 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). But cf. People v. 
Fills, 87 Misc. 2d 1067, 386 N.Y.S.2d 988 (Sup. Ct. 1976). In Fi/is, the prosecutor failed to 
inform the grand jury that the eyewitness, who identified the defendant as one of the men who 
shot her husband in her grand jury testimony, had previously stated only that she saw "a man" 
shoot her husband. The court refused to dismiss the indictment because this prior inconsistent 
statement was not so important that its introduction would have possibly caused the grand jury 
to change its findings. 87 Misc. 2d at 1069, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 990. 
547. See United States v. Provenzano, 440 F. Supp. 561 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). 
548. This is not a completely satisfactory standard for several reasons. First, the govern• 
ment might have sufficient evidence to reach a jury even if the exculpatory evidence is consid-
ered. Accordingly, the court should be given the discretion to dismiss an indictment where the 
omitted exculpatory evidence would probably have led the grand jury to return a no bill. See 
United States v. Mandel, 415 F. Supp. 1033, 1041-42 (D. Md. 1976); People v. Fills, 87 Misc. 
2d 1067, 1069, 386 N.Y.S.2d 988, 989 (Sup. Ct. 1976). 
Second, in jurisdictions that use the diminished capacity defense, psychiatric evidence of 
defendant's mental abnormality is relevant to dispute the defendant's specific intent for certain 
crimes. I have argued elsewhere that in most cases, psychiatric testimony introduced under 
this partial defense does not really negate the requisite intent as much as it explains why the 
defendant entertained it. See Arenella, The /)iminished Capacity and J)iminished Responsibility 
J)ej"enses: Two Children of a /)oomed Marriage, 77 CoLUM. L. REV. 826 (1977). Accordingly, I 
believe the prosecutor should not be obligated to present such expert testimony to the grand 
jury because in most cases it raises questions about mitigating the defendant's culpability 
which are more appropriately resolved by the ultimate trier of fact after a complete adversarial 
presentation of the evidence. 
549. See People v. Snow, 72 Cal. App. 3d 950, 956-57, 140 Cal. Rptr. 427, 430 (1977), 
overruled on other grounds, People v. Wetmore, 22 Cal. 3d 318,583 P.2d 1308, 149 Cal. Rptr. 
265 (1978) (in dicta, the Snow court observed that Johnson v. Superior Court, 38 Cal. App. 3d 
977, 113 Cal. Rptr. 740 (1974), qjfd on statutory grounds, 15 Cal. 3d 248, 539 P.2d 792, 124 Cal. 
Rptr. 32 (1975), did not require prosecutors to disclose evidence concerning a possible insanity 
defense to grand jury). 
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or raises credibility issues about one of the government's wit-
nesses, 550 the prosecutor need not present such evidence to the grand 
jury, but he should alert the grand jurors of its existence so they can 
request its production if they desire. Even if the prosecutor fails to 
alert the grand jury about this type of evidence, indictments based 
on a prima facie case of legal guilt should not be dismissed. 
This compromise proposal will have little effect on grand jury 
screening in many cases because the prosecutor may not be aware of 
exculpatory evidence in the defendant's exclusive possession. To 
cure that defect without transforming the grand jury into an adver-
sarial proceeding, the prosecutor should give target defendants551 an 
opportunity to testify before the grand jury and to present the prose-
cutor with exculpatory evidence before the grand jury is asked to 
return an indictment. 552 
550. However, if the evidence seriously questions the credibility of an essential witness 
whose testimony is needed to establish one of the material elements of the crime, the prosecu-
tor should be obligated to disclose it. See United States v. Samango, 450 F. Supp. 1097 (D. 
Hawaii 1978), qffd., 607 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1979). 
551. See H.R. 94, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3329(b)(2)(B) (1977), reprinted in 1977 Hearings, 
pt. 2, supra note 108, at 977. This provision would require the prosecutor to take "reasonable 
steps to notify" target defendants of their opportunity to testify or present evidence before their 
indictment unless the prosecutor can demonstrate to the court that "notice would result in the 
flight of the person, would endanger other witnesses, or would unduly delay the investigation 
and prosecution." Id. While federal prosecutors often notify target defendants of their oppor-
tunity to testify in white collar and political corruption cases, see United States v. Mandel, 415 
F. Supp. 1033, 1040 (D. Md. 1976), the Justice Department opposes mandating such notice 
because it believes notice is unnecessary in most cases. Furthermore, it argues that a 
mandatory requirement with special exceptions would impair the government's flexibility in 
recognizing when notice was appropriate and would spawn unnecessary litigation. 1977 Hear-
ings, pt. 1, supra note 108, at 717 (statement of Asst. Attorney General Benjamin R. Civiletti). 
See also U.S. ATTORNEY'S MANUAL§ 9-11.252 (1978) (emphasis added): 
Where a target is not called to testify pursuant to 9-11.251, supra, and does not request to 
testify on his own motion (see 9-11.252, supra), the prosecutor, in appropriate cases, is 
encouraged to notify such person a reasonable time before seeking an indictment in order 
to afford him an opportunity to testify [subject to the conditions that the witness (1) ex-
plicitly waived his privilege against self-incrimination and (2) is represented by counsel or 
voluntarily and knowingly appears without counsel and consents to full examination 
under oath] of course, notification would not be appropriate in routine clear cases .... 
While it is beyond the scope of this Article, I believe that putative defendants who elect to 
testify before the indicting grand jury should have the right to have counsel accompany them. 
Many of the arguments against permitting counsel into the grand jury room stress how such a 
procedure might endanger the investigatory grand jury's effectiveness, especially where multi-
ple representation by house counsel is involved. See Silbert, .Defense Counsel in the Grand Jury 
-The Answer to the White Collar Criminal's Prayers, 15 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 293 (1978). If the 
inquisitorial and accusatorial functions are performed by different grand juries as I have pro-
posed, these objections no longer apply. Even if the same grand jury performs both functions, 
the experience of those states that permit the witness's counsel in the grand jury room suggests 
that counsel's presence has not disrupted or delayed the proceedings. See 1977 Hearings, pt. 1, 
supra note 108, at 142; Hixson, Bringing .Down the Curtain on the Absurd .Drama of Entrances 
and Exits- Witness Representation in the Grand Jury Room, 15 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 307, 318-
20 (1978). See Appendix for a model grand jury statute which provides for presence of counsel 
in the grand jury room. 
552. Cf. U.S. ATTORNEY'S MANUAL 9-11.252 (1978) (leaving to the "sound discretion of 
570 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 78:463 
4. B!furcating the Grand Jury's Accusatorial and Inquisitorial 
'Functions 
Separate grand juries should pe,form the investigatory and accusatory 
functions so that those reforms designed to improve the quality of grand 
jury screening will not unduly restrict the grand jury's investigatory pow-
ers. 
One of the major obstacles to reform of the grand jury's accusa-
torial function is that such a reform might interfere with the grand 
jury's capacity to investigate criminal activity. As Justice Powell 
noted in Calandra, the grand jury's investigatory function requires 
that its operation be "unrestrained by the ... procedural and evi-
dentiary rules governing the conduct of criminal trials."553 Congress 
could improve the quality of grand jury screening without limiting 
its investigatory powers by precluding the same grand jury from per-
forming both functions.554 Thus, an investigatory grand jury could 
still operate free of evidentiary restraints. Once it had uncovered 
sufficient evidence to warrant indictment of particular individuals, 
the prosecutor could then sift out the legally admissible evidence and 
present it to a second grand jury that would perform only an accusa-
tory function. 
Admittedly, this proposal would require some duplication of la-
bor. Some witnesses who testified before the inquisitorial grand jury 
would have to testify again before the accusatorial grand jury. 
Moreover, the prosecutor would have to explain the nature of the 
government's preceding investigation to the second grand jury. 
However, the advantages of such a separation clearly outweigh its 
costs. 
First, a purely accusatory grand jury can screen guilt more inde-
pendently. We simply cannot expect the same grand jurors who 
have spent months ferreting out criminal activity to suddenly shift 
roles and exercise their protective function. 555 During a prolonged 
the grand jury" whether to consider testimony of the witnesses suggested by the putative 
defendant). 
553. 414 U.S. at 338, 343 (1974). 
554. Professor Leroy Clark has suggested that the prosecutor alone could perform the 
grand jury's inquisitorial function if granted the power to subpoena witnesses outside the 
grand jury's presence. Accordingly, he would restrict the grand jury to its accusatorial func-
tion. See L. CLARK, supra note 383, at 142. However, he would grant the grand jury investi-
gative power to ''initiate investigations into criminal offenses by any officer of the 
government." Id at 145 (emphasis in original). 
555. As California Supreme Court Justice Mosk recently observed, the grand jury suffers 
from "institutional schizophrenia" because "it is expected to serve two distinct and largely 
inconsistent functions - accuser and impartial fact-finder. It seems self-evident that to the 
extent it succeeds at one function, it must fail at the other." Hawkins v. Superior Court, 22 
Cal. 3d 584, 591, 586 P.2d 916, 920, 150 Cal. Rptr. 435, 439 (1978). 
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investigation into alleged criminal activity, grand jurors often grow 
to respect and trust the prosecutor who guides their activities. 556 
Moreover, the first grand jury might consider inadmissible evidence 
that convinces it of the defendant's factual guilt. Under such 
circumstances, one can hardly expect grand jurors to admit that 
their labors have proved fruitless by refusing to indict. Presenting 
whatever legally admissible evidence is uncovered by the first grand 
jury to a second grand jury removes those defects. The accusatory 
grand jury will not be prejudiced by incompetent .evidence against 
the accused nor will it identify as readily with the prosecutor's inves-
tigative efforts. 
Second, my proposal calling for judicial review of the indicting 
grand jury's transcript could impose a serious administrative burden 
on the courts if they had to wade through the transcript produced by 
a prolonged grand jury investigation. Concise presentation of the 
prosecutor's legally admissible evidence to an accusatory grand jury 
should reduce the courts' burden by producing far shorter tran-
scripts.557 
5. Redrafting Judicial Charges 
Judicial charges to the indicting grand jury should emphasize the grand 
jury's duty to screen out prosecutions where conviction at trial is unlikely. 
Courts should instruct the grand jurors not to return an indict-
ment unless the prosecutor presents them with clear and convinc-
ing558 evidence of the defendant's guilt. The instructions should also 
556. See United States v. Gramolini, 301 F. Supp. 39, 41 (D.R.I. 1969). 
557. A subsequent proposal will call for disclosure to the defendant of the indicting grand 
jury's transcript. See notes 563-80 infra and accompanying text. By separating the inquisito-
rial and accusatorial functions, the prosecutor can limit the defendant's discovery to testimony 
that directly relates to the alleged criminal activities, thereby preserving the secrecy of any 
confidential background information whose disclosure could prejudice any continuing investi-
gations. 
558. Some courts already instruct the grand jury that it should not return a true bill unless 
it is "satisfied from the evidence which is submitted to it that a conviction would be warranted 
if the evidence were presented to a trial jury where there was no evidence to rebut it." United 
States v. O'Shea, 447 F. Supp. 330, 331 (S.D. Fla. 1978), qffd. per curiam, 588 F.2d 199 (5th 
Cir. 1979). Alternatively, grand jurors are sometimes told that they should return an indict-
ment when and ff they determine that the evidence, "if unexplained or uncontradicted, would 
carry the case to a trial jury and justify the conviction of the accused." 1977 Hearings, pt. 1, 
supra note 108, at 350 (quoting the New Jersey Grand Jury Manual for Prosecutors, Final 
Draft, 1977). However, grand jurors are rarely told that to justify a conviction at trial the fact-
finder must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Logically, therefore, the grand jury should apply a reasonable doubt standard to the gov-
ernment's presentation. If the government cannot convince the grand jurors beyond a reason-
able doubt in an ex parte presentation, how can it convince a petit jury in an adversarial trial? 
However, the application of a proof-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard to the indicting 
grand jury might convert this ex parte proceeding into a mini-trial. If the grand jurors apply 
the standard rigorously, they might call for additional testimony to resolve any doubts they 
might have. The prosecutor might feel compelled to present the entire government case to 
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emphasize their power to judge credibility559 and to call additional 
witnesses,560 including the putative defendant,561 if they have any 
doubts about the prosecutor's case. They should also be told of their 
right to submit their own questions to witnesses after the prosecutor 
has screened them to weed out improper inquiries.562 Finally, they 
should be advised of their power to request the presentation of less 
serious charges if they believe that the petit jury would not convict 
the accused of the requested charge. 
6. Transcripts for .Defendants 
After indictment, the defendant should receive a copy ef the transcript ef 
all recorded proceedings ef the indicting grand jury that relate to tl1e of-
fenses charged, subject to such reasonable limitations, including protective 
orders, as the court may impose to prevent abuses. 563 
ensure that this standard is met. Accordingly, I have selected the clear and convincing stan-
dard as a compromise burden of proof because it protects the accusatorial norm that compel-
ling evidence of the defendant's factual guilt be presented to some independent adjudicator 
before the state induces a plea. Whether one views the grand jury as predicting how a trial 
jury would act or as providing a substitute lay adjudication in a system with few trials, the 
grand jurors should return a true bill only when they are personally convinced of defendant's 
factual guilt. 
559. See, e.g., United States v. Gallo, 394 F. Supp. 310, 314 (D. Conn. 1975). 
560. See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW§ 190.50(3) {McKinney 1971). When presenting 
hearsay testimony under the compelling justification exception, the prosecutor should tell the 
grand jurors of their right to call the primary source of the testimony. 
_ 561. If the target defendant declines to appear, the grand jury should be instructed not to 
draw an inference of guilt from the defendant's decision. 
562. Because grand jurors are dependent on the prosecutor for their legal advice, some 
reformers have called for the appointment of independent counsel to advise the grand jury. 
See 1977 Hearings, pt. 1, supra note 108, at 659 (statement of Professor Leon Friedman on 
behalf of the American Civil Liberties Union); id at 47 (statement of Doris Petersen on behalf 
of the Center for Constitutional Rights). I believe this reform is unnecessary because once 
prosecutors realize that their legal advice is recorded and subject to judicial review, it is un-
likely that they would deliberately give erroneous legal advice to the grand jury. Even in-
dependent counsel are capable of making good faith errors in their legal instructions. 
563. If the inquisitorial and accusatorial functions of the grand jury are not separated, I 
favor adoption of H.R. 94 § 3334(c) and (d), which provide: 
(c) A reasonable time prior to trial, and after the return of an indictment or the filing of 
an indictment or the filing of an information, a defendant shall, upon request and under 
such conditions and limitations as the court deems reasonable, be entitled to examine and 
copy a transcript or electronic recording of -
(1) the grand jury testimony of all witnesses to be called at trial; 
(2) all statements to the grand jury by the court and the attorney for the Government 
or special attorney, relating to the defendant's case; 
(3) all grand jury testimony or evidence which in any manner could be considered 
exculpatory; and 
(4) all other grand jury testimony or evidence which the court may deem material to 
the defense. 
(d) Upon a showing of good cause, the court may, at any time, order that the disclosure 
of the recorded proceedings of a grand jury be denied, restricted or deferred, or make 
such other order as is appropriate. Upon motion by the Government, the court shall 
permit the government to make such showing, in whole or in part, in the form of a written 
statement to be inspected by the judge alone. If the court enters an order granting relief 
following such a showing, the entire text of the party's statement shall be sealed and pre-
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Judicial and legislative deference to the need for grand jury secrecy 
initially prevented defendants from gaining access to grand jury 
transcripts. However, the Supreme Court has significantly weakened 
the secrecy rationale's applicability to post-indictment disclosure re-
quests. As the Court observed in .Dennis v. United States,564 grand 
jury secrecy does not justify a per se rule barring a defendant's access 
to relevant grand jury testimony that may aid the defense. "In our 
adversary system for determining guilt or innocence, it is rarely justi-
fiable for the prosecution to have exclusive access to a storehouse of 
relevant fact. Exceptions to this are justifiable only by the cle,arest 
and most compelling considerations."565 
Decisions like .Dennis, as well as critical commentary about the 
reduced need for grand jury secrecy after indictment,566 prompted 
Congress to relax rules that had restricted defendants' access to 
grand jury minutes. Defendants are now entitled to minutes of their 
own testimony under rule 16(a)(l)(A).567 Under the 1970 amend-
ments to the Jencks Act, defendants can inspect the grand jury testi-
mony of the government's trial witnesses for purposes of 
impeachment at the close of the witnesses' direct examination. 568 
Otherwise, disclosure of grand jury minutes in criminal cases is regu-
lated by rule 6.569 Interpreting an earlier version of that provision570 
in Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States,511 the Supreme Court 
concluded that disclosure is committed to the discretion of the trial 
judge and the "burden ... is on the defense to show that 'a particu-
larized need' exists• for the minutes which outweighs the policy of 
secrecy."572 
served in the records of the court to be made available to the appellate court in the event 
of an appeal by the defendant. 
H.R. 94, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3334(c), (d) (1977), reprinted in 1977 Hearings, pt. 2, supra note 
108, at 90-91. 
564. 384 U.S. 855 (1966). 
565. 384 U.S. at 873 (footnote omitted). 
566. See Knudsen, Pretrial .Disclosure of Federal Grand Jury Testimony, 48 WASH. L. REV. 
423 (1973); Sherry, Grand Jury Minutes: The Unreasonable Rule of Secrecy, 48 VA. L. REv. 668 
(1962). 
567. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(l)(A) reads in part, "[u]pon request of a defendant the govern-
ment shall permit the defendant to inspect and copy . • . recorded testimony of the defendant 
before a grand jury which relates to the offense charged." 
568. 18 U.S.C. § 3500(b), (e)(3) (1976) required disclosure of the trial witness's prior state-
ments that relate to the witness's testimony. A 1970 amendment to subsection (e)(3) defined 
"statements" to include the witness's grand jury testimony. See 8 MooRE's FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE~ 16.10[1], at 16-139 (rev. 2d ed. 1979). 
569. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2)(C). 
570. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e), 327 U.S. 837-38 (1946). 
571. 360 U.S. 395 (1959). 
572. 360 U.S. at 399-400. See also Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 
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Most commentators who have evaluated the doctrine of grand 
jury secrecy have concluded that the rule's purposes do not apply 
with much force once the defendant has been indicted.573 Defenders 
of grand jury secrecy have argued that disclosure of transcripts may 
prompt some defendants to tamper with the government's witnesses 
before trial and may deter future grand jury witnesses from testify-
ing freely.574 However, some prosecutors from jurisdictions that 
grant defendants an automatic right to disclosure have conceded that 
those fears have not been borne out. 575 There is simply no evidence 
to suggest any higher incidence of obstruction of justice or suborna-
tion of perjury in those jurisdictions. 576 Moreover, any rule mandat-
ing automatic disclosure of the entire grand jury transcript to an 
indicted defendant could alleviate such concerns by permitting the 
prosecutor to seek a protective order denying, restricting, or defer-
ring disclosure when an abuse may occur.577 
Giving the defendant access to the grand jury's transcript soon 
after indictment will improve the administration of justice in several 
respects. First, _it will save court time that is presently wasted on 
litigation about whether the defendant has shown a particularized 
need that outweighs any concern for grand jury secrecy. Second, it 
will allow defendants to determine whether they have grounds to 
challenge the legal sufficiency of the evidence presented to the grand 
jury (my first proposal). Automatic disclosure of the grand jury tran-
21 I (1979)(applying a reinvigorated particularized-need standard to civil litigant's request for 
transcripts of federal criminal grand jury proceedings). 
573. See note 566 supra. The secrecy doctrine is designed to (I) prevent the escape of 
target defendants before their indictment; (2) protect the grand jurors' ability to deliberate 
freely by preventing target defendants and their associates from influencing their decision; (3) 
prevent subornation of perjury; (4) encourage full disclosure by persons who have information 
relating to criminal activity; (5) protect the reputation of exonerated target defendants by not 
publicizing that they were under investigation. See United States v. Rose, 215 F.2d 617, 628-
29 (3d Cir. 1953). With the exception of(3) and (4), these considerations do not apply once the 
grand jury has completed its investigation and returned an indictment. 
574. See 1977 Hearings, pt. I, supra note 108, at 722 (statement of Asst. Attorney General 
Benjamin R. Civiletti). 
575. Id at 331-38 (statement of William F. Hyland, Attorney General of New Jersey, and 
Robert J. DelTufo, Asst. Attorney General of New Jersey and Director of the Division of 
Criminal Justice). 
New Jersey's criminal discovery rules are probably the most liberal in the nation. We 
have totally rejected the notion that the criminal trial is a contest. Accordingly, grand 
jury minutes are available to all defendants subsequent to a routine discovery request, 
Discovery of grand jury minutes provides an important check on any possible abuses in 
the grand jury process. Moreover, full discovery of grand jury minutes provides the basis 
for legal challenges to the sufficiency, weight, competency and admissibility of the evi-
dence presented. 
Id at 343. 
576. Id 
577. H.R. 94, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3334(d) (1977), reprinted in 1977 Hearings, pt. 2, supra 
note 108, at 990-91. See note 563 supra. 
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script will remove any incentive for the defendant to raise un-
founded motions to dismiss in the hope of gaining a glimpse of the 
prosecution's case.578 Moreover, if it is true that most prosecutors 
will not seek indictments unless they already possess sufficient evi-
dence to defeat a motion for directed acquittal, giving defendants 
access to the grand jury transcript will cause them to file fewer mo-
tions to dismiss than if they had to file the motion before knowing 
what evidence the grand jury actually received. Defense access to 
the transcript should also improve the motions themselves by foster-
ing specific allegations of evidentiary defects. Thus, the court's re-
view of the grand jury transcript will be eased because both defense 
and prosecution memoranda will point to the criticial portions of the 
grand jury testimony needed to establish a prima facie case of legal 
guilt. Third, automatic disclosure of the grand jury transcript will 
grant the defendant increased discovery of the prosecution's case and 
will do so in a far more expeditious manner than a prolonged adver-
sary proceeding such as a post-indictment preliminary hearing. 
Fourth, access to the grand jury transcript will also enable the de-
fense attorney to judge the desirability of plea-negotiations with the 
prosecutor because the defense will now have enough information to 
predict the likelihood of conviction at trial.579 Finally, disclosure of 
the grand jury's transcript is necessary to ensure detection of any 
prosecutorial misconduct before the grand jury.580 
CONCLUSION 
All of the proposals in Section V promote greater protection of 
our system's legal guilt requirements during the pretrial process 
without unduly burdening an already overtaxed criminal justice sys-
tem. Their desirability depends in part on one's view of the purposes 
served by the pretrial process. Those who believe that the criminal 
trial provides adequate protection of our system's legal guilt require-
ments will dismiss them as misconceiving the grand jury's basic 
charging function. They will argue that these reforms transform the 
grand jury's ex parte inquiry into a preliminary mini-trial proceed-
ing that adjudicates the defendant's guilt and thereby duplicates the 
trial's function.581 As Sections I, II, and III have indicated, I believe 
that objection rests on a theoretical model of our criminal justice 
system that no longer comports with reality. Since pretrial proce-
578. But see note 582 infra. 
579. See notes 241-49 supra and accompanying text. 
580. See Holderman, supra note 442, at 18-19. 
581. See Silbert, supra note 551, at 294. 
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dure is the only procedure most defendants get, the preliminary ad-
judication of legal guilt fostered by my reforms will be the only trial-
like proceeding most defendants will receive. 
A second objection to these reforms is that they will spawn time-
consuming pretrial litigation that will increase the courts' adminis-
trative burdens and generate significant pretrial delay.582 Under my 
proposals, the grand jury's ex parte evaluation of the government's 
case might be slower because, absent some compelling justification, 
the prosecutor will be obligated to present the government's chief 
trial witnesses to the grand jury.583 Courts will spend some addi-
tional time evaluating the indicting grand jury's transcript to deter-
mine whether the prosecutor presented a prima facie case.584 No 
matter how narrowly the exculpatory duty standard is defined, it is 
reasonable to expect litigation over subsidiary questions, such as 
whether the prosecutor was aware of exculpatory evidence not 
582. See 1976 Hearings, supra note 43, at 229-30 (statement of Russell E. Smith, U.S. Dis-
trict Judge, Montana): 
There is another consideration which should be weighed. Those looking on the adminis-
tration of criminal law but not participating in it may tend to think that points are raised 
and argued because, in the mind of the lawyer, the points have some real basic merit. If 
that was ever true, it is not true today. The modem American lawyer acting in a criminal 
case feels compelled to explore a case to determine if there has been any violation of any 
right ofa defendant (regardless of guilt or innocence), and to urge a denial of the right in 
any case in which arguments can be made which are not patently silly. Today it is stan-
dard procedure to test each confession, each piece of evidence obtained as a result of a 
search, each piece of identification evidence. Create a right to test the sufficiency of an 
indictment and it will become standard operating procedure to test it. Why? Under 
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 355 (1963), a defendant may not be tried for a crime 
without an opportunity to have counsel. Under the post-Gideon developments, the sixth 
amendment requirements are not met unless the representation has been adequate. See 
United States v. Decoster, 487 F.2d 1197 (D.C. Cir. 1973), which perhaps expresses the 
outer limits of the rule. There is in the minds of most lawyers who defend criminal cases 
the thought that one day a Section 2225 (the federal equivalent of habeas corpus) petition 
may be filed claiming that the lawyer was not adequate. One ground which could be 
claimed would be, given the enactment of H.R. 1277 or the bills similar to it, the failure of 
the lawyer to test the sufficiency of the indictment. We are not talking, therefore, about an 
occasional review of a grand jury indictment: we are talking about a routine review of 
grand jury indictments at the district court level and a review of the district court action at 
the court of appeals level. 
I believe Judge Smith is mistaken in several respects. First, recent studies suggest that 
defense counsel do not act as adversarily as he suggests. See notes 231-40 supra and accompa-
nying text. While defense counsel in white collar, political corruption, and organized crime 
cases often have the resources to raise a host of procedural objections, the majority of defense 
counsel do not. See Section III supra. Moreover, the directed-verdict standard will easily be 
met in most federal prosecutions. If the defense attorney already has access to the transcript, 
little would be gained by filing a motion to dismiss where it is obvious that a directed-verdict 
standard has been met. I would anticipate that motions testing the legal sufficiency of the 
charges would be filed most frequently when the prosecutor has presented some hearsay testi-
mony to the grand jury under the compelling justification exception. 
583. However, my reform proposals do not duplicate the trial's protections at the grand 
jury stage. To ensure efficient grand jury review, the prosecutor may present hearsay testi-
mony under certain specified circumstances and need not present all evidence that would be 
considered exculpatory at trial to the grand jury. 
584. But see note 557 supra and accompanying text. 
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presented to the grand jury. Disclosure of the indicting grand jury's 
transcript may generate litigation concerning prosecutorial requests 
for protective orders and increase defense claims of prosecutorial 
misconduct before the grand jury. 
On the other hand, these reforms may save some court time later 
in the process. Disclosure of the transcript removes the defense 
counsel's incentive to file frivolous motions based on what may have 
occurred before the grand jury in the hope of gaining some inciden-
tal discovery of the prosecution's case. Courts will no longer have to 
determine whether the defendant has shown a particularized need to 
see grand jury testimony. Moreover, a judicial determination that 
the prosecutor presented a prima facie case to the grand jury should 
save time at a subsequent plea hearing because the transcript can be 
used to demonstrate the factual basis of those pleas. 585 
Despite those savings, one must concede that any serious attempt 
to provide greater protection of our system's legal guilt requirements 
will inevitably decrease the efficiency of our present system. How-
ever, the experience of those states that have imposed similar re-
quirements on their grand juries suggests that the costs are 
tolerable.586 Moreover, one cannot examine these additional bur-
dens in a vacuum: they must be compared to the costs of alternative 
reforms, like the proposal to mandate preliminary hearings for all 
federal prosecutions. As Sections IV and V suggested, requiring the 
585. See note 30 l supra and accompanying text. In Afford plea situations, the court might 
wish to make its own credibility judgment by personally considering the live testimony of the 
government's critical trial witnesses. See note 293 supra. 
586. California presently permits defendants to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence 
considered by the grand jury. See CAL. PENAL CODE§ 995 (West 1970). While California 
does not define "probable cause" to require a high likelihood of conviction, see Cotton v. 
Superior Court, 56 Cal. 2d 459,462, 364 P.2d 241, 242, 15 Cal. Rptr. 65, 66 (1961) ("[p]robable 
cause is shown if a man of ordinary caution or prudence could entertain a strong suspicion of 
the guilt of the accused, and if some rational ground exists for an assumption of guilt, the 
indictment will not be set aside"), it does require the prosecution to present the grand jury with 
evidence that would be legally admissible at trial. See CAL. PENAL CODE§ 939.6(b) (West 
1970). Like my proposal, the grand jury's consideration of incompetent evidence does not void 
the indictment where it also received sufficient competent evidence to support the indictment. 
However, the California system does not provide a very useful analogy because most of its 
prosecutions co=ence by information followed by a preliminary hearing so its judiciary does 
not deal with many post-indictment review motions. 
New York also permits dismissal of indictments based on insufficient proof of legal guilt. 
See Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 43, at 909. New York's experience is 
more analogous to the federal system because its state constitution guarantees the right to 
grand jury indictment in "capital or otherwise infamous" crimes. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. 
However, one would need to know much more about the number, types, and frequency of 
post-indictment judicial inquiries into evidence sufficiency and prosecutorial misconduct 
before drawing any compelling analogy between New York and the federal system. At this 
juncture, all that can be said is that New York has adopted a series of requirements somewhat 
similar to those proposed here and the resulting pretrial delay and administrative burden gen-
erated by such procedures have not devastated its criminal justice system. 
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prosecutor to present a prima facie case of legal guilt to the grand 
jury and permitting judicial review to test the legal sufficiency of the 
government's evidence are far more efficient reforms than a proposal 
requiring the prosecutor to present that case twice: once to the grand 
jury and once to the magistrate at the preliminary hearing. First, 
requiring two dress rehearsals of the prosecution's case would cause 
greater inconvenience for the government's trial witnesses. Second, 
the adversarial presentation of the prosecutor's case at the prelimi-
nary hearing would be far more time-consuming than judicial review 
of the indicting grand jury's transcript. While my reforms might 
lengthen some grand jurys' proceedings, they would remain essen-
tially ex parte, whereas mandating preliminary hearings would foster 
the adversarial mini-trial that Costello sought to avoid. 
Finally, some observers might question the necessity of system-
wide reforms to deal with a problem that only arises in a few "hard" 
cases. According to this view, the government possesses compelling 
evidence of factual guilt that can satisfy the trial's formal proof re-
quirements in most cases. Thus, little would be achieved by length-
ening the grand jury's review of the case or by subjecting the 
prosecution's screening of legal guilt to post-indictment judicial re-
view. While the prosecutor might indict defendants despite ques-
tionable legal guilt in a small percentage of cases, these observers 
argue that we can rely on defense counsel and the court's application 
of the prosecutorial misconduct doctrine to check those isolated 
abuses. Therefore, these critics would conclude that the application 
of my system-wide reforms to deal with the exceptional case miscon-
ceives the scope of the problem and ignores existing and far more 
efficient judicial remedies. 
This objection falters in defining the problem.587 First, the dis-
tinction between hard and routine prosecutions is somewhat suspect 
because some cases that appear routine might become less so if the 
defense counsel had the time and resources to conduct a proper fac-
tual and legal investigation. One of the dangers in distinguishing 
between routine and hard cases in an adversarial system of justice is 
that the characterization depends in part on the quality of the de-
fense attorney. Criminal prosecutions involving white collar crime, 
organized crime, and corporate crime may prove difficult because 
the defendant will have the resources to deal with the government on 
587. Indeed, some commentators have minimized the importance of our system's legal 
guilt requirements by equating them with the trial's procedural protections, thereby ignoring 
how they protect a fair accusatorial process before conviction. See note 71 supra. 
February 1980] Reforming the Federal Grand Jury 579 
an equal footing. Criminal prosecutions against indigent defendants 
may well appear routine for opposite reasons. 
However, even assuming that most criminal prosecutions do not 
raise the danger that a legally innocent defendant might be con-
victed, this objection to systemic reform misunderstands the problem 
these reforms are trying to remedy. The problem involved is not 
simply one of outcome,588 but of the process by which that outcome 
is reached. While some of my reforms are designed to ensure that 
the government will not secure the conviction of a defendant who 
could not possibly be convicted at trial, most of them are designed to 
protect a fair accusatorial process before conviction. Regardless of 
whether the prosecution is routine or hard, the criminal process 
should ensure that 
(1) the government shoulders its burden of independently developing 
reliable, legally admissible evidence of the defendant's factual 
guilt before it encourages the defendant to plead; 
(2) someone other than law-enforcement officials independently ad-
judicates the defendant's legal guilt; 
(3) the community participates in the adjudication of the defendant's 
legal guilt so that the disposition of society's most serious sanction 
is not left exclusively in the hands of professionals.589 
All of these values will be fostered if we require the prosecutor to 
present the federal grand jury with a prima facie case of legal guilt, 
strengthen the grand jury's capacity to make a reliable ex parte adju-
dication of guilt, and provide greater judicial safeguards against 
prosecutorial misconduct before the indicting grand jury. Plea-bar-
gaining shall remain the dominant form of guilt determination; but 
these pretrial safeguards590 will ensure that a reliable preliminary 
adjudication of guilt will be made before the state applies its consid-
erable pressures to induce a guilty plea. 
588. See id 
589. See Kipnis, Plea-Bargaining: A Critic's Rejoinder, 13 LAW & SocY. REV. 555, 556-57 
(1979). 
590. Obviously, any comprehensive effort to promote a fair accusatorial process before 
conviction must go far beyond the proposals suggested in this Article. For example, my re-
forms do not directly address the vitally important question of how to improve the quality of 
criminal defense representation. For an interesting examination of this problem, see Tague, 
The Attempt lo Improve Criminal .Defense Representation, 15 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 109 (1977). 
Tague argues that the courts cannot improve the quality of defense representation through 
post-conviction review of counsel's effectiveness. Accordingly, he suggests that the courts 
should monitor defense counsel's performance before conviction by requiring counsel to com-
plete a checklist which would indicate and explain what counsel has and has not done and 
what he expects to do. Bui cf. United States v. Decoster, No. 72-1283 (D.C. Cir. July 10, 1979) 
(plurality opinion arguing that "extensive supervision by the trial judge through a pretrial 
checklist to ensure that counsel has met his duties of preparation" would disrupt adversary 
system by "increasing intrusio_n into the development and presentation of the defense case by 
the trial judge, and ( out of self protection) by the prosecution." Slip op. at 40). 
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.APPENDIX 
In 1974, the American Bar Association's Criminal Justice Section 
created a committee on the grand jury. This committee, whose 
members included federal and state prosecutors, judges, public and 
private defense counsel, law professors, and law students, was asked 
to evaluate pending grand jury reform legislation and to off er "legis-
lative principles" to guide such reform efforts. Under the careful 
leadership of Mr. Richard Gerstein, an attorney with over twenty 
years of prosecutorial experience, this committee proposed twenty-
five grand jury reform principles which were then approved by the 
Criminal Justice Section, a body whose members represent every 
segment of the criminal justice system. In August, 1977, the Ameri-
can Bar Association's House of Delegates enacted a resolution that 
supported grand jury reform legislation consistent with these twenty-
five principles.1 
In 1979, the Grand Jury Committee began work on a Model 
Grand Jury Reform Act to implement its reform principles. As 
chairperson of the subcommittee responsible for drafting this Act, I 
wrote several statutes that would effect some of the reforms I have 
advocated in this Article. On February 29, 1980, the Grand Jury 
Committee approved the following model statutes. 
DRAFT STATUTE § 100: GRAND JURY RULES OF EVIDENCE2 
I. The prosecutor should not present the grand jury with evidence 
against a putative defendant which he knows was obtained in violation of 
that putative defendant's constitutional rights. 
2. Except as provided in sections 3 and 4, the prosecutor should not 
present the grand jury with hearsay evidence which would not be admissi-
ble at trial absent some compelling justification for its use. [Such justifica-
tion must be stated on the record at the time of its admission. Examples of 
such compelling justifications include: 
(a) the admission of a written or oral statement made by a seri-
ously injured victim of the crime who is presently unavailable to testify 
where circumstances require prompt grand jury action; 
(b) the admission of a written or oral statement, taken under oath, 
from a witness who will be available to testify at trial, when that wit-
ness' safety would be jeopardized if he or she were required to make a 
personal appearance before the grand jury; 
I. See 1977 Hearings, pt. I, supra note 108, at 173-74. 
2. On May 9, 1980, the Grand Jury Committee deleted the bracketed segment of section 2 
and redrafted sections 3 and 4 into a more condensed format. Several states presently require 
the grand jury to receive only evidence that would be admissible at trial: Alabama, Alaska, 
Arkansas, California, Idaho, Iowa, Louisiana, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, New 
Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah. For a listing of the specific 
statutes and rules imposing this requirement, see 1976 Hearings, supra note 43, at 723 n.S I. 
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(c) the admission of a hearsay summary of the contents of volu-
minous business or financial records.] 
3. A report or a copy of a report made by a public servant or by a 
person employed by a public servant or agency who is a physicist, chemist, 
coroner or medical examiner, firearms identification expert, examiner of 
questioned documents, fingerprint technician, or an expert or technician in 
some comparable scientific or professional field, concerning the results of 
an examination, comparison or test performed by him in connection with a 
case which is the subject of a grand jury proceeding, may, when certified by 
such person as a report made by him or as a true copy thereof, be received 
in such grand jury proceeding as evidence of the facts stated therein. 
4. A written or oral statement, under oath, by a person attesting to one 
or more of the following matters may be presented to the grand jury as 
evidence of the facts stated therein: 
(a) that person's ownership of premises and of the putative de-
fendant's lack of license or privilege to enter or remain thereupon; 
(b) that person's ownership of, or possessory right in, property, 
the nature and monetary amount of any damage thereto and the puta-
tive defendant's lack of right to damage or tamper with the property; 
(c) that person's ownership of property, its value and the putative 
defendant's lack of superior or equal right to possession thereof; 
( d) that person's ownership of a vehicle and the absence of his 
consent to the putative defendant's taking, operating, exercising con-
trol over or using it; 
(e) that person's qualifications as a dealer or other expert in ap-
praising or evaluating a particular type of property, his expert opinion 
as to the value of a certain item or items or property of that type, and 
the basis for his opinion; 
(f) that person's identity as an ostensible maker or drafter of a 
written instrument and of its falsity. 
5. Nothing in subdivisions 2(b), 3, or 4 of this section shall be con-
strued to limit the power of the grand jury to cause any person to be called 
as a witness where the grand jurors entertain doubts about the v~lidity of 
said testimony. 
6. Whenever a court presiding at a jury trial would be required to in-
struct the jury with respect to the significance, legal effect or evaluation of 
evidence, the prosecutor, in an equivalent situation in a grand jury proceed-
ing, may so instruct the grand jury.3 
DRAFT STATUTE§ 101: MOTION TO DISMISS INDICTMENT ON 
GROUND OF INSUFFICIENCY OF GRAND JURY 
EVIDENCE4 
I. After arraignment upon an indictment, the court may upon motion 
3. Sections 3, 4, and 6 were taken from N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW§ 190.30 (McKinney Supp. 
1979). See note 525 supra. 
4. Many states, including some that require the grand jury to consider only legally 
admissible evidence, refuse to examine the quality, sufficiency, or competency of the evidence 
underlying the indictment. See 1976 Hearings, supra note 43, at 723 n.50. In the minority of 
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of the defendant made [within 30 days] after the entry of a not guilty plea, 
dismiss such indictment or any count thereof upon the ground that the evi-
dence before the grand jury was not legally sufficient to establish the offense 
charged or any lesser included offense. 
2. The evidence presented to the grand jury is legally sufficient if, 
viewed in the light most favorable to the State, it would support a convic-
tion at trial.5 
3. In evaluating the legal sufficiency of the evidence presented to the 
grand jury, the court can only consider evidence which would be admissible 
at trial except for hearsay testimony admitted under § 100(a)(2)-(4). The 
fact that the grand jury considered evidence which would have been ex-
cluded at trial does not invalidate the indictment as long as the remaining 
competent evidence is legally sufficient to warrant a conviction at trial; ex-
cept in those cases where the nature, extent, and prejudicial effect of the 
incompetent evidence presented to the grand jury provides strong grounds 
for believing that the grand jury would not have indicted the defendant if it 
had only considered the legally admissible evidence presented to it. 
4. The validity of an order denying any motion made pursuant to this 
section is not reviewable upon an appeal from a judgment of conviction 
following trial based upon legally sufficient evidence.6 
DRAFT STATUTE§ 102: PROSECUTOR'S DUTY TO DISCLOSE 
EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE TO THE GRAND JURY7 
1. If the prosecutor is aware of exculpatory evidence which, if be-
lieved, negates one of the material elements of the crime, he must disclose8 
jurisdictions (Alaska, California, Minnesota, Nevada, and New York) that permit courts to 
quash indictments based on insufficient evidence, the grand jury's consideration of 
incompetent as well as competent evidence will not automatically invalidate the indictment, 
See 1976 Hearings, supra note 43, at 724 & n.54. 
Judicial review of the legal sufficiency of the evidence underlying the indictment is only 
necessary where the jurisdiction does not use its preliminary hearing to screen legal guilt. 
Thus, to avoid duplicated screening, the defendant's election to receive a preliminary hearing 
which screens legal guilt should automatically waive his right to grand jury screening. In those 
jurisdictions where indictment is a jurisdictional requirement that cannot be waived, the 
defendant's election to receive a preliminary hearing that screens legal guilt should waive his 
right to judicial review under this statute. See note 358 supra. 
5. While a majority of states do not identify an evidentiary standard to measure probable 
cause to indict, a substantial minority require that the evidence would support a conviction at 
trial if unexplained or uncontradicted. See ARK. STAT. ANN, § 43-920 (1977); CAL, PENAL 
CODE§ 939.8 (West 1970); IDAHO CODE§ 19-1107 (1979); IOWA CODE ANN.§ 813.2, Rule 4(3) 
(1979); ALAsKA R. CRIM. P. 6(9) (Supp. 1966). See also 1976 Hearings, supra note 43, at 724 
n.55. 
6. See notes 517 & 521 supra. 
7. A number of states have statutes like CAL. PENAL CODE§ 939.7 (West 1970), see text at 
notes 473-86 supra, which advise the grand jury to consider any evidence that would explain 
away the charge. See 1976 Hearings, supra note 43, at 722 n.45. New Mexico has recently 
amended its statute to impose a mandatory duty on the prosecutor to present exculpatory 
evidence "that directly negates the guilt of the target where [the prosecutor] is aware of such 
evidence." N.M. STAT. ANN.§ 31-6-11 (Supp. 1979). 
8. My original proposal in this subsection contained a stronger requirement that the 
prosecutor present the grand jury with exculpatory evidence that, if believed, "negates one of 
the material elements of the crime or seriously undermines the credibility of a prosecution 
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and, if feasible, present such evidence to the grand jury. _ 
2. If the prosecutor is aware of exculpatory evidence which bears upon 
a possible affirmative defense that, if believed, raises a reasonable doubt 
about the defendant's guilt, he should alert the grand jury to its existence 
and inform them of their right to call for such evidence. 
3. After arraignment upon an indictment, the court, upon motion of 
the defendant made [within 30 days] after the entry of a not guilty plea, 
must dismiss any indictment where the prosecutor failed to disclose excul-
patory evidence of the type defined in section 1. The court should not dis-
miss an indictment because of the prosecutor's failure to disclose 
exculpatory evidence of the type defined in section 2 unless the court deter-
mines that such omitted exculpatory evidence was so compelling that it;L-
dictment by the grand jury was not justified upon the evidence presented. 
DRAFT STATUTE § 103: DISCLOSURE OF GRAND JURY 
TRANSCRIPT TO AN INDICTED DEFENDANT9 
1. A reasonable time prior to trial, and after the return of an indict-
ment or the filing of an information, a defendant shall, upon request and 
under such conditions and limitations as the court deems reasonable, be 
entitled to examine and when appropriate and necessary copy a transcript 
or electronic recording of: 
(a) the grand jury testimony of all witnesses to be called at trial; 
(b) all statements to the grand jury by the court and the attorney 
for the Government relating to the defendant's case; 
(c) all grand jury testimony or evidence which in any matter 
could be considered exculpatory, and 
(d) all other grand jury testimony or evidence which the court 
may deem material to the defense. 
2. Upon a showing of good cause, the court may, at any time, order 
that the disclosure of the recorded proceedings of a grand jury be denied, 
restricted or deferred, or make such other order as is appropriate. Upon 
motion by the govemn;ient, the court shall permit the government to make 
such showing, in whole or in part, in the form of a written statement to be 
inspected by the judge alone. If the court enters an order granting relief 
following such a showing, the entire text of the party's statement shall be 
sealed and preserved in the records of the court to be made available to the 
witness whose testimony is necessary to support a conviction." The Grand Jury Committee 
eliminated the credibility segment of this provision. 
9. There is a growing movement in the states to liberalize pretrial discovery procedures. 
See VT. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(l) (requiring disclosure of all witnesses known to the prosecution 
and access to their statements, whether or not the witnesses are to be used at trial); FLA. R. 
CRIM. P. § 3.220 (3.220(d) permits the defendant to take "the disposition upon oral 
examination of any person who may have information relevant to the offense charged"). This 
movement has prompted some state courts and legislatures to provide the indicted defendant 
with far greater access to the grand jury's transcript than that provided formally by the federal 
system. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE§ 938.1 (West 1979) (automatic disclosure of transcript to 
indicted defendant); NEV. REv. STAT.§ 172.225 (1975); N.D. CENT. CODE§ 29-10.1-38 (1974) 
(if an indicted defendant's petition for transcript of grand jury proceeding is denied, the 
defendant has a right to a preliminary examination); MINN. R. CRIM. P. 18.05(2); VT. R. CRIM. 
P. 16(a)(2)(B). 
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appellate court in the event of an appeal by the defendant. 10 
DRAFT STATUTE § 201: RIGHTS OF GRAND JURY WITNESSES 
A. Counsel: 
(1) Every witness subpoenaed to appear and testify before a grand 
jury or to produce books, papers, documents, or other objects 
before such grand jury shall be entitled to the assistance of coun-
sel, including assistance during such time as the witness is ques-
tioned in presence of the grand jury. Such counsel may be 
retained by the witness or shall be appointed in the case of any 
person financially unable to obtain legal representation. 
(2) Counsel shall be allowed to be present in the grand jury room 
only during the questioning of the witness and shall be allowed to 
advise the witness. Such counsel shall not be permitted to address 
the grand jurors, raise objections, make arguments, or otherwise 
disrupt proceedings before the grand jury. Counsel is authorized 
to disclose matters which occur before the grand jury to the same 
extent as is permitted to the client. 
(3) If the court determines that counsel for a grand jury witness has 
violated Subsection (2), then the court may take such measures as 
are necessary to ensure compliance with this rule. 
DRAFT STATUTE § 202: RIGHTS OF THE TARGET OF A GRAND 
JURY lNVESTIGATIONll 
Except as hereinafter provided, the prosecutor shall advise a target of 
the grand jury either personally, through counsel, or by mail at his last 
known address that: 
(1) he is a target of the grand jury investigation; 
(2) he shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to testify before the 
grand jury, provided he signs a waiver of immunity; and 
(3) he has the right to present the prosecutor with exculpatory evi-
dence; including the names and addresses of witnesses who pos-
sess exculpatory information. 
Such notice need not be given if the prosecutor is unable with reason-
able diligence to notify said person, or if on representation of the prosecu-
tor, the court in camera concludes that there are reasonable grounds to 
believe that to give such notice would create an undue risk of danger to 
other persons, flight of the target, or other obstruction of justice. Absent 
these circumstances justifying a failure to give notice, an indictment that 
issues without the notice required by this provision shall be dismissed. 
The Grand Jury Committee's acceptance of these proposals does 
not constitute official American Bar Association approval. The 
Committee must first complete a comprehensive Model Grand Jury 
IO. This proposal was taken verbatim from H.R. 94, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 33~4(c), (d) 
(1977), reprinted in 1977 Hearings, pt. 2, supra note 108, at 990-91. 
11. Professor George Pugh drafted this proposal. 
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Act and then the entire Act must be accepted by the Criminal Justice 
Section's Council before it can be presented to the American Bar 
Association's House of Delegates for final approval. 
